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1

INTERNALISMS AND EXTERNALISMS IN METAETHICS: A VARIETY OF CONCEPTS

100%
Janikowski W.
Etyka (Ethics)
|
2007
|
issue 40
130-143
EN
In the article the author defines basic concepts used in contemporary metaethics under terms 'internalism' and 'externalism'. He points out that these terms denote very different theses depending on various contexts. It happens that one thesis labeled as (ethical) 'internalism' is substantively very close to other labeled as (ethical) 'externalism', and vice versa. Therefore we should define each claim precisely. He has done this specifying following 'internalisms/externalisms' in metaethics: 1) practical rationality i./e.; 2) content i./e.; 3) judgment i./e.; 4) appraisal i./e.; 5) mixed and undetermined i./e.; 6) acceptance i./e.; 7) knowledgeability i./e. The author proposes this classification as most comprehensive (to his knowledge) and useful in explicating the diversity of positions. It is also showing some important affinities between some of them.
2

SELECTED METAETHICAL ASPECTS OF PHILIPPA FOOT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY

80%
Chabada M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2023
|
vol. 78
|
issue 1
1 – 13
EN
There are two main positions in metaethical discussions. The first, cognitivist, position is that moral evaluations may be true or untrue, and the second, internalist, position is that these evaluations guide actions such that the agent is internally motivated to act based on the content of that evaluation. These two positions conflict. Cognitivism has to deal with the problem of moral motivation, and internalism has to explain the relevance of moral evaluations. In this article we will explore the moral philosophy of Philippa Foot as presented in her Natural Goodness. Our aim is to reconstruct and explain Foot’s arguments in favour of cognitivist and externalist views. Hence the final part proffers a summary of the metaethical aspects of Foot’s moral philosophy, and thereby highlights both the originality and contribution it makes to contemporary ethical thinking, and sketches a constructivist interpretation of Foot’s moral philosophy that emphasises the function of practical reason in constituting moral normativity.
3

VALUE AND SCALE: SOME OBSERVATIONS AND A PROPOSAL

80%
Soria-Ruiz A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2021
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vol. 28
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issue 3
596 – 625
EN
In this paper, I investigate the scalar semantics of evaluative adjective in general and of good in particular. Lassiter (2017) has argued that good, when taking propositions as arguments, has an interval scale. I argue that there’s evidence in support of the view that good, when taking individuals as an argument, has a scale that is stronger than interval, but weaker than ratio. In particular, I propose that individual-level good has a “round” ratio scale, which allows a broader set of ratio transformations than standard ratio scales. This conclusion is consistent with the fact that good admits round ratio modifiers (twice as good), but eschews precise ones (# 1.38x as good). An important consequence of this view is that the scales of individual and propositional-level good are severed.
4
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Vzájemné uzásadnění ontologie a etiky

80%
Říha K.
Studia theologica
|
2005
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vol. 7
|
issue 1
30-40
EN
Metaphysics and Ethics as natural dispositions of the human being are - in a mutually opposite way - the expression of the transcendentality of human spirit. The transcendentality is, as such, not comprehendible by our conceptions. It can be demonstrated as unavoidable only by an indirect and negative argument, in that it is necessarily presupposed in each attempt of contesting it. But from this argument cannot be deducted any content of Metaphysics and Ethics. When we attempt a positive argument by the reflection of self-awareness or by the necessity of self-assertion, we fall in an endless regress. According to Kant, Ethics is grounded in the 'pure fact of reason'. But any fact itself requires a ground. Metaphysics cannot yield this ground, according to Hume's 'razor'. On the other hand, Metaphysics cannot be founded in Ethics, as Levinas thinks, for the relation to the 'face' of an Other has no theoretical evidence. Ethics as universally obligatory is nevertheless bounded on the principle of non-contradiction of thinking, and the principle of non-contradiction can be justified only by the ethical duty to participate in the dialogue concerning the existence of truth. This mutual necessity refers to the mutual foundation of Metaphysics and Ethics. In this mutual foundation of the unconditioned principles there is the 'utopian place' of the absolute truth of Metaphysics and the absolute validity of Ethics.
5
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THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS AND UTILITARIANISM. A REPLY TO WLODEK RABINOWICZ'S PREFERENCE UTILITARIANISM BY WAY OF PREFERENCE CHANGE? (Eksperymenty myslowe a utylitaryzm. Odpowiedz na artykul Wlodka Rabinowicza)

70%
Saja K.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2010
|
issue 12
39-60
EN
This article is a comment on Wlodek Rabinowicz Utilitarianism by Way of Preference Change?, in which I defend Richard Hare's argument for utilitarianism. I argue that Hare's role reversal thought experiments can, despite of Rabinowicz's criticism, lead to transforming interpersonal preference conflicts into intrapersonal ones, but, in order to achieve this, we need to interpret his thought experiment correctly. I distinguish three interpretation of reversing roles experiment and argue, that for at least two of them, which de facto Hare endorse, Rabinowicz criticism fails.
6

JE ETIKA NÁSLEDKOM LOGICKEJ CHYBY?

70%
Mandzela M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2008
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vol. 63
|
issue 8
704-714
EN
The article deals with the question, if, taking the validity of Hume's thesis for granted, it is legitimate to deny the cognitive claim of ethics. The author draws on Wittgenstein's differentiating between using the ethical terms in their absolute and relative senses. Using these terms in a relative sense is applied to their ethical using. The author intention is to show, that using ethical terms in this way is not contradictory to Hume's thesis. If ethics avoided using its terms in their absolute senses, the validity of Hume's thesis would not imply the rejection of its cognitive claim.
7

JAZYK A METÓDA METAFILOZOFIE

61%
Mikušiak M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
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vol. 72
|
issue 4
312 – 324
EN
The article deals primarily with the Wittgensteinian contributions to metaphilosophy as rendered in the book Metaphilosophical investigations (T. Čana – D. Kamhal – R. Maco 2015). It focuses on the language and methods of the metaphilosophical elucidations and, in some cases, puts these elucidations under criticism for an incorrect usage of the key concepts. Critical remarks are also made with regard to the methodological maxims that require simplicity and transparency of philosophizing. In addition, the article offers some alternative solutions to the problems at issue. These solutions are above all metalinguistic recommendations and intended as contributions to therapeutic philosophy.
8
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EXPRESSIVISM AND THE NATURALIZATION OF THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS: ON THE FRUITFULNESS OF EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE IN METAETHICS (Naturalizacja jezyka etycznego w ramach ekspresywizmu, czyli o owocnosci perspektywy ewolucjonistycznej w metaetyce)

51%
Kuzniar A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2010
|
issue 12
91-105
EN
Descriptivists' method of naturalizing moral language is neither the only nor the most promising one in metaethics. The paper deals with attempts to combine the expressivistic account of moral concepts with an evolutionary research programme. As Allan Gibbard (1990, p. 70) puts it: 'Normative discussion is part of nature but it does not describe nature'. First, Gibbard's expressivism is outlined against the background of the theory of evolution. Then the Author proceeds to his own metaethical theory according to which, to take but one example, the judgment that 'a' is morally wrong consists of a belief that it is possible to avoid a, a belief that there is a universal property 'P' which 'a' exemplifies, a desire not to actualize 'a', a disposition (1) to desire not to actualize anything that instantiates the property 'P', and a disposition (2) to desire to subject everyone who does 'a' to coercive measures (including punishment). Language thus interpreted is shown to be an opposite tool for negotiating a stable normative consensus; it addresses specific problems of cooperation viewed from the evolutionary perspective. Finally, it is argued that the Author's proposal exhibits some important advantages over Gibbard's theory.
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