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1

ARE POSSIBLE WORLDS POSSIBLE ?

100%
Hess L.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2008
|
vol. 36
|
issue 1
49-67
EN
David Lewis' modal realism is, in the author's opinion, one of the simplest and most useful theories of possible worlds. Nevertheless, it is not free of serious problems. In particular, important arguments against it have been endorsed by Forrest, Armstrong, and King. The answers to these arguments that were proposed either by Lewis himself or by other philosophers are not entirely satisfactory. Therefore, the aim of the present paper is to find better solutions. To provide them, an 'extension' of genuine modal realism is proposed. The crux of the 'extension' is to introduce higher-level modal operators, which can be used to incorporate into the theory provisos that make it possible to solve the apparent problems indicated by Forrest, Armstrong, and King. A semantical analysis of these 'meta-modalities' requires us to accept the existence of higher-level possible worlds. Apparently, this is in contradiction with one of the fundamental theses of Lewis' modal realism: all possible worlds are of the same kind as ours. But this is not so: higher-level possible worlds are just sets of zero-level worlds; ergo, there is no reason for not being able to talk about them.
2

IMPOSSIBILISTS’S PARADISE ON THE CHEAP?

80%
Vacek M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue 3
283 – 301
EN
The aim of the paper is to discuss the ersatz theory of Lewis’s impossible worlds, point out its undeniable benefits and demonstrate its costs. Firstly, the author presents two approaches to Lewis’s impossible worlds taken as constructions out of possibilia. Secondly, he evaluates the proposals using the Lewisian criteria of success concerning the well-defined conception of analysis. Although appealing, he does not find the proposals fully persuasive. Thirdly, the author discusses the objection from an ad hoc distinction between possible and impossible worlds. He concludes that the objection does not present a special problem for the Lewisian theory. Finally, he motivates a theory of extended modal realism, to wit, modal realism enriched with concrete impossibilia.
3

CONCRETE IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS

80%
Vacek M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
|
vol. 68
|
issue 6
523 – 529
EN
The paper deals with such a modification of genuine modal realism as to accommodate impossible worlds into its ontology. First of all, the theory of modal realism is presented. Next, several motivations for the acceptance of impossible worlds are adduced. Further, Lewis’s argument against impossible worlds is presented. It is argued that the argument can be weakened by rejection of one of its premises. Finally, two objections against the proposal are countered. Although my strategy accounts for the Opinion concerning the impossible, it allegedly violates another Opinion which conceives the reality classical. It seems, however, that there is no no-question-begging reason to think that reality is classical. How can we know, after all, which logic describes reality? Without a definite answer to the question, the incredibility objection then simply collapses into a statement of a possibility dogma.
4

PERIPETIE MODÁLNEHO REALIZMU

80%
Andreanský E.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2009
|
vol. 64
|
issue 6
535-544
EN
There are several difficulties in understanding the concept of modal realism in our philosophical context. The author shows various types of modal realism as a theory. The analyses of the main theories of modal world and modal individuals show the problems of identity and identification as the fundamental questions. One of the key problems is the place of individuals in modal world.
5

Critical Remarks about Modal Realism of David Lewis

80%
Filipczyk H.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2008
|
vol. 17
|
issue 2(66)
193-210
EN
David Lewis believes that possible worlds are spatiotemporal entities, maximal and causally isolated. They exist in the very same sense as 'our' world does. The article critically discusses his 'extreme modal realism', propounded mainly in his book 'On the Plurality of Worlds'. Having outlined the main features of this doctrine, the authoress raises several objections to it. 'Modal realism' is neither modal nor realistic. First, contrary to what Lewis declares, his theory does not analyze modality in terms of more basis entities in a theoretically defensible way. Secondly, it contains incredible existential claims whose ludicrousness is not justified by the presumed theoretical benefits it offers (in particular, by its 'economy'). Finally, it assumes that 'anything can co-exist with anything else'. This postulation, however, is controversial: it is implausible and it deprives the theory of possible worlds of its foremost motivation. Moreover it is at variance with ontological rationality. In sum, the doctrine in question, though designed with care and courage, sounds unconvincing.
6

Everett's Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics in the Light of Everett's Modal Realism and Kripke's Semantics

70%
Kus K., Kus M.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2008
|
vol. 17
|
issue 2(66)
109-125
EN
The paper analyzes Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics in which every quantum measurement process results in a splitting of the actual world into a family of possible worlds. These worlds differ depending on the results of the measurement - in each of the worlds one of the possible particular outcomes takes place. The authors pose and discuss two problems: (i) to what extent can the measurement-created worlds be identified with the possible worlds of Lewis', and (ii) which system of modal logic is modeled by Everett's worlds. In contrast with Lewis' worlds, whose existence is limited only by consistency, Everett's universes are conditioned by past measurements. Moreover, they are 'genetically' interconnected by the fact that new worlds stem from their predecessors in which a particular measurement was performed. The type of modal logic that can describe the modalities in Everett's interpretation depends on the way in which we implement our intuitions concerning 'possibility' - as something that concerns the totality of possible situations in which we could have been now, if a particular sequence of measurements had taken place in the past - or, in a more temporal spirit, as a question about possible worlds in which we can find ourselves in the future.
7

CROSS-WORLD COMPARATIVES FOR MODAL REALISTS

61%
Michels R.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2018
|
vol. 25
|
issue 3
368 – 391
EN
Divers (2014) argues that a Lewisian theory of modality which includes both counterpart theory and modal realism cannot account for the truth of certain intuitively true modal sentences involving cross-world comparatives. The main purpose of this paper is to defend the Lewisian theory against Divers’s challenge by developing a response strategy based on a degree-theoretic treatment of comparatives and by showing that this treatment is compatible with the theory.
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