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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 4
335 – 346
EN
The paper deals with von Mises’ metaphysics and argues that his methodological dualism concerns only his epistemology. The framework of Mises´s ontology is materialistic monism. Although Mises strongly criticizes materialism, his critique does not concern metaphysical ontological materialism as long as it does not try to eliminate the specific method of the social sciences. In this sense Mises’ metaphysics is fully naturalistic – it does not include any “spiritual” agents and postulates a world consisting exclusively of elementary physical particles. The study illustrates this point on Mises’ determinism and his rejection of the free will as well as on his Darwinian account of the evolution of human mind. The specific method of the social sciences which makes use of the category of finality serves merely as an efficient heuristics and is based on a pragmatic view of science. It allows us to describe the irreducible complexity of social phenomena that cannot (at least not yet) be grasped by the physical vocabulary alone. Thus the argument of complexity is seen as a cornerstone of Misesian methodological dualism.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2012
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vol. 40
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issue 1
167 - 189
EN
The paper is an attempt to reconstruct the main assumptions of the doctrine of absolute monism. I begin with a consideration of the various meanings of the internal relation that was the core of the controversy between logical atomism and neo-Hegelianism. I try to show that, contrary to Russell's thesis, the presupposition that all relations are internal does not directly result in the doctrine of absolute monism. Whitehead's process metaphysics serves as an illustration here. Whitehead holds that all relations are internal and argues, surprisingly to some extent, that only in this way can we avoid monistic consequences. Hence I show that to embrace absolute monism one needs to have additional assumptions. As result we get the three basic assumptions of the doctrine under consideration: to exist in the most fundamental sense is to be independent of anything whatsoever; all relations are internal; every entity is related to every other entity. Additionally there can be at least two versions of absolute monism: procesualistic and substantialistic, depending on whether we accept another assumption, namely, that the fundamental structure of reality consists in substance with its predicates.
EN
At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries the reception of the theory of evolution was a popular issue discussed in the scientific community of Poland. The revolutionary Darwin's theory as well as the great number of misunderstandings and controversies growing up around it have contributed to increase of scientist's interest in this subject. Ludwik Zychlinski who was not a professional philosopher but was interested in issues connected with theory of evolution took part in the debate. In my paper I present Zychlinski's critical remarks concerning the German philosophers' (E.Heackel and his followers) outlooks. These remarks reveal that the materialistic interpretation of the theory of evolution is not justified. A particular emphasis was placed on the fact of the abuse of Darwin's theory for defending a materialistic outlook.
EN
The puzzle of material constitution can be expressed in at least two ways. First, how can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are materially and spatially coincident, be regarded as different objects? Second, how can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are qualitatively distinct, be regarded as identical objects? Monists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are identical since they are materially and spatially coincident and the property differences between then are simply differences in description, perspective or context. In contrast, pluralists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are not identical even if they are materially and spatially coincident since they are qualitatively distinct. This paper proposes a solution to the puzzle of material constitution called ‘Fregean Monism’ (FM), and shows that it can better account for the property differences between the constituting and constituted objects without the need to regard them as two distinct objects. On the FM view, the puzzle of material constitution is partly a semantic puzzle and partly a metaphysical puzzle, and shows how a solution to the semantic part of the puzzle, based on the Fregean distinction between sense and reference, can yield a satisfactory solution to the metaphysical part of the puzzle. The key idea is that while the reference of a term picks out both the referent object and referent properties, the sense of the term determine which referent properties are picked out.
EN
The present paper brings up issues of the relationships between the evolutionary theory and religion in Jena University in the second part of the 19th century. Differences between original Darwinian evolutionary theory and philosophical interpretations of this theory are reported. As an example, the dispute between biologist and philosophical monist Ernst Haeckel and theologian Bernhard Puenjer is recounted. A point of departure for this dispute - the lecture Uber das Verhaltniss des Darwinismus zu Religion und Sittlichkeit - is summarized and commented.
EN
The leading idea of the article is defined by a quotation from Fichte concerning the opposition between idealism and 'dogmatism', or naturalism. That opposition is interpreted as a result of two alternative 'reductions of consciousness': according to the first, or the idealistic one, it is possible to reduce the world to consciousness (or to its 'constituted correlate', to a pure phenomenon), while according to the second, the naturalistic one, it is possible to reduce consciousness to the world conceived as a material whole of particles and physical laws. The logics of the idealistic reduction is developed on the example of Husserlian 'pure phenomenology'; this of the naturalistic one is illustrated by the proposals of Paul Churchland and John Searle. The reconstruction of the two alternative modes of reductions aims at revealing their symmetry and, also, the insufficiency of either of them. In the last paragraph, the possibility of a 'third way' between idealism and naturalism is briefly examined (on the examples of several, both classical and contemporary, 'continental' and 'analytical' ideas), but the conclusions are skeptical.
Filo-Sofija
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2009
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vol. 9
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issue 9
99-113
EN
This paper presents the critical theory of Rudolf Steiner’s cognition. His early philosophical works were inspired by Kant’s philosophy. At that time, he attempted to find a synthesis between the sensory world and the mental/spiritual one. Steiner’s early thought represented the epistemological position characteristic of Kantian bio-philosophy. It was an influential current of gnoseology in the 19th-century. The author presents main notions of Steiner’s philosophical positions such as: perceiving, image, feeling and thinking.
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