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MODEL OF THE NUMBER OF LOSSES IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE - EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH PANEL DATA FROM POLISH MARKET

100%
Witkowski B.
Roczniki Kolegium Analiz Ekonomicznych
|
2008
|
vol. 18
147-164
EN
The aim of the article is to discuss a model used to determine the number of losses in automobile insurance. The model is based on panel data. Although the aim is to model the number of losses, due to hunger for bonus not all the losses are revealed. Thus the data on the number and also the value of claims are used. Common use of these two types of data enables estimation of the true number of losses that occur (not just those that are claimed). This is done with the use of true data from the Polish market. The discussion of particular factors that influence the severity of losses (moral hazard, hunger for bonus, observed and unobserved characteristics of the insured) is included.
2

PROBLEM OF NATURAL MONOPOLY REGULATION WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION - THEORETICAL APPROACH

100%
Szablewski A.
Studia Ekonomiczne (Economic Studies)
|
2008
|
issue 3-4(58-59)
223-239
EN
The paper discusses the nature and implications of asymmetry of information in natural monopoly regulation from the theoretical perspective. To reflect the complexity of the subject two main strands of the discussion are presented. The first one that dominates within the theoretical approach is founded on defining two dimensions of the asymmetry which is a situation when the regulator is much less informed on costs than the regulated firm managers. The dimensions are described in the regulatory literature as 'regulation with unknown costs' and 'regulation with unobservable effect'. Both have very serious regulatory implications known as adverse selection and moral hazard which in turn reflect the key regulatory problem i.e. the conflict between allocative and productive efficiency. Existence of trade-offs between different aspects of efficiency means that the optimal regulatory mechanism ( but only in a second best sense) lies between two polar regulatory mechanisms - the traditional cost of service regulation and fixed price, or price cup, regulation. The second strand of discussion is based on Austrian school of economics and it sees the asymmetry of information as only one side of the regulator's imperfect information problem. The other side refers to the inherent indeterminacy of the economic processes that unable regulator and the managers to predict costs accurately. Giving priority to long term interests of consumers, price cup regulation should be taken by regulators as a key option.
3
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Wlasny interes menedzerów wyzszego szczebla w fuzjach i przejeciach: rzeczywiste i deklarowane oddzialywanie i skutki w postaci zagrozen moralnych

72%
Lewis A., Routhieaux R. L.
Zarządzanie Zasobami Ludzkimi
|
2011
|
issue 6(83)
49-61
PL
Niniejszy artykuł bada proces fuzji i  przejęć w  zakresie przywództwa, podejmowania decyzji i  zagrożenia moralnego. W szczególności badamy role i  zamiary menedżerów wyższego szczebla w  fuzjach i  przejęciach, opierając się na teoriach przywództwa, a  następnie wykorzystujemy te koncepcyjne ramy odniesienia w  celu oceny oddziaływania fuzji i  przejęć na zasoby ludzkie. Istniejąca literatura sugeruje brak połączenia pomiędzy wyznawanymi wartościami i  zasadami przeprowadzania fuzji i  przejęć a  rzeczywistym oddziaływaniem takich transakcji. W szczególności występuje często wyraźny rozdźwięk pomiędzy oświadczeniami przed dokonaniem fuzji lub przejęcia a  rzeczywistą sytuacją po dokonaniu transakcji, jeżeli chodzi o  rentowność, wpływ na zasoby ludzkie, skutki w  zakresie udziału w  rynku oraz zmiany układu w  branży. W dalszej części artykułu przedstawiamy analizę dwóch dużych fuzji i  przejęć w  dwóch różnych branżach, aby zilustrować powyższe kwestie. Badamy również zagrożenia moralne i  pułapki decyzyjne związane z  fuzjami i  przejęciami pod kątem korzyści dla udziałowców i  dla konsumentów, a  także pakietów wynagrodzeń kierownictwa wyższego szczebla.
EN
This paper examines the process of mergers and acquisitions from the combined perspectives of leadership and decision-making/moral hazards. In particular, we examine the roles and intentions of senior managers in M&A activities based on leadership theories, and then use this framework in evaluating the human resource impacts of mergers and acquisitions. Existing literature suggests disconnects between the espoused values and guiding principles of mergers and acquisitions with the actual impacts of these deals. More specifically, there are often clear gaps between pronouncements prior to M&A transactions and the subsequent reality in terms of financial returns, human resource impacts, market share effects, and industry realignment. This paper then applies this conceptual framework in reviewing two major M&A deals in differing industries. We also explore the moral hazard and decision traps of M&A transactions in regards to shareholder benefits, consumer benefits, and senior management compensation packages.
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