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Problematika mnichovské dohody a jejích politických reflexí v zrcadle komunistického tisku na příkladu Rudého práva 1948-1989

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Šebek J.
Český časopis historický (The Czech Historical Review)
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2012
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vol. 110
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issue 3-4
654-670
EN
The Munich Agreement represents one of the most fundamental events in modern Czech history. Because of the topic´s resonance amongst the public, it also became an important part of propaganda during the ensuing Communist regime. The political instrumentalization of the Munich events was utilised to provide ideological support and justification of both the internal and external political initiatives of Communist power. This study aims to analyse the ways and means of reflection of these historical events in Rudé právo as the principal press propaganda organ of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The manner in which the consequences of the Munich Agreement were reported in this daily paper represented one of the ideological constants on which the regime based its legitimacy. Its editorials stereotypically assessed the consequences and causes of the Munich Agreement as evidence of the inability of the non-Communist parties to defend the independence and sovereignty of the state and to justify the alliance with the Soviet Union. Yet, understandably, external circumstances changed throughout the forty year existence of Communist supremacy during which constant reminders of 1938 Munich were invoked. The culmination of these propaganda efforts is particularly evident in the 1950s and in the first half of the 1960s. However, the year 1968 is another important milestone, when, after the August invasion, Rudé právo attempted to restore the positive image of the Soviet Union through the pro-regime interpretations of the Munich trauma. Following the conclusion of the December 1973 Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, which also addressed the disputed issues concerning the interpretation of the Munich Agreement, propaganda aspects did somewhat retreat into the background and Rudé právo and other Communist mass media devoted themselves primarily to the historical contexts of this event, although intentional reflections on the Munich of 1938 continued to be used for propaganda purposes, also.
2

THE POLICY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT AIMED AT NEUTRALIZING THE GERMAN THREAT DURING 1935 – 1938 WITH A FOCUS ON THE SITUATION IN SLOVAKIA

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Olejník M.
Človek a spoločnosť. Internetový časopis pre pôvodné teoretické a výskumné štúdie z oblasti spoločenských vied
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2018
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vol. 21
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issue 3
1 – 24
EN
The second half of 1930s was a period of dramatic political changes in Europe. The stability established by peace agreements concluded after World War I underwent gradual but continual erosion. The main reason for the transforming political landscape was the political developments in Germany which resulted in the collapse of the democratic parliamentary system. In the spring of 1933 The Nazi Party assumed power in Germany and over the span of a few years succeeded in remaking Germany into a totalitarian state. In the context of Hitler´s political aims, the growing economic and military power of Germany constituted a clear threat to Central European states. The Czechoslovak government concluded that it had to apply all possible means to reinforce the defense ability of the state, and consequently a policy of rapid fortification on the border with Germany was initiated. The Czechoslovaks hoped that the Western powers (namely France, who had a defense treaty with the CSR and had on numerous occasions professed a determination to come to Czechoslovak defense in case of German aggression) would fulfill its obligation. Chamberlain, in an attempt to find accommodation with Hitler, arranged a conference with the French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier, the Italian leader Mussolini and Hitler. Despite the fact that the fate of Czechoslovakia was about to be decided, no representative of the Czechoslovak Republic was invited. The signatories of the conference accepted Germany’s demands. This paper maps the steps taken by the Czechoslovak government to implement measures aimed at protecting the Republic against German aggression.
3
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Sir Frederick Leith-Ross a jednání o pomnichovské půjčce Česko-Slovensku

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Kuklik J., Nemecek J.
Moderní dějiny: sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století (Modern History: Studies into 19th and 20th century history)
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2011
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vol. 19
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issue 1
123-156
EN
The Munich Agreement hit the Czechoslovak state very hard. Its economic consequences were expected to be partly solved by a financial loan granted by two of its signatories, France and Great Britain. Sir Frederick Leith Ross as Chief Economic Advisor to the British Government played a very important role in the negotiations. The loan ought to solve both the question of economic reconstruction of Czechoslovakia after the cession of industrially developed regions and the interruption of transportation ways, and that of financial aid to the refugees from Czechoslovakia. The talks between the Czechoslovak and British government delegations started in mid-October 1938 and their first material result was an advance of 10 million pounds granted by the British party to the National Bank of Czechoslovakia. After further difficult negotiations about the loan a three-party agreement between Great Britain, France and Czecho-Slovakia on funds to be granted to Czecho-Slovakia was signed on 27th January, 1939, according to which a total loan of 12 million pounds was agreed, out of which 4 million pounds constituted a special gift to support the refugees and the remaining 8 million pounds were primarily intended to create the conditions needed to accommodate the refugees from ceded regions. Unfortunately, the German aggression against Czecho-Slovakia of March, 1939 made it impossible to make full use of the loan.
4

OBYVATEĽSTVO A PRIEMYSEL NA SLOVENSKU V ROKU 1938

88%
Vanek P.
Populačné štúdie Slovenska
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2022
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vol. 15
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issue 2
81 - 89
EN
The paper’s main goal is to analyse the impact of the Munich Agreement, the Vienna Award, and the Polish territorial claim on Slovakia in 1938. After November 1938, many factories, power plants, millions of inhabitants, and even whole regions of Czechoslovakia remained in a territory that Hungary, Germany, or Poland occupied. The paper focuses on losses in three key areas: population, territory, and industry. This research is primarily based on the study of contemporary statistical reports in combination with archive materials that are placed in the National Archive in Prague and in the Slovak National Archive in Bratislava. In conclusion, it can be stated that the change of borders in 1938 had a negative impact on Slovakia and on the whole state. A new border meant a radical intervention in the republic’s economy, ethnic composition, and territorial integrity. As a result, the republic lost around 30 % of its territory, on which approximately a third of the population lived.
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