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Human Affairs
|
2012
|
vol. 22
|
issue 2
161-177
EN
Alexius Meinong advocated a bold new theory of nonexistent objects, where we could gain knowledge and assert true claims of things that did not exist. While the theory has merit in interpreting sentences and solving puzzles, it unfortunately paves the way for contradictions. As Bertrand Russell argued, impossible objects, such as the round square, would have conflicting properties. Meinong and his proponents had a solution to that charge, posing genuine and non-genuine versions of the Law of Non-Contradiction. No doubt, they had a clever response, but it may not adequately address Russell’s concern. Moreover, as I argue, genuine contradictions are inherent to the set of all nonexistent objects. And such contradictions lead to even further absurdities, for example, that nonexistent objects have and lack every property. Unfortunately, such implications of the theory make it too treacherous to adopt.
PL
Artykuł omawia system logiki meinongowskiej T. Parsonsa zbudowany z myślą o analizach przedmiotów fikcyjnych. System Parsonsa był pierwszym systemem formalnym tego rodzaju i wytyczył kierunek badań formalnych nad problemami fikcji. Przedstawione zostają główne założenia filozoficzne logik meinogowskich m.in. teza intencjonalności Brentana, Annahmen Thesis Meinonga, prawo identyczności Leibniza-Meinoga i in. Następnie zostają omówione podstawy systemu T. Parsona – jego syntaktyka i semantyka. W dalszej kolejności dokonuje się krytycznej analizy tego systemu. Najbardziej kontrowersyjna jest kwestia podziału własności na nuklearne i ekstranuklearne. Dyskutowany też jest status przedmiotów fikcyjnych w teorii Parsonsa. Ostatecznie dochodzimy do stwierdzenia, że podstawową zaletą systemu jest właśnie jego nowatorstwo.
EN
This paper presents T. Parsons’ system of Meinongian logic, designed for the analysis of fictional objects. It was the first formal Meinongian system, and it directs formal inquiries concerning the problematic of fiction. The argument points out the main philosophical assumptions of Meinongian logics, including Brentano’s thesis of intentionality, Meinong’s Annahmen Thesis and Leibniz-Meinong’s law of identity. Subsequently, the syntax and semantics of Parsons’ system are presented. What follows is a critical analysis of the system, highlighting its most controversial point, the division of properties into nuclear and extranuclear. Status of fictional objects is also discussed. The conclusion is that the main advantage of Parsons’ system is its innovativeness.
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