The article deals with the basics of metaphysics of the German theologian Karl Rahner, as it developed in his key works Geist in Welt and Hörer des Wortes. In both cases, the article pertains to the second edition of both works, which are revised and supplemented. The starting point for the philosophical thinking of Karl Rahner can be seen in four philosophical streams: the classical scholasticism of St. Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant’s transcendental reflection, the intellectual dynamism of Joseph Maréchal and the existential philosophy of Martin Heidegger. More specifically, the scope of the article is to explore the question that is the fundamental basis of Rahner’s metaphysics. The question has two sides: the interrogativeness (which demonstrates the original unity of knowledge and being) and the disputableness (doubtfulness, alienation of being by the matter). Finally, the article raises certain objections to Rahner’s metaphysical starting point. The main objection to the subjectivism can be seen as having been overcome in Rahner’s theology of the symbol.
The word “ontology” has no meaning outside the context in which it was created. When it was invented, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the word 'metaphysics' already existed. So the creation of “ontology” had to express a distance with respect to tradition. “Metaphysics” had its roots in Aristotle and his search, his impossible search, for a first principle. This project is taken up again by “ontology” but this time by limiting the Aristotelian intention to the area of univocal formality, while Aristotle had situated himself within the order of dialectical investigation. Current phenomenology tries to re-actualize the Aristotelian intention by emphasizing ontological difference and analogy, while analytic philosophy remains firmly within the tradition of modern ontology.
The leap from primitive to scientific time represented as the “time” in “relativity physics,” or in “thermodynamics” or perhaps in “quantum physics” or even within “statistical mechanics” is large. Large also is the conceptual difference between these various understandings of the nature of time. How are we really to understand these physical perspectives on time: As knowledge about the real nature of time represented by the objective concepts: Or as epistemological-operational abstractions that cannot avoid elevating their results to the level of full-fledged reality, to ontology?
William of Auvergne (1180–1249) was one of the first wave professors of University in Paris to engage with Greek, Islamic and Jewish philosophical writings that had become available in Latin translation. He was the author of a vast work that he calls the Magisterium divinale (Teaching on God). De universo (On the Universe), written in the 1230s, is the most philosophical treatise of the Magisterium. One short part (I, 3, 25-26) of this treatise includes a very important philosophical topic – the problem of truth. Based on a doctrine of Avicenna, William formulated one of the forms of truth's classical definition. In his view, this definition express the essence of logical truth, which is constituted in any relation between human intellect and things, if intellect is adequate to his object. So the logical truth is a basis and property of true judgments and statements about all real things, and even about what really does not exist (things in the future, in the past, non-beings, negations), and – generally – about all the man can think or about everything possible to thinking. William rejects the doctrine of St. Augustine, who taught that every truth has its source in the First Truth identified with God the Creator of all things and intellects contingent. William argues that only actually existing things are real existing as caused by God. So only actually existing things can be substrates of truth and so subjects of true judgments and statements. The Creator doesn't cause things as existing in the past, in the future, but as existing in the present. What is more, He doesn't cause non-beings and negations. In consequence, William recognizes logical truth as the only justification for true adjudication of all what exists and doesn't exist. In Steven P. Marrone's opinion William's theory of truth is a new idea in the early thirteenth century. He believes that William's theory, however incomplete, explains how much the problem of truth is depended on logic rather than metaphysics, so that it could be separated radically from questions of being and viewed independently of the issue concerning the relation of the mind and creatures to God. In fact, although William continued to speak in traditional terms, he divorced with the point of view of ontology and natural theology, finding solutions in theories of logic and language. However, taken in this article studies seem to show that William's theory of truth is embedded in a metaphysical context. Furthermore, medieval logic is the science of the action of the intellect, which is a faculty of human being. This is not logic in twentieth-century's sense. Thus, it does not seem to William resigned from metaphysics to logic. His theory of logical truth is imperfect because of metaphysical errors. The main error is that the logical truth, which realizes in the relation of intellect to things and so is one of truths that exist in contingent beings, William considered as final and the sole basis of every true judgments and statements, without regard to its dependence on the First Truth. Indeed, logical truth is not able to truly independent existence.
In this article I want to show similarities, analogies, and differences between the main categories constituting the fundamental principle on which the logocentric metaphysics of Aristotle and the positive metaphysics of Bergson were constructed. Both metaphysical theories, on the grounds of understanding of the reality and rudimentary principles, that govern this reality, do not show significant discrepancies. Both, in my opinion, try to bring to the fore these metaphysical categories, which represent paradigms for the same power, energy, principle of life, or just life manifesting itself in a movement, a becoming and a flow that operates rationally and consciously, that is to say, intentionally. This power infiltrates and connects beings to one another and, in this way, each one and all are related to each one. This power is Bergson’s élan vital - that within animals is manifested as instinct, whereas within people, it sublimates into intuition - and Aristotle’s individual nature of things (phisis), as the inner principle of movement and rest within the individual being. The main factors for the different interpretations and incomparability of these two theories are, as I suppose; language as a tool for description of reality and different hermeneutics of rationality that the two philosophers represent. The language used for the description of reality, at the level of metaphysics is a result of the aforementioned different hermeneutics.
How to explain the existence of evil if being by its very nature is good? My paper examines an interesting and perhaps significant parallel between two exponents of the metaphysical tradition usually thought to stand widely apart, Thomas Aquinas and Hegel. I argue that Hegel's system shares certain features of Aquinas' convertibility thesis (S.T. 1, 5, 1), that upon closer inspection will yield a set of interesting reflections not only about the problem of evil, but also about the limits and possibilities of metaphysical method. I discuss Aquinas' thesis of the convertibility of being and good and how it determines his treatment of evil. I then construct a Hegelian version of convertibility and argue that Hegel's system fails for similar reasons to provide a satisfactory account of the problem of evil. This leads to my central question: should the inadequacy of traditional approaches to evil call for a reversal or abandonment of metaphysics, or invite a deeper reflection about reality that would not subsume the world's darkness under what Hans Blumenberg once called “metaphysics of light?”
According to two critics, Georgia Warnke and John Caputo, Gadamer's hermeneutics is inherently “conservative” insofar as he appeals to tradition as a constituent in understanding. They insist that he simply preserves the ideals, norms and values of the Western metaphysical tradition without critically examining them. I do not agree and will argue that views like this depend upon several false assumptions—for example, that Gadamer reifies the text as a “thing-in-itself” (Sache selbst) and remains trapped in subjectivism. I will begin by examining some of the ways in which these charges might be warranted before proceeding to defend him.
Ingarden conceives ontology as a philosophia prima, which deals with being as purely possible (it complies with the essentialistic tradition of Duns Scotus and Wolff). It is an intuitive (anschaulich) and a priori analysis of the content of the relevant ideas (rein apriorische Analyse der Ideengehalte). It consists of three parts: existential, formal and material ontology. Existential ontology deals with the possible modes of existence (Seinsweise). Problems of factual existence pertain to metaphysics, which is a separate branch of theoretical philosophy, based on ontology.
The classical arguments against metaphysics provided by Immanuel Kant, neopositivists and recently by analytical philosophers focus on the problem of meaning. In my paper I would like to shed a little bit of light on different dimensions of this problem in the metaphysical discourse and make a proposition how to overcome the difficulties that arise from this kind of discourse.
What determines whether the procedures for proving the affirmative statement of God's existence may be called a proof? Certainly, it is necessary that all premises be true and that a reliable inference schemata be applied. One premise appears to be the most critical in the theistic argument. This premise is the principle of sufficient reason. I hold the view that the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found among the premises of any metaphysical explanation of reality, so I suggest that the terms “proof” and “argument” not be used. Instead, we could speak of ways of acquiring discursive knowledge of God and ways of indirect substantiation of God's existence.
The article deals with the problem of representation in Greek Classical art. The authoranalyses the idea of man from the perspective of the Greek natural tendency to representvarious phenomena in the form of human figure. The notion of idea of man as a metaphysicalfigure shall be, however, understood not only as a psychisation of the image butbroadly as the element of the process of antropomorphisation of the surrounding realityas well as giving human form to various phenomena including transcendent ones, e.g.the antropomorphisation of the images of gods. In case of the Greek image, an idea ofman understood as a metaphysical figure reveals a man his being through the constantlyundertaken attempt to appear fulfilment. Simultaneously, in the world of senses, this fulfilmententails the dissolution of the metaphysical secret.
The article deals with the problem of representation in Greek Classical art. The authoranalyses the idea of man from the perspective of the Greek natural tendency to representvarious phenomena in the form of human figure. The notion of idea of man as a metaphysicalfigure shall be, however, understood not only as a psychisation of the image butbroadly as the element of the process of antropomorphisation of the surrounding realityas well as giving human form to various phenomena including transcendent ones, e.g.the antropomorphisation of the images of gods. In case of the Greek image, an idea ofman understood as a metaphysical figure reveals a man his being through the constantlyundertaken attempt to appear fulfilment. Simultaneously, in the world of senses, this fulfilmententails the dissolution of the metaphysical secret.
It is claimed sometimes that science on the one hand, and metaphysics and religion on the other, are incompatible conceptual schemes, in the sense that their statements are not inter-translatable. Our view, instead, is that science and religion deal with fundamentally diverse aspects of human experience. This means that, when each field stays within its proper domain, they can get along without problems. We must deny the still popular opinion that science is the only instrument which allows us to know nature. And we must also question the idea that science has acquired the exclusive right to speak about nature by progressively expelling metaphysics from the field. In order to do this one should, however, reject the neo-positivist characterization of the relations among science, metaphysics, theology and religion.
In late antiquity, in the context of the jagged tradition of Neo-Platonism,Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the specific science that is traced out in itare indicated with the current denominations of meta ta physika andtheologikē pragmateia, which are seen as consistent with one anotherand closely interconnected. In this connection, the Metaphysics, in thewake of previous philosophical readings, is considered as a treatise on“theological science” - the most elevated among the sciences - and thedenomination meta ta physika is seen in a specifically theological sense.According to a widespread Neo-Platonic reading, the science thematizedin the Metaphysics is “metaphysics” in that it is theological science,an epistemic discourse on divine realities, which, within the ordo rerum,transcend the physical ones, and, therefore, according to the ordo cognoscendi,must be studied after the latter.
IT
In late antiquity, in the context of the jagged tradition of Neo-Platonism, Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the specific science that is traced out in it are indicated with the current denominations of meta ta physika and theologikē pragmateia, which are seen as consistent with one another and closely interconnected. In this connection, the Metaphysics, in the wake of previous philosophical readings, is considered as a treatise on “theological science” - the most elevated among the sciences - and the denomination meta ta physika is seen in a specifically theological sense. According to a widespread Neo-Platonic reading, the science thematized in the Metaphysics is “metaphysics” in that it is theological science, an epistemic discourse on divine realities, which, within the ordo rerum, transcend the physical ones, and, therefore, according to the ordo cognoscendi, must be studied after the latter.
If we consider certain features of Spinoza's metaphysics, it can seem very difficult to see how error, or the having of false ideas, is possible. In this paper I want to give the metaphysical background to the problem, before turning to a more detailed consideration of how Spinoza in fact accounts for error, or the having of false ideas. I will show the importance of the notions of adequacy and inadequacy in Spinoza's account. Having done this I will return to the central problem of accounting for the ontological status of false ideas vis a vis both the Infinite Intellect, and finite minds.
Jeśli metafizyka jest filozofią pierwszą, której celem jest ostateczne wyjaśnienie rze-czywistości, to jest ona przydatna tylko takiej religii, która uznaje swój przekaz za prawdzi-wy. Chrześcijaństwo jest taką religią, bo nie zadowala się tylko uzasadnieniem jakiejś formy obyczaju, ale chce swój przekaz odnieść do prawdy, chce być religią prawdziwą. Stąd dyskurs teologii chrześcijańskiej dokonywał się w dyskusji z metafizycznym roszczeniem do prawdy. Arystoteles określił metafizykę trojako: jako mądrość (poznanie inne niż fizyczne i matematyczne), jako teoria tego co wolne od materialnych ograniczeń (poznanie pierwszych zasad) oraz jako filozofia bytu, jako bytu (poznanie najgłębszej struktury rzeczywistości). Na tych trzech płaszczyznach dokonuje się jej dialog z religią prawdziwą.
EN
If metaphysics is the first philosophy, the ultimate aim of which is the clarification of reality, it is only useful for a religion that recognizes its message as true. Christianity is such a religion because it does not satisfy itself with justification for some form of custom, culture but wants its message to be true, it wants to be a true religion. Hence, the discourse of Christian theology was held in a discussion with the metaphysical claim to truth. Aristotle defined metaphysics as a triple: as wisdom (cognition other than physical and ma-thematical), as a theory of what is free from material limitations (knowledge of the first prin-ciples) and as a philosophy of being as being (learning the deepest structure of reality). On these three levels, a dialogue is made with the true religion.
What kind of causality does the Aristotelian Prime Mover exert on the heaven? Who “loves” the Prime Mover? Renaissance peripatetic philosopher, Francesco Vimercato, a “royal” teacher of “Greek and Latin philosophy” in Paris during the forties and the fifties of the 16th century tried to resolve these traditional puzzles that resulted from the exegesis of the Metaphysics XII, 6–7. His solution appears to be innovative, if compared to the ancient and the medieval ones. It seems partially to prefigure the last two decades’ interpretations of Aristotelian “theology”.
The article deals with Aquinas’ onto-theological concept of metaphysics. In particular, it focuses on the question of the subject of metaphysics. The author shows how Aquinas systematizes various expressions about the subject of the first philosophy that appear in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Attention is also paid to some ancient commentators who stood for the theological concept of metaphysics. Avicenna’s concept of metaphysics is thematized in order to clarify to what extent Aquinas, in his determination of the subject of metaphysics, followed this Arabic thinker. A clarification of the relationship between metaphysics and “sacred doctrine” enables to understand why it is Avicenna’s onto-theological concept of metaphysics, which Thomas took over. The author argues that paradoxically Aquinas did not accept the Neoplatonic theological concept of metaphysics and tilted towards Avicenna to allow space for his own “sacred doctrine,” constructed according to Neoplatonic theology.
CS
Autor v této stati analyzuje onto-teologické pojetí metafyziky u Tomáše Akvinského. V souladu s tím se zaměřuje zejména na problém předmětu metafyziky. Nejprve ukazuje, jakým způsobem Tomáš systematizuje různá vyjádření o předmětu první filosofie a rozmanitá označení pro tuto disciplínu, která se objevují v Aristotelově Metafyzice. Poté věnuje pozornost některým antickým komentátorům, kteří se klonili k teologickému pojetí metafyziky. Dále tematizuje Avicennovo pojetí metafyziky, aby objasnil, do jaké míry Tomáš ve svém určení předmětu metafyziky následuje tohoto arabského myslitele. Objasnění poměru metafyziky a „posvátné vědy“ umožňuje porozumět důvodům, jež Tomáše vedly právě k převzetí Avicennova onto-teologického pojetí. Autor zastává tezi, že Tomáš paradoxně nepřijal novoplatónské teologické pojetí metafyziky a přiklonil se k Avicennovi proto, aby si uvolnil místo pro vlastní „posvátnou vědu“, která je ovšem vytvořená podle modelu novoplatónské teologie.
One of the aims of the Neoplatonists is to demonstrate that ancient Presocratic thought is, in fact, a Preplatonic thought. According to the Neoplatonists, Presocratics, who were not far from the truth, employed an inaccurate and ambiguous language, whereas Plato spoke about the truth in a more appropriate and clear way. That is why the Presocratics are not necessarily erroneous and their theoretical originality and their terminology can be incorporated into the Neoplatonic philosophy. I would like to show how some Presocratic theories are embedded in the Neoplatonic metaphysical system of the three Hypostases. Regarding the One and the Intellect, Plotinus, Proclus and the Anonymous Author of the Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy read and employ some Presocratic texts in order to harmonize the Platonic and the Presocratic accounts. Although the Neoplatonists see themselves as continuing the Greek philosophical tradition started by the Presocratics, their interpretation of Presocratic thought illustrates the birth of exegetic philosophy which is able to apply ancient concepts and predicates to its own metaphysical theory.
IT
One of the aims of the Neoplatonists is to demonstrate that ancient Presocratic thought is, in fact, a Preplatonic thought. According to the Neoplatonists, Presocratics, who were not far from the truth, employed an inaccurate and ambiguous language, whereas Plato spoke about the truth in a more appropriate and clear way. That is why the Presocratics are not necessarily erroneous and their theoretical originality and their terminology can be incorporated into the Neoplatonic philosophy. I would like to show how some Presocratic theories are embedded in the Neoplatonic metaphysical system of the three Hypostases. Regarding the One and the Intellect, Plotinus, Proclus and the Anonymous Author of the Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy read and employ some Presocratic texts in order to harmonize the Platonic and the Presocratic accounts. Although the Neoplatonists see themselves as continuing the Greek philosophical tradition started by the Presocratics, their interpretation of Presocratic thought illustrates the birth of exegetic philosophy which is able to apply ancient concepts and predicates to its own metaphysical theory.
Tresmontant has never explicitly dealt with the interpretation of the concepts of body and corporeality in his work. He was, however, very interested in the philosophy of creation and the biblical interpretations. In this work we systematically organized his anthropological thoughts and present them as a logically organized framework that characterizes his perception of body and flesh as anthropological categories. Despite the fact that Tresmontant based his arguments on the classical metaphysical and biblical interpretation of various texts, we suggest that they still represent a comprehensive modern theological anthropology.
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