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EN
Often, a particular historical event, phenomenon or process “defies” inclusion in a specific ideal type or terminology which we are used to using to indicate the particular event. One example of note is the Prague Peace Conference of 1813, which does not meet the“requirements” that a historian might make of a typical peace congress. This is even more reason not to be deterred from attempting to describe, structuralise and systematise it. In this regard, three interconnected paradoxical circumstances come to the fore. First of all, the above-noted conflict between expectation and reality. Secondly the paradox of historiographical disinterest in this “crucial event”, and finally the misappropriation of an event taking place on Czech territory from Czech “national history” and our historical consciousness.
EN
The aim of the study is to analyse Austro-papal relations in the period 1838–1848 in the context of the Italian liberal-national movement. The reactionary, backward, absolutist regime of the papal government had often been the cause of the crises in the Papal States in the pre-March period, with the most significant one being in 1831, when it was only through Austrian military intervention that the papal regime survived. The papal government was unwilling to change the course of its internal policy and transform the Papal States for the sake of both its subjects and its government. Therefore, when it came to reforming the papal regime, Metternich’s lifelong advising of the Pope was like beating a dead horse. Austria’s readiness to intervene militarily whenever requested by the Pope was the most important part of Metternich’s diplomatic passivity within his papal policy during the 1840s, although none of the local uprisings in this period required the intervention of Austrian troops The change in the Austrian chancellor’s approach to Rome emerged because of the reform course of Pius IX, who was elected Pope in the summer of 1846. The Pope’s utter disinterest and opposition to Austria after 1846 eventually resulted in the ultimate fall of Metternich’s papal policy.
EN
The primary goal of the paper is to put the assistance of Austria and Prussia to the Ottoman military reforms in the 1830s into the context of diplomatic relations within the Eastern Question, and explain why the Sublime Porte asked the two German Powers for their officers, why only the Prussians were finally employed in 1837. Furthermore, the paper also evidences the fact that the collaboration of the two German Powers with Sultan Mahmud II in his reformatory effort must be viewed not only in the diplomatic but also social context and that the changes in the Ottoman army had been attentively observed by Austria’s and Prussia’s diplomats, and Austrian Chancellor Metternich in particular, long before the employment of the two Powers’ officers in the Near East was officially discussed with the Ottoman authorities; the Viennese cabinet had even provided the education of several Ottoman youths in its Technical military academy. The paper is finally intended as a brief contribution to the relations between Central Europe, represented in this case by the two most important members of the German Confederation, and the Ottoman Empire in the 1830s.
EN
The purpose of this study is analysis of Austrian Chancellor Metternich’s approach towards the civil war in Switzerland, which ensued in 1847 between the Catholic and Protestant cantons, and evaluation of the consequences of Metternich’s diplomatic defeat, for him personally and also for Austria and its relationship with the German Confederation. Eruption of the conflict itself, its progress and its consequences will be discussed. Metternich considered the dispute in Switzerland to be an issue for Austria, because he believed that the radical (Protestant) cantons’ efforts to create a unified federal state could act as an impulse for the increased involvement of German nationalists who would finally trigger a revolution in Germany. He made all possible effort to prevent this development, however, his intention this time was not just to use diplomatic means, but also armed intervention by Austria and France and he also considered using military assistance from the states of the German Confederation. But his efforts failed, the Sonderbund, a military defensive alliance of the seven Catholic conservative cantons created for the purpose of protecting the sovereignty of the cantons, was defeated in the civil war and a new federal constitution was adopted in Switzerland. The Prince’s fears were realised when the victory of the Swiss radicals became one of the impulses for a revolution in Germany and Italy in 1848.
EN
He never lost sight of his long-term strategy (European peace and the internal legal security of the many peoples within the Monarchy). 7) He was also a visionary. This means the imagined anticipation of coming crises, catastrophes or problems or even concepts of a desired peace order up to the ideal of a League of Nations. He saw a permanent source of wars in the will of the various nationalities to each establish a linguistically homogeneous nation state in the middle of Europe. As a counter-model, he envisioned a loose, confederative union of various nationalities based on the model of the Swiss Confederation. 8) Metternich was not the all-powerful „coachman of Europe“. His great adversary Count Franz Anton Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky was in charge of police, censorship and finances within the Habsburg Monarchy. He also had to fight against the Emperor‘s obstinacy and against the selfish interests of Habsburg domestic power politics. His biography is at the same time an examination of European history in the period of upheaval between 1770 and 1850.
EN
The aim of the paper is to evaluate the role that Italy played in the European States System in 1830–1848 from a new, more realist perspective paying particular attention to the policy of Metternich’s Austria in the Apennines. As it attempts to prove, from 1830 to 1848 Italy witnessed considerable reluctance on the part of the Great Powers as well as the Italian states themselves to contribute through cooperation and restraint to the strengthening of the pillars that upheld the system. Italy, much like the Ottoman Empire, was an unstable area with dangerous potential for European peace, and it was no accident that the peace restored in 1815 was disturbed for the first time in Western Europe during 1848 in Italy.
EN
This study presents an interesting memoir about the Congress of Vienna. La Garde-Chambonas, a French aristocrat, went to Vienna in 1814 to participate in the life of the city during the Congress. This book is a very good source for getting acquainted with the life of the European aristocracy in the capital of the Habsburg Monarchy. The author of the memoir presents a lot of personalities, rulers as Alexander I of Russia, Isabey, the famous painter and others. But first of all he writes about Prince of Ligne, his patron in Vienna. Before the presentation of the life in Vienna, the study deals with some questions of organisation regarding the Congress.
EN
This paper attempts to offer a different assessment of Austrian Chancellor Metternich’s role in the Eastern Question as well as the diplomatic concert to the one generally held. Additionally, it refutes the widely held fallacy that at the wellknown meeting in Münchengrätz in September 1833, Metternich acceded to Nicholas I’s interests in the East in return for his support against the revolutions in the West, particularly in the Apennines. The paper tries to prove that Metternich did not fear Russian policy towards the Ottoman Empire in the early 1830s and no Austro-Russian quid pro quo was agreed upon in Münchengrätz because both countries’ interests in the East and West were identical: the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire and the fight against revolutionary movements. Consequently, Austria and Russia supported each other in both these matters because it was in their mutual interest to do so. By providing relevant evidence, the paper also demonstrates that the Eastern Question concerned not only the Balkans, but also other parts of the Ottoman Empire including, for example, Egypt, and this comprised an important agenda within Metternich’s foreign policy.
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EN
The objective of this study is to explain the negative consequences of France’s occupation of the Papal city of Ancona in February 1832. This event occurred against the Pope’s will, yet at a time when France and the Papal States were at peace. The whole incident represented a serious breach of international law, and was criticised throughout Europe not just by sovereigns, diplomats and politicians, but also by lower social groups. In the long-term, its significance lay in reducing the faith of European societies in the fairness of the Great Powers’ policies, and the stability of the European system of states which had until then been guaranteed by the outcome of the Congress of Vienna in 1815.
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