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1

The Cost Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission

100%
Westermeier A.
South East European Journal of Economics and Business
|
2010
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vol. 5
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issue 1
19-23
EN
In this paper, we develop the new Keynesian Phillips curve augmented by the cost channel of monetary transmission and analyze the central bank's best monetary policy if the central bank is obliged to minimize inflation. It can be shown that a small change of the cost channel's coefficient might lead from a major increase in interest rates to a major decrease in interest rates and vice versa. Even though the optimal interest rate might change dramatically, the inflation response is of only marginal effect.
2
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SHORT-TERM CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION FORECASTING FOR MONETARY POLICY PURPOSES – THE CASE OF POLAND

100%
Koziński W., Świst T.
Finansowy Kwartalnik Internetowy e-Finanse
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2015
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vol. 11
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issue 1
65-74
EN
One of the most significant factors which influences the level of banking sector liquidity is Currency in Circulation. Although the central bank is in charge of distribution of the currency it can’t assess the demand for the currency, as that demand is generated by the customers of commercial banks. Therefore, the amount of Currency in Circulation has to be modelled and forecasted. This paper introduces ARIMA(2,1) and SARIMA(2,1)(5,0) models with dummy variables and discusses its applicability to the forecasting of Currency in Circulation. The forecasting performance of these models is compared. The results indicate that the performance of SARIMA(2,1)(5,0) is better and that both models might be applied for monetary policy purposes as supportive tools for banking sector liquidity forecasting.
3
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Měnová politika Národní banky Československé v období deflace (1929–1934)

100%
Kunert J.
Prager wirtschafts- und sozialhistorische Mitteilungen - Prague Economic and Social History Papers
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2018
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issue 27
24-74
EN
The interwar Czechoslovakia experienced two periods of deflation. The first one (1922–1925) was caused by the monetary policy of the Banking Office of the Ministry of Finance inspired by the ideas of Alois Rašín, Minister of Finance. On the beginning of the interventions of the Banking Office the crown was undervalued but then it rose above its natural level. The rise in the exchange rate of the Czechoslovak crown was followed by the crisis in industry and then banking crisis. After 1923 the exchange rate was stable and in 1929 Czechoslovakia adopted a gold currency (gold exchange standard). The appropriate exchange rate stipulated during the 1920s was later the object of discussions during the Great Depression in the 1930s. The second deflationary period was caused by the falling prices, at first of agricultural and then industrial production. This appreciation of the monetary unit pegged to gold caused a grave internal crisis, for a drop in prices was in conflict with a whole complex of economic elements, especially taxes, wages and debts. Furthermore since the 1920s there was the disparity between the external and internal purchasing power of the crown. This caused the problems for the Czechoslovak export and made Czechoslovakia attractive for the import. Finding the solution how to increase the competitiveness of Czechoslovak wares on the international market was therefore essential. During the years 1929–1934 was National Bank of Czechoslovakia, and its decisive body – the bank board –, confronted with the problems caused by the decline of prices. The bank board had to tackle this problem. The attempts to bring the prices on the appropriate level happened to be the main target of the monetary policy. The paper follows therefore the attitude of the bank board to the question of prices, their conservative policy and attempts to supplement it with the idea to help the economic subjects of Czechoslovakia in the time of world crisis. It tries even to explain their criticism of different types of so called monetary experiments especially promoted by the Anglo-Saxon economists. The period ends by February 1934 with the decision to devaluate the Czechoslovak crone by one sixth. This profound change in monetary policy of Czechoslovakia was then one of the first steps on the way to the recovery of its economy
4

Integration of Monetary and Fiscal Policy of the Countries of the Visegrad Group

88%
Kappel S., Janků J.
Review of Economic Perspectives
|
2014
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vol. 14
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issue 3
197-213
EN
The aim of this paper is to evaluate mutual interaction of monetary and fiscal policies in the countries of the Visegrad group, i.e. in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. The relationship of monetary and fiscal policy - their coordination, cooperation or mutual antagonism - are basic determinants of successful implementation for economic policy of the state. Fiscal and monetary policies usually have different aims, and some conflict situations may arise in practical economic and political decision- making. Each policy has to make its decision with regard to the other one. Methodical approaches of this contribution are based on the game theory, which deals with the analysis of a wide range of decision situations with more participants (players) and it is primarily focused on the conflict situations. This game-theoretical approach is responsible for creating the theoretical model which is then dealt with in the empirical analysis. We find a distinctly stabilizing role of monetary policy and relatively problematic stabilizing role of fiscal policy in the analyzed countries. The dominant role of monetary policy is statistically confirmed in the case of the Czech Republic and Hungary.
5
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Rola banku centralnego w gospodarce – obraz po kryzysie

75%
Skibińska-Fabrowska I.
Zeszyty Naukowe Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego w Zielonej Górze
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2017
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issue 6
154-159; 161-166
PL
Problem aktywności banku centralnego i jego wpływu na gospodarkę od dawna nurtuje teoretyków i praktyków ekonomii. Znaczenie polityki pieniężnej dla sfery realnej było przedmiotem analiz wielu nurtów myśli ekonomicznej. Konsensus wypracowany w tym zakresie zaowocował nową syntezą neoklasyczną mającą praktyczny wyraz w strategii bezpośredniego celu inflacyjnego. Kryzys finansowy, który wybuchł w 2008 roku sprawił, że banki centralne w sposób niezwykle aktywny podjęły działania wykraczające poza tradycyjne rozumienie ich roli. Skutki kryzysowej polityki pieniężnej widoczne są nie tylko w gospodarce ale także skłaniają do zastanowienia nad przeformułowaniem roli polityki pieniężnej w obrębie polityki gospodarczej. W artykule obok przeglądu różnych poglądów dotyczących znaczenia polityki pieniężnej dla gospodarki opisane zostały działania podejmowane przez banki centralne w reakcji na kryzys wraz z ich obserwowanymi skutkami. Na tym tle zostanie podjęta próba wskazania możliwego nowego usytuowania polityki pieniężnej w strukturze polityki gospodarczej państwa.
EN
The problems of the activity of the central bank and impact monetary policy on the economy are interesting for theoreticians and practitioners of economics. The significance of the monetary policy for the real sphere was an object of analyses in many areas of economic. The developed agreement in this respect resulted in the new synthesis neoclassical having a practical expression of the purpose direct in the inflation targeting. The financial crisis which burst in 2008 caused that central banks, in the unusually active way, took action going beyond the traditional understanding their role. Effects of the unconventional monetary policy are visible not only in the economy but also in changing thinking of the role of the monetary. In the article the inspection of the different views concerning the significance of the monetary politics for the economy action taken by central banks in the reaction to the crisis was described along with their observed effects. Taking this into account, the attempt to explain the new place of monetary policy in structure of economic policy was made.
6
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Problem deflacji jako zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego

63%
Tomczak A.
Journal of Modern Science
|
2015
|
issue 1(24)
169-187
EN
One of the dangers to economic safety comes from the disturbances in nominal economy. Subsequent, aft er the crisis of 2008, decrease of prices indicators in advanced economies as well as the troubles in implementing interest rates policy by the central banks, encourage to analyse the phenomenon of defl ation. Defl ation, contrary to infl ation, has much more modest explanation in economic literature. Th e main thesis of this text is that defl ation is not strictly monetary phenomenon but results from global and country economic situation. Th e central banks should not be responsible so much to fi ght defl ation up. Defl ation should not be appreciated only negative since the drop of CPI or HICP down to -1%, if is not accompanied by GDP and employment decrease and speculation bubble, do not is dangerous to economic safety.
PL
Istotnym zagrożeniem dla bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego mogą być zaburzenia sfery nominalnej gospodarki. W związku z ponownym, od kryzysu 2007+, pojawieniem się obniżek wskaźników cenowych w krajach wysokorozwiniętych, jak i powstałych w związku z tym trudności z realizacją polityki stóp procentowych przez banki centralne, uzasadnione jest podjęcie analizy czynników wpływających na pojawienie się defl acji, zwłaszcza w jej uporczywej i powodującej koszty, „złej” postaci. O ile infl acja jest szeroko opisana w literaturze, a banki centralne wypracowały skuteczne instrumentarium w celu jej obniżania, o tyle defl acja doczekała się skromniejszej liczby opracowań, a pozbycie się jej jest nadal trudne. Główną tezą artykułu jest stwierdzenie, że defl acja nie jest zjawiskiem ściśle pieniężnym, lecz wynikiem oddziaływania wielu elementów globalnej i krajowej sytuacji gospodarczej, zaś banki centralne nie powinny być obarczone nieproporcjonalnie dużą odpowiedzialnością za jej zwalczanie. Od kilku lat banki centralne krajów wysokorozwiniętych stosują niekonwencjonalne instrumenty polityki i usiłują pobudzić akcję kredytową oraz wpłynąć na oczekiwania infl acyjne, aby osiągnąć cel infl acyjny na poziomie około 2%. Defl acji nie można oceniać wyłącznie negatywnie, a spadek CPI lub HICP do -1%, któremu nie towarzyszy obniżenie się PKB, zatrudnienia, wzrost złych długów ani bańka spekulacyjna, nie stanowi zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego.
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