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1

Buddyjskie pojęcie pradźńapti i jego wykładnia w filozofii Nagardźuny

100%

Szymański M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2014

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issue 28

93 - 119

EN

In Buddhism the word prajñapti traditionally refers to unreal objects, which are referents of names without any real referents. The word was important because Buddhists thought the realisation of the status of some unreal objects (primarily one’s own substantial self as a basis for personal identity) is a condition for attaining nirvāṇa. The tendency to consider objects called prajñapti to be products of intentional acts of consciousness is not unexpected. However, the objects created by acts of consciousness were not clearly distinguished from acts of consciousness themselves, names and their meanings, or real compositions of dharmas. Sarvastivadins gave some class of prajñapti objects a special mode of being, which is equivalent to that of Ingarden’s purely intentional objects. The Theravadin thinker Anuruddha II distinguished between attha-paññattis and names and understood the first as objects created by acts of consciousness. Attha-paññattis should not be identified with purely intentional objects because they were not clearly contrasted with cognitive acts creating them. According to Nāgārjuna every object is prajñapti because it is unavoidably a product of an act of consciousness. It is an effect of imposition of some concept on cognitive data. Acts of consciousness, conceptualization and language create false impression of reality unless we clearly know they are essentially defective and the way they are defective. The view of Nāgārjuna seems to be a result of his processual beliefs about reality.

2

The Values of “Contradiction” in Theory and Practice in Cultural Philosophy. A Different Way for Overcoming the Contradiction in the Non-occidental Philosophy: The Principle of Absolute-Contradictory Self-Identity by NISHIDA (Kyoto School)

86%

Hashi H.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2017

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issue 2

31-44

EN

This article examines contradictions between the theory and practice of comparative philosophy in a global world. Aristotle and Plato had different approaches to these “contradictions” that show a “discrepancy” between these two classical thinkers. The topic unaddressed by Plato is taken up in the topos of Nāgārjuna, the great ancient logi-cian of ontology in Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy (the 3rd century AD). The “contra-diction” is a principle that have/had profound influence on creative thought in East Asia. Nishida, the founder of the Kyoto School (20th century), established his philo-sophy through the principle of “Absolute Contradictory Self-Identity.” This principle may stimulate reflection upon our digitally connected contemporary global world, and the chaos it has to face.

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Krytyka dialektycznej interpretacji filozofii Nagardżuny

58%

Bogacz S.

Diametros

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2014

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issue 42

227-246

PL

Celem niniejszej pracy jest zaprezentowanie dwóch argumentów przeciwko dialektycznej interpretacji filozofii Nagardżuny. Interpretacja dialektyczna zakłada, że Nagardżuna nie głosi żadnych twierdzeń, natomiast całość jego działalności filozoficznej polega na krytyce poglądów oponentów z pozycji pozbawionej założeń doktryny środkowej drogi. Pierwszy argument będzie dotyczył metody jaką posługuje się Nagardżuna, drugi pozytywnych twierdzeń głoszonych przez Nagardżunę, szczególnie tych na temat praktyki buddyjskiej. Ponadto zostanie omówiona koncepcja zręcznych środków oraz koncepcja dwóch prawd, obie związane z interpretacją dialektyczną. W tekście znajdzie się również przyczynek do interpretacji filozofii Nagardżuny jako wyznaczającej metafizyczne warunki możliwości praktyki buddyjskiej.

EN

The aim of this paper is to present two arguments against the dialectical interpretation of Nagarjuna's philosophy. This interpretation understands Nagarjuna's philosophy as a method of deconstruction, abstracting from Nagarjuna's own standpoint. The first argument refers to the metaphysical presuppositions of this method. The second argument refers to the positive statements asserted by Nagarjuna and focuses mainly on those concerning Buddhist practice. Furthermore, the conception of 'skillful means' and 'the two truths' will be discussed. The conclusion of this paper is that Nagarjuna's philosophy is based upon determining the conditions of the possibility of the Buddhist practice rather than on a dialectic without any metaphysical assumptions.

Refine search results

1 Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

1 Dialogue and Universalism

1 Diametros

1 2017

2 2014

1 Bogacz S.

1 Hashi H.

1 Szymański M.

Buddyjskie pojęcie pradźńapti i jego wykładnia w filozofii Nagardźuny

The Values of “Contradiction” in Theory and Practice in Cultural Philosophy. A Different Way for Overcoming the Contradiction in the Non-occidental Philosophy: The Principle of Absolute-Contradictory Self-Identity by NISHIDA (Kyoto School)

Krytyka dialektycznej interpretacji filozofii Nagardżuny