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Mass and Count Natural Kind Terms

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Odrowaz-Sypniewska J.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2008
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vol. 17
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issue 4(68)
249-263
EN
Between count and mass terms there are syntactic, semantic and pragmatic differences. Although the differences of each kind can be put into question, the distinction between count and mass terms is unquestionable. In particular, it is not obliterated by the fact that mass terms can be used as count terms (and vice versa). Quine thought that the count term - mass term distinction is very important and can be noticed in the process of learning the language. Count terms are harder to learn because they involve divided reference. On the other hand - according to Quine - mass terms are protean in character: at the subject position they function as singular terms whereas at the predicate position they are general terms. As far as natural kinds are concerned, Quine argued that they are intuitive nominal kinds and claimed that humans have many different systems of classification into kinds adequate for different purposes. Kripke and Putnam are mostly interested in natural kinds and natural kind terms, but do not pay any attention to the distinction between count- and mass natural-kind-terms. Their natural kinds are real kinds, whose extensions are delimited by 'hidden natures'. The authoress argues that the notion of natural kind used by Kripke and Putnam is more philosophically interesting than that of Quine and that Quinean idea of many equally good classifications into kinds is mistaken. On the other hand, it seems that Kripke's and Putnam's analysis of natural kind terms should take into account the count term - mass term distinction. Such a distinction allows to explain the differences between Kripkean theoretical identifications and makes the solution of Johnston's problem easier.
2

PUTNAM’S VIEW ON REFERENCE CHANGE IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF KRIPKE’S

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Moreno L. F.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2016
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vol. 23
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issue 3
367 – 383
EN
A usual objection put forward against the causal theory of reference is that it cannot explain the reference changes that terms may undergo. The main aim of this paper is to examine the position on reference change of one of the classic supporters of the causal theory, Hilary Putnam. It is usually claimed that Putnam’s causal theory of reference of natural kind terms is closely related to Kripke’s theory and can be conceived as a development of the same. The motivation of this paper is to allege that there is at least one important difference between both theories, consisting of their explanation of reference changes or at least in the way in which those theories make reference changes possible. After dealing with the problem of reference change within the framework of Kripke’s theory and reconstructing Kripke’s proposal to account for it, we will allege that there are components of Putnam’s theory which make reference changes possible, although they are different from those present in Kripke’s theory.
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