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1

NIETZSCHE ON THE NECESSITY OF SOCIAL DECADENCE

100%
Jeong J.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
|
vol. 76
|
issue 3
209 – 222
EN
The aim of this article is to elucidate Nietzsche’s idea of the necessity of social decadence. It is discussed that the necessity indicates an inevitable or necessary historical process, on the one hand, and the decadent being necessarily produced in society, on the other. Nietzsche presents a seemingly contradictory idea regarding this necessity. While he describes decadence as a necessary part of life, he also demands disposing of a decadent part in society. This article suggests a solution to this problem and argues what should be fought is not decadence itself but its metastasis that risks the health of the whole. Christian morality of equality plays a key role in this metastasis.
2

ON A SUPPOSED PUZZLE CONCERNING MODALITY AND EXISTENCE

100%
Atkinson T., Hill D. J., McLeod S. K.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2019
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vol. 26
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issue 3
446 – 473
EN
Kit Fine has proposed a new solution to what he calls ‘a familiar puzzle’ concerning modality and existence. The puzzle concerns the argument from the alleged truths ‘It is necessary that Socrates is a man’ and ‘It is possible that Socrates does not exist’ to the apparent falsehood ‘It is possible that Socrates is a man and does not exist’. We discuss in detail Fine’s setting up of the ‘puzzle’ and his rejection, with which we concur, of two mooted solutions to it. (One of these uses standard, Kripkean, notions, and the other rests on work done by Arthur Prior.) We set out, and reject, the philosophy of modality underlying Fine’s new solution, and we defend an alternative response to the alleged puzzle. Our solution follows the work of David Wiggins in distinguishing between the sentential operator ‘It is necessary that’ and the predicate modifier ‘necessarily’. We briefly provide this distinction with a possible- world semantics on which it is neither a necessary truth, in some sense, that Socrates does not exist, in some sense, that Socrates necessarily exists.
3

Niebieskie złoto i trójnogi tygrys

100%
Suchoń W.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2013
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vol. 41
|
issue 2
49 - 59
EN
The article refers directly to the widely read and well-known book Naming and Necessity by Saul Kripke, presenting reflections on the thesis found in Kripke to the effect that the power of necessity attributed to analytic sentences of the same structure can be varied. An attempt is made to explain on what grounds one may adopt such a paradoxical belief and to what extent can we agree with Kripke's thesis.
4

Teoriia motyvatsii ta yii znachennia v praktychnii diialnosti

100%
Teletov O. S., Yulia O O.
Mekhanizm Rehuluvannya Economiky
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2011
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vol. 1 (51)
100-110
EN
It is performed analysis of ground theories in the sphere of labour motivation. Theoretical aspects of motivation are analysed: definition of motivation, entity of motivation theories and stimulation of Ukrainian labour force. It is performed the conclusions about necessity of strengthening efforts in the direction of labour motivation in Ukraine.
5

FALIBILIZMUS V KONCEPCII Ch. S. PEIRCEA

100%
Bajúzsová Z.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2007
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vol. 62
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issue 4
304-309
EN
The paper tries to show, how fallibilism and necessity are related to each other in the philosophy of Ch. S. Peirce. Fallibilism as an epistemological doctrine is grounded in the idea, that there are no definitely valid propositions. Then, however, the approval of the existence of necessary conclusions in mathematics equals claiming that Peirce's philosophy embodies a contradiction. The authoress argumentation is, that the latter is illusionary: in fact there does exist such an interpretation of Peirce's philosophy, which enables fallibilism and necessity to coexist without any contradiction.
6

Konieczność i nazywanie

100%
: S. W.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2012
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vol. 40
|
issue 4
11 - 24
EN
The article refers directly to Saul Kripke’s well-known work Naming and Necessity and it presents reflections on issues discussed in the book in question that are usually considered in logic courses offered to students of philosophy. The particular subject of reflection is the claim that any identity between proper names, if it holds, must be necessary. An attempt is made to explain how, in this context, one can understand necessity, the role of proper names, and what is involved in the relationship of identity, because the Kripke’s proposals are not always based on a definitive refutation of objections raised by opponents of his solutions.
7

ON EVERYTHING IS NECESSARILY WHAT IT IS

100%
Blum A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2023
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vol. 30
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issue 3
278 – 280
EN
It is argued that if everything is necessarily what it is, then given the equivalence ‘p≡[a= (℩x)(x=a&p)]’, it follows that whatever happens or is the case, had to happen or had to be the case.
8

Konieczność i przypadek w ewolucji Wszechświata

88%
Heller M.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2010
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vol. 46
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issue 1
17-24
EN
The paper deals with the role of chance in the evolution of the Universe. Chance (randomness) does not undermine the structure of the Universe encoded in the laws of nature, but constitutes an indispensable element of that structure, an element in-built, in a non-linear way, in the dynamic architecture of the whole. Moreover, random events do not contradict mathematical orderliness of the Universe, because they themselves are mathematical in character. The paper suggests also that mathematical structure of the Universe echoes the Mind of God which, together with the previous statements, implies that random events are important part of that Mind.
9

NEUROVEDY, SLOBODA A DETERMINIZMUS. TOMÁŠ AKVINSKÝ V DIALÓGU SO SÚČASNÝMI VEDAMI O ČLOVEKU

88%
Lovás P. S.
Verba Theologica. Teologický časopis
|
2023
|
vol. 22
|
issue 1
89 – 111
EN
Is human freedom only an illusion and we are determined by all kinds of facts that exclude our freedom? According to some thinkers, the results of Benjamin Libet’s experiments seem to prove this. More effectively than any arguments of science, the existence of free human actions can be questioned by philosophical theses, above all by various doctrines of determinism. In an interdisciplinary dialogue, we will try to answer some postulates of the natural and human sciences with the arguments of Thomas Aquinas, according to which human will is ordered to the general good, which is what determines it. However, every particular good is limited and not good from some point of view. That is why our choice of a specific good is not determined. Reason frees our will from the necessity of always following some individual good, and keeps it open to the complete and universal good.
10

ON CHANGING THE PAST

88%
Blum A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue 3
377 – 378
EN
We confront two seemingly incompatible positions in regard to the past. One, the modal status of a proposition is unchangeable; and two, that omnipotence is trumped only by necessity.
11
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Futura contingentia jako przedmiot wiedzy Boga. Stanowisko Jana Dunsa Szkota

75%
Filo-Sofija
|
2012
|
vol. 12
|
issue 4(19)
53-74
EN
The article concerns John Duns Scotus’ views on the problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents, presented by Scotus in his Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum d. 39, n. 1-93. He begins his analysis of the notion of God’s knowledge concerning the future events by criticizing two theories: first, the claim that the content of the idea of a thing, possessed by God, can include contingency of this thing; second, the claim that eternity of God is simultaneous with the flowing time as a whole, and therefore His knowledge of future contingents is the knowledge of present contingents. Duns Scotus presents his own conception in the form of the following claims: (1) there is contingency in the reality, however, we are not able to prove it; (2) the proximate second causes are not the causes of contingency in things; (3) the main cause of contingency in reality is God, precisely His will. Thus, contingency is not an imperfection because it is produced immediately by God. The article also presents Scotus’ theory of synchronic contingency. This conception explains the possibility of God’s contingent knowledge of contingent reality.
12
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Pojetí svobody v komentářích Maria Victorina k pavlovským epištolám

75%
Hušek V.
Studia theologica
|
2005
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vol. 7
|
issue 4
1-12
EN
In the second half of the 4th century, the first Latin commentaries on the Pauline epistles emerge. This article examines how human freedom is treated in the earliest of them, the commentaries of Marius Victorinus on Ephesians, Galatians and Philippians. The theme is touched especially in the passages explaining the pre-existence of human souls, their descent to the world and return back to God. According to Victorinus, the souls have already existed before the creation of the world, 'spiritually', in Christ. Having separated from Logos, which necessarily happens, they are confronted with the world and have to choose between God and the sensual world. Whatever they choose, the decision completes their perfection. The souls, which got entangled in the sensual world, are not able to free themselves and return back to God. They are redeemed by Christ, through his incarnation and crucifixion. The souls have to do nothing but believe in Christ; thus their 'spiritualization' and return to God begins. The question whether this faith is an act performed fully from human power, or whether it is God's gift, is not answered unambiguously.
13

JSOU NUTNÉ SOUDY A PRIORI?

75%
Sousedík P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2012
|
vol. 19
|
issue 2
180 – 200
EN
The article shows the positions that philosophers held to the relationship between a priori judgments and those judgments which are valid necessarily. Enlightenment philosophers of the 18th and 19th century, who though often in different ways, opposed the concept of metaphysics and scholastic necessity (Hume, Kant, Mill, idealists), play the leading role. At the beginning of the 20th century analytic philosophy was born. Its first leaders inherited from their predecessors an antipathy to metaphysics, and so they had no desire to return again to the traditional concept of necessity (Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer). Their logic and the new characterization of the a priori paved the way for the linguistic turn. Some of their followers in the second half of the 20th century realized that the concept needed to be returned to its original meaning (Kripke). This is not a mere repetition of the Aristotelian-scholastic conception, but a new addition that rethinks the relationship between the notions of a priori and necessity.
14

NON-LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE

63%
Hitchcock D.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
|
2009
|
issue 16(29)
137-158
EN
Contemporary philosophers generally conceive of consequence as necessary truth-preservation. They generally construe this necessity as logical, and operationalize it in substitutional, formal or model-theoretic terms as the absence of a counter-example. A minority tradition allows for grounding truth-preservation also on non-logical necessities, especially on the semantics of extra-logical constants. The present article reviews and updates the author's previous proposals to modify the received conception of consequence so as to require truth-preservation to be non-trivial (i.e. not a mere consequence of a necessarily true implicatum or a necessarily untrue implicans) and to allow variants of the substitutional, formal and model-theoretic realizations of the received conception where the condition underwriting truth-preservation is not purely formal. Indeed, the condition may be contingent rather than necessary. Allowing contingent non-trivial truth-preservation as a consequence relation fits our inferential practices, but turns out to be subject to counter-examples. We are left with an unhappy choice between an overly strict requirement that non-trivial truth-preservation be underwritten by a necessary truth and an overly loose recognition of non-trivial truth-preservation wherever some truth underwrites it. We need to look for a principled intermediate position between these alternatives.
15
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Aspekty prawne NATO ROE – MC 362/1 (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem komponentu morskiego)

51%
Szuniewicz M.
Międzynarodowe Prawo Humanitarne
|
2012
|
vol. 3
63-88
EN
The multinational military operations require the harmonisation of the operational procedures, especially in respect of the use of force (Rules of Engagement). The manifestation of an above attitude is the decision of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance MC 362/1 of 2003, June 30 (so called NATO ROE). The document contains a compendium of strategic and operational ROE and NATO policy for approving and implementing these rules for all NATO/NATOled military operations. The NATO ROE provides guidance and direction on rules of engagement, use of force in self-defence, the requirements of necessity and proportionality. A particular problem is the legal meaning of ROE and its binding force on a commander and the soldiers, and accordingly an issue of using ROE for precluding their accountability. The conformity of any action with any set of ROE in force does not guarantee its lawfulness, and it remains the commander‘s responsibility to use only that force which is necessary and proportionate under the prevailing circumstances. The guidelines on the use of ROE in maritime operations (Annex D to MC 362/1) underlines the specific features of naval military activities. Some directives can be found in the operational doctrine of the Polish Navy (DD/3.1) of 2010.
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