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The paper attempts to reconstruct the defining features of Austrian avant-garde fiction of the 60's, exploring structural characteristics of its emblematic novel 'the improvement of Central-Europe' (die verbesserung von mitteleuropa) by Oswald Wiener on the background of Austrian Neopositivism, or, more precisely, of its changing concept of language (L. Wittgenstein). Another frame of reference, confirming the avant-garde character of Wiener's work is Stirner's conception of individual anarchism. The tension between these two poles, characterizing several works of Austrian literary avant-garde can be perceived not only in the framework of poetologic innovation (a new form of novel-writing) but also of epistemological reflection, which leads to questioning of some surviving scientific and theoretic concepts of the cognitive language function.
EN
First part of the text presents a historical excursion searching for the genesis of Popper’s philosophical views in the interwar Vienna. It analyses the actual writing process and circumstances that surrounded Popper’s work on Die beiden Grund-probleme der Erkenntnistheorie. The aim of this section is to evaluate Popper’s reception and intellectual self-development through the denial of logical positivism. The second “internalist” segment of this article further examines the Grundprobleme itself through the analysis of Popper’s specific interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. We will confront Seubert’s claim that through Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie Popper definitely and knowingly accepts Kant’s stance. We show that even though Popper adopted Kant’s transcendental method of questioning, he had later criticized certain aspects of Kant’s transcendental method. As a result, Popper establishes the so called genetic apriorism, which dwells on his own version of the deductive psychology of knowledge.
EN
A review of Western European theories of science philosophy is made, with focus on neopositivism. The analysis of K.Poper's theory, critical rationalism, is focused on his verification method based on the principle of falsification for demarcation between scientific and non-scientific knowledge. It's shown that absolute reliance on this principle, denial of the objective truth of scientific knowledge, conventional interpretation of human perceptions about the natural world, dissociation of the knowledge producer from the produced knowledge is not in compliance with K.Poper's theory of growth in scientific knowledge. The method of critical rationalism, elaborated for physics, is spread by K.Popper on social sphere. It's shown that his treatment of history as 'interpretation of events', which, not being a verifiable hypothesis (conception or theory), can be falsified, that is, rejected by new facts, is quite effective, as it supposes both distinction between and common character of history and natural science. Unlike neopositivist formal and logical analysis, K.Popper's logic of scientific research represents an attempt for theoretical reconstruction of the dynamics of science, development of science through 'tries and mistakes, or, more exactly, through removal of mistakes'. An indisputable contribution of him is reconstruction of science in its irreversible history and not as an aggregate of separated static deductively organized systems. His historicism implicitly complies with the principle of non-linearity of the scientific progress, hence, the ontology of a theory is always conventional and relational, and the resulting fallibilism (exposure to mistakes) of a theoretical construction supposes that it can be falsified when confronted by contradictory empirical data.
EN
One of the central aspects of contemporary epistemology lies in the difference between abstraction and idealization. While the former consists of the generalization of empirical facts, with the latter, those factors deemed secondary are neglected in order to operationalize instead those factors deemed essential. In the early years of the twentieth century, the authors such as Cassirer and Husserl acutely pointed out the limitations of abstraction, re-evaluating instead the idealizing character of scientific concepts. This distinction was also the subject of an important epistemological work published in 1980, namely The Structure of Idealization by Polish philosopher of science Leszek Nowak. At this point a question arises. In what does the originality of Leszek Nowak’s reflection consist of? It could be said that Nowak’s importance is here twofold: terminological and systematic. From the terminological point of view Nowak made a very clear distinction between abstraction and idealization, which instead in the authors such as Cassirer and Husserl are much more blurred or veiled. From the systematic point of view Nowak has extensively analysed the way mature science works. In other words, Nowak highlighted the limits – but also the values – of contemporary epistemology by comparing the latter with the idealizational approach to science.
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