The paper studies organizational niches and also network niches around nodes embedded to the n-dimensional social space (Blau-space). Dimension change, a shift in the number of descriptors of the social domain influences niches in many ways. It alters the optimal niche size. It affects the chances of niche overlap, and so, competition intensity. Dimension change can also open new, unoccupied spots in spaces already 'tightly packed' with niches, thus facilitating organizational entry or the establishment of additional network nodes.
The following paper consists of the description and application of an approach to the research of political sphere in the Internet. The first part is a theoretical introduction to the network analysis. It sketches the issues of political research in the Internet. The second part presents the research focused on the analysis of political orientation which emerges out of the network structure of Internet hyperlinks connecting political domains.
The paper presents a model system for network management structures, with a particular focus on characterising the subjective aspect, dynamic aspect (relationship network) and how the network is coordinated. It also presents system analysis methodology, network management structures and management policies on different aspects of the functioning of the network structures. The final part of the article presents an example of the use of network analysis as a tool to study the knowledge processes in an organisation (the construction of a learning organisation).
This paper analyses spatial patterns in intra-European migration flows in the periods 1997 – 2004 and 2005 – 2013. The paper uses network analysis, and regression and factor analysis in order to establish the major determinants of the spatial patterns exhibited by intra-European migrant stocks. The EU’s Eastern enlargement generated vast East-West migrant flows and prompted a particular reconfiguration of the migration network. The basic topology of the network, however, did not change across the two observed periods: The whole network remains dominated by a ‘rich club’ structure. The topology of the network was seen to rely on a complex and stable set of long-term institutions, such as culture and language structures, and/or established pathways of trade in goods and knowledge.
The study addresses the question of links between narcissism and position in proximate social groups, defined as approval, popularity (positive, negative and overall) and centrality. Narcissists exhibit many socially undesirable features and behaviours, therefore the main hypothesis was that narcissistic people will be unpopular and disapproved by those who have known them for a longer time. Additionally, tested were hypotheses that narcissistic people will overestimate their own standing in a group and that they will like each other. The study applied network analysis of sociometric and psychometric data to verify the hypotheses in natural environments of small peer groups of Polish university students (N = 124). Results provided a complex picture of narcissists’ standing in groups. The main finding was that narcissism correlated with certain social popularity, both overall and positive. It also correlated with the overestimation index, however absolute values of the overestimation indicated that Polish narcissistic people do not overestimate but rather underestimate less their social position compared to the nonnarcissitic ones. The network analysis revealed the central position of narcissists in the groups, as indicated by a higher number of interpersonal relations (Degree), especially those directed from the narcissists outwards (Outdegree), a strategic selection of friends from influential group members, and more control over information flow in the network, resulting from standing between other group members (Betweenness). The hypothesis of reciprocal attraction of narcissistic people was supported. The findings point to possible culture-based differences in the expression of narcissistic features. Conclusions are drawn for understanding the perpetuation of narcissism. Limitations of the results and further research directions are discussed.
The case study undergoes an analysis of the FaceBook (FB) activity of two Slovak populist entities, leader Boris Kollár and OĽaNO movement. The aim was to explore whether and how they construct a populist network and draw on media sources that are out of the mainstream or associated with a populist style. Both selected entities were highly active and quite successful in their communication on FB throughout most of the last five years at least. The study finds that these parties publish sources and connect with other FB pages that mostly confirm their parties’ positions and alliances. Yet there was no preference for alternative sources, understood as disseminating hyper-partisan or fake news and hoaxes, often associated with populist parties. Rather, OĽaNO had some reciprocity in media visibility with mainstream liberal media, in the sense that the party drew on liberal mainstream sources, which also covered the parties’ activities. In sharing posts, Boris Kollár had the most intensive dissemination network, while movements WAF and OĽaNO were very similar in terms of size of their network. There was a rather low cross-promotion. OĽaNO supporters were more appreciative of the efforts made by murdered journalist Ján Kuciak, and showed a stronger focus against Smer-SD (Direction-Social Democracy). In contrast, Kollár was associated more with pro-Christian, national and social rhetoric.
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader Erdoğan represent the culturally heterogeneous periphery against the old ruling elite in Turkey. After almost two decades in power, Erdoğan and the AKP subdued the mainstream media while they aim to realize the same scenario with respect to the social media. Social media are spaces for governmental or pro-governmental propaganda, but also for the expression of political dissent. Politicians in Turkey have been using various social media platforms more effectively since the 2010s. This research reveals that the great majority of the content shared by Erdoğan and the AKP Facebook (FB) accounts belong to their own media production teams. The shared sources are disseminating pro-government propaganda. The Erdoğan FB account has a more intensive network than the AKP FB account. We also found that the main promoters of these two FB accounts were using pseudo names, which might indicate that the main promoters were political trolls.
This article explores how UKIP and Nigel Farage used social media to amplify their message. Mainly digital sources, such as websites and social media, were the preferred source type of both profiles, but more for UKIP than for N. Farage. The most shared digital content of both profiles was websites and social media accounts of their political parties. The second most used source type was print media – mainly national newspapers. Radio stations were the least used source by UKIP, while TV channels the least used source by N. Farage. The higher use of radio sources concerns links to LBC Radio, where he presented a show between 2019 and 2020. TV channels and radio were largely ignored by both profiles as sources. In terms of ownership, sources used by either profile were in their vast majority private due to prevailing type of ownership in the UK. Both profiles relied more on quality newspapers and magazines rather than tabloids but this was often accompanied by a critical approach to the content of such sources. The analysis found that Farage’s profile has only four reciprocal connections. In contrast, UKIP had a much larger reciprocal network of 25 different pages. While in terms of reciprocity the two profiles maintained different networks, the analysis of centrality showed a significant number of 63 pages shared the profiles of both UKIP and Nigel Farage. Although the profile of N. Farage had a much smaller reciprocal network and the number of shares of the two profiles by the central groups disseminating their messages was roughly equal, yet, the Brexit Party and N. Farage were the more successful political actors in the period of interest to this study – in the 2019 European Parliamentary elections.
This article proposes a literature review of existing works on the use of social networks by the populist parties in France, showing that they are part of the extension of a very different political history in both cases. French populists are divided along clear ideological radical left – radical right lines. The conflict is highly personalised. It heavily relies on social media – in part as a result of criticism of bias on the part of legacy media. Especially J.L.Mélenchon seems to be rather innovative and active in using many social media platforms and novel approaches to communication even when comparing at international level. The results show that the FB pages most shared by the two populist leaders were FB pages related to themselves, their party or other members of their organization. The shared links corresponded to the ideological orientation of the two leaders. We therefore study in detail the populist galaxies online, as a sign of the existence of two opposing political traditions that do not rely on the same networks.
Populist leaders tend to be more popular and more followed than their parties or movements. Exceptions, like Igor Matovič, or Jaroslaw Kaczynski, confirm the rule. The major differences in party versus leader´s popularity („likes“) could be found for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Matteo Salvini, Alexis Tsipras and their respective parties. These three leaders were clearly FB stars (with caveat that Tsipras was actually not populist in his communication) and their parties seemed to be much less relevant for those who used FB. The most negative significant divergence in popularity on FB between a party and a party leader was noticed in the case of PiS and Jaroslaw Kaczyński. Kaczyński´s FB page could be called as a niche phenomenon in Polish political communication. Also, Kaczyński was the least frequent actual user of FB among party leaders as well as the leader with the lowest popularity („likes“ in absolute and relative numbers) among political leaders in our sample among FB users. Similarly, FB seemed to be a rather irrelevant tool for PiS considering its FB popularity, although PiS actually communicated quite actively on this platform. While populists tend to be associated with alternative, highly biased, radical or conspiratorial media sources, the analyses in the national case studies showed that these types of sources were exceptions rather than the norm in almost all cases. The most often shared sources were digital sources or social networks. The least often shared were radio or TV channels. The rather ambiguous ideology promoted by Luigi di Maio and Boris Kollár was also reflected in their preferences for ideologically diverse media sources.
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