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EN
In his seminal book (Mind and World) John McDowell argues against the widely spread claim of empiricists that content of experience might be non-conceptual. His argumentation refers to the Kantian idea of spontaneity and the conceptual and propositional activity of mind on the one hand, and to demonstrative concepts as a tool enabling full conceptualization of the entire content of any experience on the other. In this paper I am focusing on the second argument. It seems to be clear that if we assume that demonstratives indeed have this extraordinary function, we have to accept a much deeper stipulation that concerns both the work of concepts in general and ontological consequences. My claim here is that three main possible relations between concepts and the content of experience (these are constitutive, possessional and transformative relations) may lead us to three different ways of understanding content in terms of ontology. Different relations give us distinct pictures of experience and different pictures of non-conceptual content.
EN
This article argues that paintings have a nonconceptual content unlike that of mechanically produced images. The first part of the article outlines an information-theory approach (Lopes, Kulvicki) modelled on the camera and based on the idea that pictures convey information about what they depict. Picture structure is conceived of as contentful by virtue of a supposed causal link with what is depicted and as nonconceptual because it is independent of observers' understanding. The second part introduces an embodied depiction approach based on Merleau-Ponty's view of style and the act of painting. It is argued that (i) because of bodily mediation the nonconceptual content of paintings cannot be assimilated to the information-theory approach; (ii) painted configurations are contentful by virtue of being the product of intelligent activity, but are nonconceptual because they differ from concepts in their representational function.
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