This work is aimed at determining whether we can regard Francisco Suárez as representative of the social-contracting theories developing in the period from the 16th up until the 18th century. Suárez, who is in all probability better known for his metaphysical disputations, provides a truly sophisticated formulation concerning the origin of civil society and political power, where the concept of social consent holds a key role. Suarez’s concept of social consent is situated in the ontological framework and is closely associated with the term nature. Suárez consequently understands the state as a natural and moral organization.
There has been a small revival of natural law thinking in Protestant churches and theology since 1990. This article poses the question of what kind of ethics the German American theologian, philosopher and ethicist Paul Tillich espoused. More specifically what kind of natural theory did he hold? The methodological and hermeneutical key of the article is based on reading thoroughly from Tillich’s work, e.g. Morality and Beyond; Love, Power and Justice; Morality and Moralism: Towards a Theonomous ethics; Systematic Theology, etc. and quoting these sources extensively in order to avoid misconceptions. In order to answer the aforementioned question, the author presents the main concepts in Tillich’s writings, such as theonomy, the Protestant principle, and proceeds to demonstrate how they are related to the natural law thinking which Tillich stands for. All this will be applied to one of the most common objections to natural law: the naturalistic fallacy and the way Tillich bypasses it. This article also provides a short survey of secondary literature about Tillich and Natural Law.
Hume's chapter "Of Miracles" has been widely discussed, and one issue is that Hume seems to simply beg the question. Hume has a strong but implicit naturalist bias when he argues against the existence of reliable testimony for miracles. In this article, I explain that Hume begs the question, despite what he says about the possibility of miracles occurring. The main point is that he never describes a violation of the laws of nature that could not be explained by scientific theories.
The paper describes and explains the position of Thomas Aquinas regarding the possibility of the dispensation of certain precepts of the natural law by man. It situates this concept into the broader context of his views concerning God’s action within practical reason and human participation in providence which is also the basis of his comprehension of every law used by men. The meaning and the relationship between certain key notions (law, dispensation, obligation, moral, natural and divine law) in the discourse of Aquinas is explained. Aquinas is revealed to be a thinker who is very much aware of the limits bound to more particular rules in their attempt to translate the first imperatives of practical reason into a singular situation. Without despising these rules he asks for more than their blind application: he asks for their use in accordance with reason (and with reason) which has originated them and which sometimes requires it to be done otherwise.
The paper provides a philological, literary, hermeneutical, anthropological and gender analysis of Paul’s Letters (Proto-Pauline) which deals with question of homoeroticism (Rom 1:18–32 and 1 Cor 6:9–10). Based on an interpretative tradition which had an absolute prevalence up until the 1960s, it postulates the hypothesis of Paul’s strong heteronormativity, which it consequently intends to examine. It also studies the concept of gender in Greco-Roman society and in Hebrew tradition and the symbolical models lying behind it. It inquires into eventual sources and influences of Paul’s thoughts in the Torah, in Second Temple Judaism and in Hellenistic philosophy (especially natural theology and natural law theory). The paper traces mutual differences but also intersections. It then attempts to situate Paul’s own ideas into this environment with a focus on its heteronormative tendencies and interpretations.
The period sees the transition of the ordinary fighter from feudal levy, yeoman or city burgher militia, to subject in an absolute polity, to today’s concept of the free citizen in a democratic state. In the period, the Swiss Confederacy was the only major polity that was not monarchical, but republican, and at the same time eschewed a standing army in favour of continued reliance on militia throughout. A commonwealth’s military organisation is clearly one of fundamental importance to its own understanding of the nature of rule - its “constitution”. The article traces the transition and relates it to the concept of government under the different theories of the period.
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