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EN
The Polish version of the article was published in “Roczniki Humanistyczne,” vol. 64 (2016), issue 3. The article deals with “brutishness” or “beastliness” (thēriotēs), a concept introduced by Aristotle in the seventh book of the Nicomachean Ethics and defined by him as a negative ethical disposition, different both from vice (kakia) and from incontinence (akrasia), and leading to such pathological behaviours as cannibalism, paedophilia, omophagy, phobias and compulsions. Aristotle’s statements concerning brutishness (VII 1, 1145a15–35, VII 5, 1148b15–1149a24 and VII 6, 1149b23–1150a8) are examined and interpreted in order to clarify the following issues: the essence of thēriotēs as a specific ethical disposition (Sections I–II), its concrete forms and their causes (Section III), the moral-psychological condition of persons with a brutish hexis (Section IV), and their self-consciousness and moral responsibility for their brutish acts (Section V).
EN
At the beginning of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that “the good is the same for an individual as for a city”. The good in question is εὐδαιμονία – the highest good achievable for human beings. In Book X, we learn that contemplative activity (θεωρητική) meets best the requirements set for eudaimonia. Even if we agree that contemplative activity is the good for an individual, how should we understand the claim that contemplation is also the good for a city? I start by reminding readers that for Aristotle the Nicomachean Ethics is essentially a political enquiry and should be read together with his Politics. I focus on the teleological character of his political philosophy and the interlinking of the concepts of the good (τἀγαθόν), nature (φύσις), form (τὸ εἶδος, τὸ τί ἐστι, ἡ μορφή), end (τέλος, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) and function (ἔργον). Then, I look at Aristotle’s two closely-connected statements that polis exists by nature and that men are political animals. Having taken into account Aristotle’s opinion regarding the imperfection of this world, which is exemplified by the vulnerability of human lives to fortune, luck and accidents, I conclude that Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of the political community as a common project explains well how contemplation could be the end of polis. Only very few individuals can achieve the highest good and they can do it only if they have the support of the political community. But all the inhabitants of a polis structured towards achieving the highest good benefit from living in a well-ordered community whose constitution reflects the objective hierarchy of goods.
PL
At the beginning of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that “the good is the same for an individual as for a city”. The good in question is εὐδαιμονία – the highest good achievable for human beings. In Book X, we learn that contemplative activity (θεωρητική) meets best the requirements set for eudaimonia. Even if we agree that contemplative activity is the good for an individual, how should we understand the claim that contemplation is also the good for a city? I start by reminding readers that for Aristotle the Nicomachean Ethics is essentially a political enquiry and should be read together with his Politics. I focus on the teleological character of his political philosophy and the interlinking of the concepts of the good (τἀγαθόν), nature (φύσις), form (τὸ εἶδος, τὸ τί ἐστι, ἡ μορφή), end (τέλος, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) and function (ἔργον). Then, I look at Aristotle’s two closely-connected statements that polis exists by nature and that men are political animals. Having taken into account Aristotle’s opinion regarding the imperfection of this world, which is exemplified by the vulnerability of human lives to fortune, luck and accidents, I conclude that Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of the political community as a common project explains well how contemplation could be the end of polis. Only very few individuals can achieve the highest good and they can do it only if they have the support of the political community. But all the inhabitants of a polis structured towards achieving the highest good benefit from living in a well-ordered community whose constitution reflects the objective hierarchy of goods.
EN
The aim of the article is to indicate that there is quite strong support in the text of the Nicomachean Ethics for the argument that its inquiry is “political” rather than “ethical” in character – the textual evidence provides reasons to challenge the traditional belief that Aristotle sepa­rated ethics from politics and started the rise of ethics as a new branch of philosophy. In addition, one can posit a hypothesis (and this has already been done) that the reader, whom Aristotle had in mind while writing what we now know as the Ethics, was a politician-lawgiver (and not just any educated Greek or – which is even less probable – any human being). So the reader aimed at in the Ethics is the same as the reader aimed at in the Politics – a politician-lawgiver. The Ethics and the Politics are a two-part but inseparable compound that together make a textbook for a politician-lawgiver. Both parts should be read together because the one cannot be understood correctly (i.e. as closely as possible to the intentions of their author) without the other. Aristotle studies human good not from the point of view of the individual but from the point of view of the human community. The highest human good – the philosopher’s eudaimonia – is achieved not by individual effort (or not fundamentally by that) but as a result of good laws and a well-organized life in a polis.
PL
The aim of the article is to indicate that there is quite strong support in the text of the Nicomachean Ethics for the argument that its inquiry is “political” rather than “ethical” in character – the textual evidence provides reasons to challenge the traditional belief that Aristotle separated ethics from politics and started the rise of ethics as a new branch of philosophy. In addition, one can posit a hypothesis (and this has already been done) that the reader, whom Aristotle had in mind while writing what we now know as the Ethics, was a politician-lawgiver (and not just any educated Greek or – which is even less probable – any human being). So the reader aimed at in the Ethics is the same as the reader aimed at in the Politics – a politician-lawgiver. The Ethics and the Politics are a two-part but inseparable compound that together make a textbook for a politician-lawgiver. Both parts should be read together because the one cannot be understood correctly (i.e. as closely as possible to the intentions of their author) without the other. Aristotle studies human good not from the point of view of the individual but from the point of view of the human community. The highest human good – the philosopher’s eudaimonia – is achieved not by individual effort (or not fundamentally by that) but as a result of good laws and a well-organized life in a polis.
PL
Słynne stwierdzenie Arystotelesa dotyczące handlowej genezy wprowadzenia pieniądza monetarnego stało się dominującym i powszechnie przyjmowanym poglądem. Jednakże idee prezentowane przez filozofa wydają się bardziej subtelne i złożone. Właściwie Arystoteles rozważa początki pieniądza w dwóch różnych pracach, Etyce Nikomachejskiej i Polityce. W pierwszej z nich koncentruje się na znaczeniu handlu i bogactwa oraz na wymianie wewnątrz polis. W drugiej zaś analizuje powstanie państwa oraz rozważa zarówno rolę pieniądza w rozwoju polis jak i pieniądza jako środka wymiany między państwami. Pieniądz monetarny pojawia się nie tylko jako środek wymiany handlowej ale także jako część społecznej i politycznej wzajemności, jako znak wynikający z umowy, prawa czy tradycji. Ważnym jest by zrozumieć te różne konteksty i umieścić je w szerszej ideologicznej i filozoficznej perspektywie.
EN
Famous statement proposed by Aristotle that the first coinage was introduced for the needs of trade became the dominant and universally favoured view. However, the ideas of the philosopher seem to be more sophisticated and complex. In fact, Aristotle considers the origin of coinage in two different works, the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. The first one concentrates on the meaning of commerce and wealth and on exchange within the polis. The other focuses on the origin of the state and considers both the role of coins in the development of the polis and money as a medium of exchange between states. Coinage emerges not merely as a medium of commercial exchange but also as a part of civic and political reciprocity, as a conventional sign. It is important to understand these different contexts and to put them in the wider ideological and philosophical discursive perspective.
PL
Artykuł poświęcony jest pojęciu bestialstwa (thēriotēs), wprowadzonemu przez Arystotelesa w VII księdze Etyki nikomachejskiej i zdefiniowanemu przez niego jako negatywna, różna zarówno od nikczemności (kakia) jak i od nieopanowania (akrasia) dyspozycja etyczna, prowadząca do patologicznych zachowań takich jak kanibalizm, pedofilia, omofagia, fobie i kompulsje. W tekście zostaje podjęta próba interpretacji wypowiedzi Arystotelesa dotyczących bestialstwa (EN VII 1, 1145a15-35; VII 5, 1148b15-1149a24; VII 6, 1149b23-1150a8) w celu rozjaśnienia szeregu istotnych dla rozumienia tej koncepcji kwestii, takich jak: istota bestialstwa jako specyficznej dyspozycji etycznej (cz. I-II), jej konkretne postaci oraz ich geneza (cz. III), psychologiczno-moralna kondycja osób dotkniętych bestialską dyspozycją (cz. IV) oraz problem świadomości i odpowiedzialności moralnej tychże osób (cz. V).
EN
The article deals with the „brutishness” or „beastliness” (thēriotēs), a concept introduced by Aristotle in the seventh book of the Nicomachean Ethics and defined by him as a negative ethical disposition, different both from vice (kakia) and from incontinence (akrasia), and leading to such pathological behaviours as canibalism, paedophilia, omophagia, phobias and compulsions. Aristotle’s statements concerning the brutishness (VII 1, 1145a15-35, VII 5, 1148b15-1149a24 and VII 6, 1149b23-1150a8) are examined and interpreted in order to clarify the following issues: the essence of the thēriotēs as a specific ethical disposition (Part I-II), its concrete forms and their causes (Part III), the moral-psychological condition of persons with a brutish hexis (Part IV), and their self-consciousness and moral responsibility for their bestial acts (Part V).
EN
The article is dedicated to the abbreviation of Nicomachean ethics written by Wrocław Dominican John of Ząbkowice (in manuscripts: „Johannes de Franckenstein”). The text, titled Auctoritates ethicorum, is preserved in only one manuscript – Wrocław, Bibl. Univ. Wrocł., ms. IV Q 52, scriptum per manus Johannis de Franckenstein – together with Auctoritates politicorum, Auctoritates yconomicorum and Auctoritates rethoricorum. The authorship of the texts is not certain, but in the previous works of histo-rians it is attributed to John (that thesis is followed also by Ch. Lohr listing the Aristotelian medieval commentaries, and by T. Kaeppeli in his compendium on the medieval Dominican scriptores). Only the part of Auctoritates ethicorum has been edited so far: the fragment, concerning the geometrical model of economic exchange and nature of money from the Book V. The author of the article published it in his book Zagadnienia ekonomiczne w nauczaniu wrocławskiej szkoły dominikańskiej w późnym średniowieczu (Wrocław 2004); this fragment was later referred in details also in the book of the same author: „Oeco-nomica mediaevalia” of Wrocław Dominicans. Library and Studies of Friars, and Ethical-Economic Ideas: the Example from Silesia (Spoleto 2010). The sources of the text of Auctoritates ethicorum are the following: translatio Lincoliensis of the Aristotelian text, Sententia libri ethicorum by Thomas Aquinas, paraphrasis of Ethica by Albertus Magnus, and Summa Alexandrinorum (called translacio arabica). The fragments of the Book IV and Book V, described in the article, shed light on the method applied in the Auctoritates. Summa Alexandrinorum is quoted in the description of the virtue of liberalitas. Writing about diversity of artes and occupations the author cites Albertus Magnus, quoting after him the sentence delivered from Michael Ephesius, erroneously attributed to Eustratius by Albert. However, the Albertinian reference to the role of compensation of labores and expensa is omitted. The author of the Auctoritates refers mainly to points the common to St. Thomas and St. Albert.
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