Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 18

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  OBJECT
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The author attempts to present cinema from the point of view of an object. It appears that a film object gives rise to a number of fundamental, anthropological questions: about characteristic ways of experiencing being in time, about the existential character of memory and the need for meaning, and about basic directions of teleological cinematic visualization of reality. Analyzed here are the ideas present in traditional theories of film, as it is there, where the ontology of cinema was considered first. St. Augustine and Martin Heidegger define further steps of the philosophical reflection.
EN
The material world and in particular objects are a focus of great interest in anthropology, sociology, historiography, archeology and literature studies. And so in turn Koschany considers how objects and the material world are understood and analysed in film studies. One of the possibilities is the interdisciplinary comparative reflection upon the function and the ways of being of objects in film and literature. Koschany considers the example of object poems (Ding-Gedicht) and their film equivalent. The starting point in this comparison is to distinguish 'normal' objects (that are always subordinate in relation to subjects) from objects (things) that are of equal rank to men, understood in accordance to the framework provided by Kant, Husserl or Heidegger (hence the frequent references to philosophy). In the article two methods dealing with the analysis of things in poems and films are considered: the semiotic and the phenomenological. The author also considers the example of the word 'Rosebud', spoken by Citizen Kane, and its particular relation with another object - a child's sleigh.
EN
There are two fundamental questions concerning the choice and presence of objects in various formal systems: (1) Where do these objects come from? (2) What do (can) we know about them? To answer these questions, the author introduces the notion of a protoontology as the pre-theoretic realm of (unspecified) entities from which the basic objects - individuals - of the formal system 'S' are postulated. The pragmatic aspects of such choices are investigated with regard to the first-order logic, both pure and applied. It is claimed that the postulated (chosen, constructed) objects enter the formal system 'S' with a package of the properties and relationships, the recognition of which depends on the interpretation and application of the available predicates of 'S'. If these properties and relationships are not made explicit, a possible clash may arise between them and the properties and relationships 'assigned' to the individuals of 'S' by the interpreted predicates of 'S'. As regards the relationship between logic and metaphysics, the author contends that logic can perhaps be viewed as the articulation of the fundamental features of the protoontological objects without which no discourse or theory would be possible. In this sense logic could also be viewed as a theory and method of the construction of a well-articulated metaphysical theory.
EN
This paper focuses on the Slovak phraseme “figu borovú” (expressing the meaning a) absolutely not b) nothing at all), which is presented in Slovak lexicographic literature as a phraseme with the highest degree of morphological restriction (restricted to the form in the accusative of singular). However, the material in the Slovak National Corpus (sub-corpus of Slovak texts available on the web), in addition to the accusative form, also offers examples of the nominative type “figa borová”. The paper maps the occurrence of these forms and analyses them from the functional semantic and morphosyntactic aspects. A natural part of the topic is also the sociocultural dimension of the lexical unit “figa borová”, which is also related to its gestural anchoring (the gesture: a thumb inserted between the index finger and middle finger). The core of the study is therefore preceded by an introduction to the gestural paralinguistic background and a look at lexicographic works of synchronic and diachronic character capturing the semantic structure of the noun figa. Special attention is paid to the relationship of phraseological units mať, dostať, dať (to have, to get, to give) figu borovú – mať, dostať, dať (to have, to get, to give) šušku borovú, from the attributive aspect, that is, in the line of model – analogy with relation to the adjective borový, which is their component part.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2007
|
vol. 35
|
issue 2
109-121
EN
This article presents arguments for the existential connectiveness of the summative whole. The summative whole is a type of whole in Ingarden's ontology. It occurs alongside the absolute whole (the inseparable whole) and is of great importance in formal ontology, especially in the analysis of objects of higher rank and subject domains. Establishing the existential status of the summative whole seems to be important and to contribute to the development of some fields of ontology. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the moments of existential distinctiveness and connectiveness are themselves included in the context of such terms as 'object' and ‘whole'.
EN
Frege argues that considering Socrates as an object in the proposition “Socrates exists” raises two problems. First, this proposition would be uninformative. Second, its negation entails a contradiction. Attempting to solve these problems, Frege claims that Socrates is representing the concept of a man whose name is Socrates. Therefore, existence is a second-order concept. This paper surveys the main modern theories about the types of existence, in order to find another response to Frege’s problems. For, if Socrates’ existence differs from the type that “exists” implies, “Socrates exists” is informative and its negation is not a contradiction. At last, this paper argues for an idea, in which “existence” is not a concept or property. Existence is the principle of the objects. So, “Socrates exists” is in fact “the existence is Socrates,” and “Socrates does not exist” is “there is no existence that is Socrates.” This idea could be an alternative for responding to Frege’s problems.
EN
The object - an individuated, integral and continuous element of reality - is a basic unit of human cognition. Objects, spatial relations between them, and trajectories of their movements are the contents of the very first perceptions and categorizations. It is claimed that abstract things (numbers, values, etc.) are categorized and understood through 'reification' - by analogy to material objects. A complete and coherent analysis of object and reification concepts, and their relation to language, was proposed from an empiricist position by W. V. O. Quine. His proposal is at the same time an almost complete research program for cognitive developmental psychology. Here psychological reality of this program is analyzed in the light of contemporary research on object perception, individuation, perceptual and conceptual categorization, object permanence, inferring the object's causal role from different patterns of movement, and reification of abstract things. It is concluded that Quine accurately diagnozed the role and properties of the object category in cognition, but he underestimated the smartness and conceptual advance of cognitive tools used by the child at the very start. We refer here to mechanisms of object individuation, perception of object permanence, and attribution of causal roles on the basis of patterns of movement, and finally formation of basic ontological distinctions from the prelinguistic stage.
EN
In the described research the authoress examined hypothesis about the significance of Object and Context and about memory of them among Polish and Chinese representatives. The project was based on the comparative studies among Americans and East-Asians dealing with two cognitive styles: holistic and analytic. The research on comparing the context sensitivity of Japanese and Americans publishes by Nisbett and Masuda in 2001 was a prototype study for the own one. The results showed that Poles preferred the Objects, which is rated higher. For Chinese the Background was always more important than the Object, irrespectively to the stimulus origin. Chinese cognitive style was more constant. The results of recognition test showed that Chinese made more errors and Poles had more correct indications. The research gave some evidences for the differentiation on two cognitive styles specific for Asian and European. The holistic style of thinking characteristic for Chinese, in contrary to analytic style typical for Poles, does not bring Asians only advantages. Although they see more details which let them see far more of the world than Westerners, they are also in cognitively more demanding situation and they have to remember more elements. Depending on the situation both of cognitive styles: holistic and analytic can be useful and appropriate.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
|
vol. 65
|
issue 7
643-651
EN
There is a growing pessimism about objects based on the view that objects are mysterious un-observables. According to this line of thought objects can disturb our senses or measuring devices only indirectly, via properties or relations - only properties or relations are observables, not the objects per se. As a result, inaccessible objects open a gap between science and reality and scientific realism is lost. Defenders of objects may respond that the scope of this reasoning is rather limited, because its truth is restricted to very specific views of objects and scientific realism. The paper is concerned with three forms of scientific realism confronting them with three basic ontologies of objects. It appears, then, that seen from the perspective of scientific realism the least problematic picture of objects is given by the Spinozian conception of objects and their modes. However, even this conception faces some difficulties and it seems that the traditional metaphysics is not able to provide a scientifically unproblematic notion of object.
EN
Roman Ingarden believed that the ontological status of properties cannot be exhausted by the claim that properties are non-independent and fulfill the formal function of “belonging to” some object. To explain this he used the metaphor that “properties enter into the account of an object”, a version of the scholastic saying that “accidentia non sunt entia sed entis”. I argue that properties do not have their own qualitative content. For example, in the case of a bar of steel which has property of being hard, the quality of “hardness” does not inhere immediately in this property and then indirectly in the bar, but inheres directly in the bar. The property in question does not have hardness on its own. This seems trivial but it needs to be emphasized because some philosophers treat properties as objects, even if they claim that properties cannot exist without objects. The thesis of the formal heteronomy of properties consists just in this view: properties have no matter on their own. The second part of the article is devoted to the saying “accidentis esse est inesse”. I argue for a strict connection between the thesis that properties exist because of the object’s existence and the thesis of formal heteronomy, and I use the latter to argue against bundle theories of object.
|
2004
|
vol. 13
|
issue 4(52)
227-241
EN
In connection with recent research conducted by several contemporary German scholars, such writers as Baum, Wolff and Reich, the author addresses the following problem: If the subject, conceived generally, is a representation formed by the intellect then a combination of various representations into one object as it appears to the subject must also be a product of the intellect. If so much is granted, the question arises: How is it possible that various representations are unified in the intellect in a way adequate to the representations themselves rather than to the patterns of unification used by the subject? And another question becomes important: What is the meaning of the 'objective unity of apperception', and what is its relation to the 'synthetic unity of apperception' in this context? According to Reich, for instance, objective cognition cannot be effected within one concept due to the properties of the self itself. If the thought presenting the subject, conceived generally, to itself is a necessary thought for the subject which in this way acquires knowledge of its own non-productivity, and if this condition characterises all thoughts different from the self then the limitations of the self are transferred to all its thoughts. From these considerations springs the main idea of the article, namely, that the proposition is, by virtue of its own definition, an instance of the use of concepts when the subject wants to gain cognition of objects. With the mediation of the proposition concepts are constituted as synthetically unified in the subject. According to Wolff the concept of intellectual cognition that underlies transcendental deduction is the point of departure and the guiding beacon for the Kantian program. Eventually, the author joins the position of Reich who claims that the meaning of 'proposition' and 'intellect' must be seen in the light of Kant's contention that the unity of intellect and the unifying functions of intellect can be fully discovered only after a comprehensive understanding of the unifying functions of propositions has been achieved.
EN
The essence of the place and role of public private partnership, its character, purpose in the formation of investment attractiveness of environmental infrastructure, carried out the conceptual rationale for and the prospects of public-private partnership mechanisms to ensure that investment activity and improve the attractiveness of environmental infrastructure to attract the necessary investment.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
vol. 72
|
issue 4
245 – 258
EN
The paper deals with Newton’s eight definitions from his Principia making them a subject of logical-semantic and epistemological analyses. First, it lists these definitions and then presents two views on the nature of definition, as given in recent scholarly works. These views are applied to Newton’s definitions. Resulting from this application is the conclusion that Transparent Intensional Logic’s approach to definitions, once the latter contain magnitudes, is unable to reconstruct the fact that the magnitude (or magnitudes) in the defining is (are) different from the magnitude in the definiendum. Another result is the recognition that Newton’s eight definitions, regardless of their a priori nature, still yield an increase of knowledge about the world. This conclusion is justified by Newton’s computation of the mass of planets and his reflection on the possibility of space flight.
EN
The article attempts to investigate the essence of imagination by questioning the status of imagined objects. The author refers to Husserl’s concept of imagination as a form of consciousness that functions by presenting its object as imagined, i.e., as absent. Although Husserl formulated at least two theories of non-existent objects, his descriptions of imagination – states the author – are only partial, since he did not describe the noematical aspect of consciousness. In this context, Ingarden’s ontology provides useful tools for describing the imagined object as a purely intentional object. The author claims that Ingarden’s analysis of fiction can serve to supplement Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination. In this context, Blaustein seems to bind both perspectives – noetic and noematic – by indicating a transcendent content as a necessary element of any act of imagining. On this basis, the author defines the conditions of identity for imagined objects.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2014
|
vol. 42
|
issue 3
187-202
EN
The article reconstructs main topics presented by Husserl in his “D 17” research manuscript entitled Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature. The author claims that in the “D 17” manuscript Husserl introduces a non-idealistic concept of constitution, i.e., he understands constitution as a correlation of the ground (Boden), living body, and a perceived object. A phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of the ground, however, leads to generative phenomenology which introduces intersubjectivity and history into the process of constitution.
EN
The paper deals with the certain problems concerning semantic structure of sentence on the basis of the theoretical and methodological postulates and analysis presented in the work Semantic Structure of Slovak Sentence (2012) by Eva Tibenská. The paper describes some open questions concerning the investigation how semantic and syntactic aspects of sentence structure cooperate. The paper concentrates especially on problems arising with the classification of predicates and delimiting the semantic roles of subject and object participants in the sentence structures. A special attention is put on the questions connected with the semantic structures of subject less sentence and the understanding of causative sentences in the language. The paper also analyses the meaning of the structures in which dative participant occurs with regard to its semantic interpretation.
EN
The philosophical concepts by Gottfried Leibniz, Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, and especially parts that contributed to the development of theoretical thinking about film became the inspiration for writing this study. Leibniz writes about perception and apperception as two fundamental moments of cognition of the external (object) and the internal (subject). Identification occurs during the impact of film illusion on perception that is identification of perception of sentient (viewer) and perceived projection (film images). Due to the identification with film, a viewer is able to respond to the film content authentically and realistically. Extent of identification, which is the essence of film experience, is one of the ways how to approach the understanding of film reality. The second way is the realization of this relationship as something unreal and illusive. This knowledge takes place in the act of apperception, when we recollect our original identity. The film is depleted of the basic assumption of experience if it does not offer adequate forms of subjectivisation and it is not seen as the game with identification. Subjectivisation is a basic condition of recognition of film work. It is created around the chronological image-concept (main character). It is essential for the perception of film as it extends into the affects and subordinate consciousness and brings sensational colourfulness into the experience of the film's story.
EN
This article examines albums from the Romantic period – scrapbooks containing captions autographs, drawings, and personal memorabilia – both as artefacts, and as polysemic, heterogeneous “texts” of early nineteenth-century Russian and Polish culture. Albums flourished in the age of Romanticism because of their location in the nexus of literature and fine arts, social life and domesticity, high and low culture. Flexible and open-ended, albums facilitated discourse about memory, national identity, and authorship. The history of the album shows it to have originated in ancient Rome, where it was called the album amicorum, and it was introduced into Slavic culture via the German Stammbuch as early as the sixteenth century. After an introductory presentation of the album as a cultural object, the article focuses on the album’s textual structure: form, multifarious content, and the internal languages that govern its arrangement and decoding. Thus the album is a cultural text in two senses: it is a collection that encapsulates philosophical, sociopolitical, and the aesthetic concerns of Romanticism, but it is also a physical verbal/pictorial text that also frequently approximates a literary work, a book, or an art object.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.