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EN
Prior entrepreneurship research shows that individuals often possess biased expectations regarding their chances of success in the market compared to objective reality, as well as to their success and profitability compared to their peers. The present study addresses the effect of overconfidence on corporate decision-making with regard to the methodology used in economic and psychological studies. Current research provides contradictory and inconclusive results about the effect of overconfidence on various Chief Executive Officers’ decisions and profitability. In this study, the author tries to explain this inconclusiveness by outlining some of the most important methodological issues in the overconfidence research. Overconfidence can be defined as a systematic tendency to overestimate one’s own ability to make accurate forecasts, or as an overestimation of one’s own performance, or knowledge, compared to his/her actual performance, or others’ knowledge. In this paper, he describes, firstly, the origins and differences in operationalization between economic and psychology studies. Several widely-used measures and proxies of overconfidence in economic research are described and the diversity of using these measures in previous studies is showed. Subsequently, he discusses how different forms of overconfidence impact the decision-making and performance of entrepreneurs. In this part, the study focuses on the three most frequent areas that are reflected in the current literature; namely the effect of overconfidence on financial decision-making, firm profitability, and entrepreneurs’ innovativeness. The final part of the study outlines several possible ways how problems with methodology and inconclusiveness in the overconfidence research could be solved.
Studia Psychologica
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2016
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vol. 58
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issue 4
286 - 306
EN
This study examined whether participants will show optimism about common events, yet show pessimism about rare events (regardless of their desirability), and whether there is a relationship between optimism and overconfidence, conceptualized (Shepperd et al., 2013) as unrealistic absolute optimism. 136 pedagogy students completed a questionnaire with 28 events (positive and negative, rare and common) together with two cognitive tasks and an estimation of their performance. The results support neither the unrealistic hypothesis nor the egocentrism hypothesis fully – the participants appeared to be somewhat pessimistic in estimating the likelihood of mainly positive events happening to them; they were quite optimistic in expecting to avoid negative events. Only a small overlap between the unrealistic comparative optimism and unrealistic absolute optimism (overconfidence) was found. These results support the necessity to distinguish between distinct types of optimism bias and highlight methodological problems connected mainly with estimates of unrealistic comparative optimism.
Studia Psychologica
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2021
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vol. 63
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issue 2
158 – 174
EN
Current research on bullshit has shifted its focus from the recipient of bullshit to its producer; this trend being reflected in the new Bullshitting frequency scale (Littrell et al., 2021) measuring persuasive and evasive bullshitting. The aim of our study was to validate the scale for the Slovak population and to examine the relationship between persuasive and evasive bullshitting behaviour, overconfidence and myside bias in the context of the topic of migration. Six hundred and sixty-six Slovak adults (52.7% men, Mage = 41.84) participated in an online study. The two-factor structure of BFS was confirmed. The results showed that people high in persuasive bullshitting (“persuasive bullshitters”), after controlling for evasive bullshitting, felt they had more knowledge about migration, but they also showed more myside bias. Similarly, people high in evasive bullshitting (“evasive bullshitters”), after controlling for persuasive bullshitting, felt they had less knowledge about migration and tended to underestimate their knowledge. Contrary to our expectations, correlation between overconfidence and persuasive bullshitting disappeared when evasive bullshitting was controlled for, and it seems that the negative correlation was caused by evasive bullshitters being underconfident. Our results further expand the knowledge about cognitive characteristics of bullshitters and support the distinction between the two kinds of bullshitting behaviour, which has implications for political debates as well.
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