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RFN wobec Grudnia 1970. Reakcje dyplomatyczne i prasowe

100%
Jasiński Ł.
Dzieje Najnowsze
|
2022
|
vol. 54
|
issue 1
153-178
EN
The article’s primary purpose is to analyse reactions of West German diplomacy and media towards strikes and protests in towns and cities of the Polish coast in December 1970. The article was prepared based on documents issued by Polish and West German authorities, particularly the diplomatic service of these two countries and the daily press. The text focuses on a wide range of reactions of press correspondents and diplomats from West Germany faced with crisis and bloodshed in Poland.
PL
Celem prezentowanego artykułu jest poddanie analizie reakcji dyplomacji oraz mediów RFN na strajki i protesty na polskim Wybrzeżu w grudniu 1970 r. Bazę źródłową tekstu stanowią dokumenty wytworzone przez polski i zachodnioniemiecki aparat władzy oraz polska i zachodnioniemiecka prasa z grudnia 1970 r. Artykuł opisuje szereg reakcji korespondentów zachodnioniemieckich mediów oraz dyplomatów RFN w obliczu kryzysu i rozlewu krwi w Polsce.
2
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Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in der Ära-Kreisky: Entwicklung und Probleme des österreichischen Osthandels mit der ČSSR 1970–1983

99%
Graf M.
Prague Papers on the History of International Relations
|
2016
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issue 1
98-120
EN
Austrian–Czechoslovakian economic relations constitute a special case auf Austria’s Osthandel (Eastern Trade) in the Cold War era. The reasons for this can be traced back to the historical development of economic exchange as well as the complicated political relations between Vienna and Prague. Against this historical background and the context of Austria’s Ostpolitik and Osthandel after 1945, the study delivers a first analysis of economic interactions in the Kreisky era (1970–1983). The post-1945 development of bilateral relations between the two Central European neighbors also hindered improvement on the economic level. In comparison to other Socialist states, Austria’s nationalized industries played a rather small roll in trade with Czechoslovakia. Despite good will on both sides, negotiations on the ministerial level remained complicated. While most COMECON members (except the Soviet Union) continuously faced severe trade balance deficits with Austria, Czechoslovakia’s balance was usually active. By the end of the 1970s, Austria’s deficit grew massively. Additionally, this article presents case studies on trilateral cooperation in the fields of economic and energy supplies. The difficulties in realizing those projects with Poland or Hungary strengthen the image of a highly heterogeneous “Eastern bloc”. The analysis is primarily based on Austrian and East German archival sources.
3
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The Ostpolitik of Francoist Spain

85%
Orella J. L.
Przegląd Europejski
|
2017
|
vol. 2017 (46)(4)
98-117
EN
Francoist Spain was not recognised by the Communist Bloc countries due to its support of the communities of political exiles. In 1969 a thaw in relations began at an economic level in search of markets for Spanish development. The timid contact would gradually increase and favour relationships away from political ideology, beneficial in economic terms, and this would prepare the basis of full future recognition, with the exchange of ambassadors in 1977.
4
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Polityka Niemiec wobec Europy Wschodniej: Russia first?

80%
Malinowski K.
Przegląd Politologiczny
|
2015
|
issue 4
19-32
EN
The strategic assumptions of German Ostpolitik have been undermined by the aggressive activities of Russia during the Ukraine crisis. The tight economic relations between Germany and Russia have not brought about domestic transformations in the political system in Russia, and have not reduced its interest in regaining its imperial position in Eastern Europe, i.e. in the area of the former Soviet Union. Germany’s support for both the reform program in Ukraine and deepening its relations with the EU has shown that it is ready to critically evaluate its strategy toward Eastern Europe and review its ‘Russia first’ approach.
PL
Agresywne zachowania Rosji w trakcie konfliktu na Ukrainie w 2014 r. podważyły strategiczne założenia polityki Niemiec. Powiązania gospodarcze nie doprowadziły do przemian wewnętrznych w Rosji oraz nie ograniczyły jej nastawienia na rewindykowanie wpływów imperialnych. Gotowość Niemiec do poparcia Ukrainy w reformach wewnętrznych i jej zbliżenia do UE oznaczała, że są one skłonne bardziej zniuansować założenia swojej strategii wobec Europy Wschodniej i tym samym ograniczyć priorytet Russia first.
5
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Making the Best of a Bad Job? The Nixon Administration and the 1971 Four Power Berlin Agreement

71%
Reeves C.
Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
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2014
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issue 6(32)
287-314
EN
In the period 1969‑1971, the Nixon administration had significant misgivings regarding the Eastern Policy (Ostpolitik) of the new West German government led by Willy Brandt. These mainly stemmed from a fear that it could create divisions within NATO and instability within the Federal Republic. Of particular concern was that Brandt had made ratification of the renunciation of force treaty he signed with the Soviet Union in August 1970 contingent upon a Four Power Berlin Agreement. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, did not view the talks with any enthusiasm, believing that it would be extremely difficult to achieve a satisfactory agreement. Moreover, they feared that the Three Western Powers would be negotiating from a position of weakness. Accordingly, in 1969 and 1970 the White House did not view the Berlin negotiations as a priority. At the beginning of 1971, however, Kissinger and Nixon appeared to perform a volte‑face when they decided, using their secret backchannel with the Soviets, to actively work to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. It is argued that this change was partly prompted by their wider diplomatic strategy; in particular, Nixon’s desire to obtain a summit meeting in Moscow with his Soviet counterpart. It is also suggested that political calculations, especially the pressing need for a foreign policy success before the 1972 presidential election, played a significant role. Nixon and Kissinger established a secret set of tripartite discussions in Bonn that ultimately resulted in the successful conclusion of a Four Power Berlin Agreement. In doing so, they effectively negotiated behind the backs of two of their chief allies in Western Europe, Britain and France, and officials in their own State Department.
6

The Ostpolitik of Francoist Spain

57%
Orella J. L.
Przegląd Europejski
|
2017
|
issue 4(46)
98-117
EN
Francoist Spain was not recognised by the Communist Bloc countries due to its support of the communities of political exiles. In 1969 a thaw in relations began at an economic level in search of markets for Spanish development. The timid contact would gradually increase and favour relationships away from political ideology, beneficial in economic terms, and this would prepare the basis of full future recognition, with the exchange of ambassadors in 1977.
PL
Państwa Bloku Wschodniego nie utrzymywały stosunków z Państwem Hiszpańskim (dyktatura Francisco Franco) ze względu na wsparcie udzielane przez nie emigrantom politycznym. W 1969 r. zaczęła się odwilż w relacjach gospodarczych, związana z poszukiwaniem przez Hiszpanię nowych rynków. Nieśmiałe kontakty z czasem rozwinęły się, sprzyjając kontaktom, które, niezależnie od różnic ideologicznych, przynosiły korzyści wymiarze ekonomicznym. W ten sposób utorowano drogę do pełnego uznania i wymiany ambasadorów w 1977 r.
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