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1

Kategoria pasywności w fenomenologii materialnej Michela Henry`ego

100%
Walczak M.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2018
|
vol. 46
|
issue 4
5-21
EN
The aim of this article is to analyze the notion of passivity in Michel Henry's material phenomenology. I focus on three main issues: noetic-noematic structure, internal time consciousness, and phenomenological method. What I consider my main reference point is the classical Husserlian version of phenomenology, which is what is discussed by Michel Henry. In particular, I pay attention to those of Husserl's works where the notion of passivity is introduced. For instance, Husserl refers to it when analyzing passive synthesis, which is performed at the level of internal time consciousness. I present Husserl's ideas, which have met with skepticism from Henry's side. In comparing works written by both philosophers I probe whether this criticism is justified and show how Henry’s innovative ideas shed a new light on phenomenology. Some of them allow him to move beyond the limits of the traditional phenomenological approach. To cite an example, defining the notion of préimpression in an utterly different way leads to associating it with suffering (souffrir), which is considered a exemplary model of experiencing. Consequently, adopting this approach enables Henry to uncover the substance of material phenomenology ‒ the pathetic immediacy in which life experiences itself.
2

SUÁREZOVA TEORIE VZNIKU SPECIES SENSIBILIS A KOGNITIVNÍHO AKTU VNĚJŠÍCH SMYSLŮ V KONTEXTU STŘEDOVĚKÉ A RENESANČNÍ FILOSOFIE

86%
Heider D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2015
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vol. 22
|
issue 2
229 - 249
EN
The study presents F. Suárez’s theory of the principles of sensation in the context of medieval (Averroes, John of Jandun) and Renaissance philosophy (Nifo, Cajetan). It proceeds in five steps. First, it considers Suárez’s ontology of sensory cognitive act. Second, it treats Suárez’s theory of the formation of sensible species. Third, it presents Suárez’s ontology of sensible species. Fourth, it exposes Suárez’s theory of the efficient causes of the sensory cognitive act. In conclusion, the author states that Suárez’s theory, compared to the doctrines of Aquinas and Thomists, constitutes the significant historical shift from cognitive passivism to cognitive activism mirroring the Zeitgeist of the Renaissance philosophy without abandoning the basic tenets of the traditional Aristotelian – scholastic philosophy.
3

SVEDOMIE AKO „INÉ V TOM ISTOM“. RICŒUR, LEVINAS: DVE ODLIŠNÉ NEEPISTEMOLOGICKÉ PERSPEKTÍVY

72%
Sucharek P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
|
vol. 65
|
issue 9
845-859
EN
The essay compares Ricour's and Levinas's conceptions of the constitution of conscience in the sense of German Gewissen. Beginning with Ricour's basic distinction between 'identity-idem' and 'identity-ipse' it shows the proper place of conscience in his conception. For Ricour conscience is a finite category of otherness as related to the self, i.e. its most interior, intrinsic otherness. For Levinas, on the other hand, conscience - the other in the same - is an initiatory category, which is described in terms of absolute passivity, persecution and substitution. In conclusion Ricour´s critique of Levinas' category of 'the Other' is examined on the background of Levinas' conception of subjectivity as a vocation for Good.
4

Rola stosunków aktywność-pasywność w Husserlowskiej teorii świadomości

72%
Maciejczak M.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2014
|
vol. 42
|
issue 3
31-45
EN
At the very basis of the cognitive efficacy of consciousness there is a domain of passive synthesis, a pre-linguistic and pre-predicative intentionality that Husserl called world-experiencing life (welterfahrenes Leben). It also makes possible thematic consciousness and its connection to the world. Husserl holds the opposed notions of passivity and activity to be functional. What has been actively constituted becomes passive and a basis for higher forms of understanding. The article offers arguments for the above mentioned thesis, taking into account the systematic unity of consciousness. It presents the formal and material aspects of consciousness, the domain of passive synthesis and also the role of reflection for its peculiar autonomy. In the broader view it is easier to explain the meaning of the opposed notions of passivity and activity. The opposition depicts the dynamics of the system of consciousness.
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