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FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE

100%
Olszewska L.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2005
|
issue 1
139-157
EN
Perdurance is one of the ways in which material objects can exist in time. This way of existing in time is of the special significance when the so-called 'Leibniz's Law' (the law of indiscernibility of identicals) is being applied to material objects undergoing changes in time. According to the Leibniz's Law, if two objects are identical, they can be ascribed exactly the same properties. However, an object existing before a change does not share all its properties with the very same object existing after a change - this is what a change consists in. The proponents of perdurance want to solve the above puzzle in the following way: an object is to be understood as composed of temporal parts, and to these temporal parts we can ascribe different properties, like 'being p' and 'being non-p'. In such a way, according to the proponents of perdurance, we can give an account of how a change is compatible with identity of an object. However, it seems that if the doctrine of perdurance is supposed to solve problems with identity through change, temporal parts must be understood as non-momentary (extended in time) and arbitrary (their ontological status cannot be superior to the status of objects). Otherwise the doctrine of perdurance is threatened by the so called 'no-change' objection, according to which there is no real change of perduring objects, since there is nothing to survive a change, as there are only successions of different objects, that is, successions of temporal parts.
2

PERSONITE PROBLEM AND THE STAGE-THEORETIC REPLY

88%
Noonan H.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2022
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vol. 29
|
issue 2
275 – 282
EN
Personites are shorter-lived, person-like things that extend across part of a person’s life. Their existence follows from the standard perdurance view of persons. Johnston argues that it has bizarre moral consequences. For example, it renders morally problematic spending time learning a difficult language in anticipation of going abroad. The crucial thought is that if persons have moral status so do personites. Johnston argues for this claim. Kaiserman responds, on behalf of stage theory that this only works on a perdurantist account. This is a conservative response to the problem. It seeks to show that retaining the ontology of perdurantism one can resolve the difficulty by a semantic change. I show that the personite problem can be reworked as an argument against stage theorists. The stage theorist can respond by rejecting an assumption of the reasoning. But if it is acceptable for him to do so the perdurantist can reject this assumption too, which is enough by itself to block Johnston’s argument. Thus, for all it helps with the personite problem, stage theorists might as well be perdurantists.
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