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Granice redukcji w fenomenologii Husserla a kres filozofii transcendentalnej

100%
Trykowska M.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2010
|
vol. 38
|
issue 3
25-48
EN
The article considers the evolution of the basic epistemological mechanism of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, the (phenomenological) reduction, in its main variants (the Cartesian way, the way through intentional psychology, the way through ontology). These are further radicalized into the primordial reduction and the reduction to the living present. An analysis of the key assumptions and results of Husserl’s reduction makes it possible to conclude that the most radical, far-reaching version of the reduction (to the living present) may exhaust the philosophical potential of intentional phenomenology. What is left in the area of transcendental philosophy (the philosophy which moves beyond the attitude of “natural objectivism”) are phenomenological positions that resign from the concept of intentionality as the crux of (phenomenological) cognition: Heidegger’s and Henry’s standpoints allow for a critical examination of Husserl’s philosophy from a new perspective, while at the same time opening new vistas for transcendentalism. These positions make it possible to note the limits of Husserl’s method and show that a different kind of reduction is possible.
2

MEDZI SUBJEKTIVITOU A INTERSUBJEKTIVITOU

100%
Vydrová J.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2007
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vol. 62
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issue 8
668-674
EN
There are more forms of intersubjectivity or more ways of how we experience the overlaps of our subjectivity to the other, to the alter in his different forms. The paper focuses on some selected aspects of this problem, which are related to the phenomenological reduction and situated at the intersection point of two theses: Subjectivity is intersubjectivity; Intersubjectivity is subjectivity. The discussion is based on selected texts of Edmund Husserl and Natalie Depraz.
3

INTENTIONALITY AS A CHARACTERISTIC OF THE EMPIRICAL MENTAL ACTS AND AS A TRANSCENDENTAL CONDITION OF THE POSSIBLE EXPERIENCE (Intentsiinist' yak kharakterystyka empirychnykh psykhichnykh aktiv i yak transtsendentalna umova mozhlyvosti dosvidu)

88%
Kebuladze V.
Філософська Думка
|
2009
|
issue 4
84-91
EN
The article is intended to investigate the concept of intentionality of Edmund Husserl in terms of the phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology. Such an approach makes possible to consider the reflection of Husserlian understanding of intentionality in the philosophical conception of Vincent Descombes. The author aims to show two different levels of intentionality - psychological intentionality and transcendental-philosophical intentionality. In this way he tries to solve the problem of the passive intentionality.
4

LANGUAGE AS A PHENOMENON OF CULTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF EVOLUTION OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY (ON THE BASIS OF M. SCHELER'S PHENOMENOLOGY) (Mova yak fenomen kultury v konteksti rozvytku transtsendentalnoi fenomenolohii)

88%
Grigorishin S.
Філософська Думка
|
2009
|
issue 1
54-65
EN
The article is intended to investigate the concept of language as a phenomenon of culture in Max Scheler's phenomenology. Special attention is paid to analysis of this concept in the context of phenomenological reductions problems. The author describes the most important part of Scheler's conception of language, notably his theory of symbols. The role of this conception is defined by differentiation between the latter theory and Husserl's ideas about the place of language in the reductions method. The author argues that Scheler's concept of symbols can get round the obstacles of transcendental and eidetic reductions. Scheler interprets modifications of judgments only as modifications of individual pronouncements, but not as general pronouncements. It is a kind of treatment which has an influence upon the whole phenomenological procedures, as well as upon the practice of phenomenological reductions. All these changes show that phenomenology is also possible as a philosophy with a natural standpoint. The ground of such a view is Max Scheler's concept of language or, to be more precise, his theory of symbols and theory of judgement.
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