In the paper, the author presents phenomenological ideas of corporeality by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre showing, how living body is experienced and involved in human world. The bounding between body and its environment, as well as its role in creation of intentions and formation of our understanding of the world are of exceptional significance. He shows, what implication such an understanding of the body has for popular in contemporary cognitive science concept of 'representation' as well as for propositional of knowledge . Finally, he tries to show, to what extend phenomenological concept of corporeality of mind is parallel to pragmatists concept of action.
The objective of the article is a comparison of three texts by Edmund Husserl:'Ideen I', its revision in 'Hua XXXIV' and 'Epilogue' of 'Ideen III'. There are internal (thematic) and external (resulting from author's motivation) connections between these three texts which - also as a justification of this comparison - will be examined in this article. The comparison should give answers to several questions: Why did Husserl decide to do this revision? What changes did he make? Should we regard these changes as important interventions into certain phenomenological topics? What are the results of this comparison for the phenomenological method? By means of these texts several chosen phenomenological themes - such as the problematic of consciousness, intentionality, natural and phenomenological attitudes, method etc. - can be presented, as well as a new view of them 16 or 17 years later. The last text introduces also Husserl's résumé of the idea of philosophy.
In this paper, the author analyses a case of philosophical imagination as a variant of 'anthropological imagination'. This example is the growing radicalization of the conceptualization of the phenomenon of human body in the work of three phenomenologists - Husserl, Merlau-Ponty, and Levinas. This radicalization consisted in passing from the conceptualization of human body as an empirical phenomenon, through treating it as a phenomenon reduced to a certain structure, to treating human corporeality as a phantasm of the sharpest ethical duty.
The author focuses on uses (and meanings) of the term 'metaphysics' that are inherent in the philosophical tradition but are different from or opposed to the most common (classical) treatment of metaphysics as a domain of objective knowledge, as 'science of being qua being'. Such uses are found in 'late' dialogs of Plato, in Descartes' 'first philosophy', in Kant's critical metaphysics and its phenomenological continuation in Husserl and in Heidegger's introduction of timeliness and historicity into fundamental structures of Being.
The transcendental method shows certain analogies with the philosophical analysis of language, in so far as this inquires the objects in the mode of speach about them, that in the mode of thinking them. It is also similar to phenomenlogy, in so far as this presupposes the exact correspondence of noesis and noema, that presupposes the exact correspondence of operatio and intentio as two moments of the one act of mind. These three methods are therefore not to apply exclusively, but jointly. The transcendental method is nowadays nearly forsaken for the reproach of its impossibility to reflect the interpersonality and the story. This deficiency is conditioned by the presupposition of the invariability of the transcendental subject as ground of the absolute truth. But this presupposition is overhauled, if the transcendental reflection goes out from the concrete act of mind, that contains two inseparable moments of knowing and wishing, as founding each other mutually. In this mode theology obtains again the renewed method of reflecting the truths of belief in a horizon of apodictic validity.
This phenomenological analysis of literature comprises a description of the relationship of two related poles of experience: the noetic (which in the case of literary discourse is the ‘act of reading’) and the noematic (again, in literary discourse, the structure of the literary utterance, which shapes the ‘act of reading’). The preliminary conclusions that were reached both by proponents of a poetics based on experience and the philosophy of art (in particular, Kant and the Constance School) and by proponents of Prague Structuralism (Jan Mukařovský, Felix vodička, and Milan Jankovič) constitute a starting point of the phenomenological reflection on poetic utterance. The epistemological pole becomes manifest in time: the time of reading is the time of particular expectations (which spread around the centre of the experience of this moment), the special meeting of these expectations and the retention of the experience so far. (recall Iser’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology of the inner consciousness of time). The noematic pole (which must be emphasized in contrast to Iser’s conclusions) is not then comprised of the work’s fictional world, but of structural bundle of linguistic components (the acoustic and semantic layers), of composition (the climax and contrasts), and theme. In this we follow on from vodička’s concept of ‘concretization’. The article seeks to demonstrate the proposed principles of structural phenomenological analysis on the basis of rimbaud’s ‘voyelles’ (1871).
The article tries to show, from the phenomenological position, that it must be possible to reflect on so called pre-linguistic experience. The argumentation is based on a disputation with a symptomatic example used by Wittgenstein to substantiate his language games theory. The analysis of the example attempts to indicate that the language games theory, which has to justify the rejection of the existence of pre-linguistic experience, meets with discrepancies and difficulties which limit the range of this theory to a certain extent. Because it presupposes the existence of 'private', experiential sphere in which - even before language and verbalization enter the game - the structuring of the world, identification of things and an elementary understanding of these processes must be realized. It seems that the discussion on this topic is not only a specific polemic over one problem that can be found in Wittgenstein, but has wider implications because the language games concept in the form of various 'discourses', 'vocabularies' or 'cultures' has found great favour in contemporary postmodern philosophy. On its basis postmodern philosophy very radically (and perhaps against the will of Wittgenstein himself) crosses out the world, profanes its rational, objective description and calls for free variation of different interpretations - their legitimacy is authenticated only by a consensus of their users. In this dispute, phenomenology does not declare that there is a single true description of the world and that it is possible to find a reliable criterion for its definite legitimization. It does, however, draw on the fact that so called pre-linguistic experience does not succumb to the variability of language games and the interests of its users, but that it more and more clearly reflects the unitary and scrutable style of showing the real, objectively given world even though this always happens in seemingly impalpable subjective acts.
The article presents a critical analysis of Patocka's attempt to revise Husserlian phenomenology. The considerations are divided into four sections. In the first section, Patocka's critique is presented, the core of which consists in the accusation of Cartesianism. From this critique Patocka's concepts of intention, intuition (Anschauung), reflexion and the subject, resp. consciousness emerge. Within this conceptual framework the problem of perception arises, as a meeting of inside and outside, intention and intuition, all of which have been strictly separated by Patocka. The concept of immanence of the presence, which sets out to clarify the problem, is shown to only further exacerbate it. In consequence two irreconcilable motifs are distinguished, which have been named as Cartesianism in the proper sense and physicalism. Their intertwining within Patocka's thought results most firstly, in a disintegration of the concept of object into a double meaning, secondly, in a shift between the concept of consciousness and the concept of subject, and finally in the ambiguity of the argument of Cartesianism itself. In the following third section several of Patocka's concepts are analyzed in order to illustrate this mutual intertwining and its consequences: the problem of continuity of consciousness and the assertion that consciousness is an object, which further results in a misinterpretation of Husserlian concepts of immanence and overlapping (Deckung). On this basis the thesis is put forward that Patocka's conception is a contradictory one. Finally, three possibilities of how to proceed with this conception, if it is not to be abandoned, have been formulated: the first two of them have resulted in concepts which, according to the criteria given by us, must be considered non-phenomenological. The third possibility amounts to a cancellation of Patocka's revision, thus turning us back to Husserlian phenomenology.
This paper is based on phenomenological interviews with teachers who worked with underachieving students in South Africa, Russia, and the United States. It focuses on the analysis of meanings that teachers constructed while describing their relationship with underachieving students and how metaphors worked to construct such meanings. The researchers also used Buber's "I-Thou" concept as an interpretive lens to further understand the meanings of teacher-student relationships. The study concludes that the teacher-student relationship is one of the fundamental themes of the teaching experience and is common for teachers from different countries.
To what extent could the limits of imagination be of help in elucidating our relationship to the sense of our experience? Is it the imagination that produces the sense of our living, or does it have some another function that comes into play with the sense? To what extent the imaginable and the meaningful overlap and what are the consequences of this overlapping? If the sense of experience is produced by imagination, the unimaginable then has to be understood as a sheer experience of the absence of sense, as its momentary crisis or interruption. However, if the relationship between the sense and experience is of another sort, the investigation of the limits of imagination could unveil the nature of sense. We try to find the answers to these questions, which would be informed by the analyses of the aesthetic theories inspired by social philosophy and phenomenology.
The author of these considerations puts a question, non-trivial from the point of view of science of science, about relationship of theoretic-methodological consistency between research sub-disciplines regarded by their own creators as discourses of paradigms corresponding to one another in a general philosophical perspective. As a historical example used for this analysis serves the concept of the sociology of knowledge and of the philosophical anthropology, developed - as elements of an overall philosophical perspective - by Max Scheler (1874-1928), beside E. Husserl the most widely known representative of the phenomenological movement in the 20th century. M. Scheler had often articulated his intention in his writings that philosophical anthropology should form a basis of categories of the sociology of knowledge, a reservoir of philosophical assumptions for socio-cognitive ideas. The hypothesis of the present paper is as follows: (a) some fragments of Schelerian sociology of knowledge (the so-called concepts of 'class idols') would be very hard to thought ot as 'grounded' in that meaning into the model of philosophical anthropology that he had proposed; (b) an anthropology different from Schelerian may be indicated (by Helmuth Plessner) more logically consistent with the idea of 'class idol'.
The essay deals with existential phenomenology, focusing on question its nowadays importance especially regarding freedom and authenticity in current society. The author describes development of existentialism on the background and with respect to the book At the Existentialist Cafe by S. Bakewell, and states that there is increasing interest in what existential phenomenology means todays.
The contribution tackles certain themes in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, which exert more or less direct influence on Heideggers’s phenomenology. The analysis is followed by a more general reflection on the tense relationship between religious thought and philosophy.
There is a similiarity beetwen the approach of a Phenomenologist on the one hand and the general cognitive principles of the modernist poetry on the other. This sort of poetry follows the rule of removing the previous assumptions in order to return to the epistemologically primal situation in which the object and the subject are brought together. The works of Julian Przybos constitute the most eminent example of this approach in Polish poetry.
The article is devoted to the contemporary developments of the 16-century-old professional philosophy in Georgia. The term 'contemporary' here defines the period after 1953 in soviet and post-soviet Georgian history, when totalitarianism remained, albeit in its milder form. Along with the recognized philosophers (Sh. Nutsubidze, K. Bakradze, S. Danelia, S. Tsereteli, Z. Kakabadze, et al.) the achievements of young philosophers working in Georgia, as well as abroad, are shown in the article.
This article seeks to assess the interplay of society, nature and the world from the perspective of spatial characteristics. First, that is viewed from a purely phenomenological perspective, and then phenomenology is assessed in a broader context, with discussion of its limitations and the possibility of overcoming of them. The focus is on whether and how it is possible to observe society and thus to capture its 'essence' on the level of special phenomenological experience. Thus, first of all, it should be determined how social experience occurs, and it should be ascertained whether society can be captured as a 'meaningful structure' or as a specific 'objectity' (Gegenständlichkeit), as something that can be 'experienced' in a particular way. Or, as is more likely, it is a category of understanding that unites the totality of certain events, namely, something that happens with directly experienced human activities and their final results - 'facts'. The author concludes that the 'secret' of everything lies in the coexistential space and in the way being/nature is transformed into the world.
The authoress discusses our contemporary revival of interest in the title issue, in association with transformations within humanities, which perceive a dimension of involvement in both the activity of those being studied and the research actions taken. While discussing involvement, its emotional and axiotic contexts should not be neglected. The European philosophical tradition, especially, the British thought of 17th and 18th centuries, has tended to combine the issue of feelings with axiology. In the field of phenomenology, Max Scheler directly combined feelings with axiological issues in his non-formalist ethics and phenomenology of feelings project. As for cultural anthropology, Clifford Geertz's project called 'interpretative anthropology' has been treated as legitimised anthropology of experiencing things. Opposing an intra-psychical 'localisation' of feelings, this scholar was of opinion that the thesis claiming their cultural constitution had been relatively well proved in the context of cultural anthropology, albeit feelings are one of the most indefinable and heterogeneous aspects of our life.
The main problem of this article is a try to find the meaning of an essence of the Person. Asking about the Person in colloquial meaning is asking about the cultural pattern of the Person at the same time. What can be helpful in leaving the cultural pattern of the Person without leaving an essence of problem known as a Person, but difficult to indicate without an example? Answer at this question, will be probably similar with finding an essence of the Person as a pure comprehension. Phenomenology, as a finding of certainty can be a method in that “personalistic adventure”, especially in version of the German phenomenologist – Max Scheler, who was trying to explain comprehension of the Person from the emotional point of view. Emotions, which can be understood as a phenomenon of the Person appearing in the practical function, and creating a culture with its examples of the Person, and finally giving its place in non personal surrounding world. Here appears solution. By using Scheler’s method describing the Person from the emotional side, it seems to be possible to separate the pure comprehension from the cultural pattern of the Person. That shows another reduction, next to well known reductions in Phenomenology. It could be something like an emotional reduction, which separates the Person from non personal structure of surrounding world and not gives a cultural pattern of the Person at the same time. The next move is building a dialogue as a relation between Persons, which defines them as a dialogical subjects.
The main problem of the paper is to what extent the political can become a subject of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. Its starting point is Ludwig Landgrebe's thesis that if phenomenology is to be a transcendental philosophy, it is - consistently thought out to an end - a transcendental theory of history. Referring to this thesis, the author poses the question: would the meaning of phenomenological transcendentalism not be consistently thought out to an end only if phenomenology proved its capacity as a transcendental theory of the political? In order to answer this critical question Landgrebe's thesis is interpreted from the perspective of Klaus Held's project of a 'phenomenology of the political world'. The author of this paper analyses the categorial relationship between both projects and poses two questions in this context: To what extent the problem of the political falls within the scope of phenomenology as a transcendental theory of history and how far the phenomenology of the political world can be understood as a transcendental theory of the political.
The author explores the quasi-religious encroachment of Husserl's phenomenology that is generalized in the notion of 'prophetism'. Prophetism is understood here as philosophy exceeding its own theoretical boundaries and its transformation into practice, that is, subordinating consciousness to the power of ideas, science, or doctrine. Modern philosophy demonstrates the following paradox: though it declares itself to be determined by scientific ideal, but realization of this intention causes quasi-religious phenomena and effects. Obviously, the objective truth of thought is attained in order to make possible the domination of prophetic spirit. This is the specific feature of German modern philosophy, specifically of Husserl's one. The paper discusses Husserl's analysis of the 'crisis of European humankind' and his idea of the 'spiritual Europe' (Vienna Speech, 1935). In order to make evident its specific commitment Husserl's position is compared with Marxist materialistic conception. This is rather helpful in underlining the common logic of these two philosophies. The paper marks out the following elements constituting the prophetic position: primacy of idea over reality; reduction of reality to privileged ontological instance; radical disparagement of any other opinion as untrue; emancipation from untruth by way of soteriological practice; and defining true reality and legitimating one's own philosophy as the way to achieve it. Thus, both Husserl's phenomenology and Marx's materialistic understanding of history turn into the kind of messiah able to rescue the world from the captivity of a deleterious existence. Thus philosophy becomes the propaganda of 'Weltanschauung'.
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