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1

Types of Philosophical Problems in Wittgenstein's Philosophy

100%
Dabrowska Z.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2007
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vol. 16
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issue 2(62)
181-195
EN
Seven different types of philosophical problems can be found in the texts of late Wittgenstein, says the authoress. She offers this differentiation in order to support the claim that Wittgenstein was not working under a clear assumption that philosophy had a well defined scope. It amounted to much more for him that simply an attempt to make sense of a difficulty that caused confusion in the mind, as he himself argued. Type (1): problems arising from grammatical similarity of the kind to which some expressions belong; Type (2): problems causes by illegitimate attempt to attain some sort of an ideal; Type (3): problems caused by unconscious confusion of incompatible language games; Type (4): problems created by undermining the rules of ordinary language; Type (5): problems that are occasioned by an illusion created by a picture; Type (6): problems that are caused by treating philosophy as if it were science; Type (7): problems generated by efforts to attain philosophical depth.
2

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS AND THERAPY. POLEMIC WITH THE NEW WITTGENSTEIN

100%
Stelmach M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 4
281 – 292
EN
The paper argues against the interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy by Conant, Diamond, and Crary presented in The New Wittgenstein. Such interpretations are based on the concept of mere (or plain) nonsense and try out a strategy of translating Wittgenstein’s work into the idiom of therapeutic philosophy. In my argumentation, I show that it is impossible to effectively interpret Tractatus in the way proposed by Conant, Diamond and Crary. This fact has consequences for the concept of mere nonsense. If Tractatus is mere nonsense and means nothing, it is impossible to use the Tractatus method to identify logical object like problem or philosophical problem and finally identify mere nonsense. If philosophy as a therapy is to cure philosophical problems, then we must have a criterion that allows us to identify such problems as philosophical problems and, consequently, the entire therapy as a philosophical therapy. The concept of mere nonsense does not provide such a criterion. Without such a criterion, the therapy proposed by mentioned authors is a therapy with the use of any tool directed against anything. If we reduce understanding of the author’s understanding only and not of his work, there is no reason why this activity should be described as philosophical. My argumentation shows that the consequences of the methodology derived from The New Wittgenstein’s basic postulates, will be always confusing and will usually lead to contradictions, arbitrariness, or lack of connection with interpreted text.
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