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1

KTO SÚ FRONIMOI V PLATÓNOVOM DIALÓGU GORGIAS? (GORG. 489E3-491D3)

100%
Wollner U.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2018
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vol. 73
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issue 2
97 – 107
EN
In 489e3-491d3 of Plato’s Gorgias one can find various derivatives of the adjective “wise” (phronimos) in two Callicles’ cardinal triads. In the first triad he adds two comparatives: “better” and “superior”. In the second triad he adds “manly” to “superior”. These triads represent the necessary characteristics of a true ruler, which enable him to rule appropriately as well as to fulfil the strictly hedonistic claim “to have more”. Socrates tries to persuade Callicles that there is no direct proportion between “to be wise” and “having more”. Socrates uses various examples to show him that his connecting “wise” with the principle of “having more” could bring about the unacceptable identifying the claim of being “wise” with techné.
2

OPOZÍCIA SÓFROSYNÉ – FRONÉSIS U PLATÓNOVHO KALLIKLA

86%
Wollner U.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
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vol. 71
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issue 5
369 – 378
EN
In Callicles’ monologue (491e5-492c8) from the dialogue Gorgias the term φρόνησις is used only in one place. The most important Socrates’ opponent applied it when defending his own conception of a good life. His ideal of a good life is represented by a ruler who must not restrict himself in any way. This means that Callicles rejects the moral ideal, i. e. temperance (σωφροσύνη). His ruler is expected to act in opposition to σωφροσύνη and let his desires to grow as intense as possible. These maximized desires are to be developed by means of his manliness and intelligence (φρόνησις). The main aim of the article is to answer the question: Why in Plato’s Callicles σωφροσύνη and φρόνησις are opposite terms?
3

PARMENIDES’ METHODOLOGICAL CRITICISM AND THE PROBLEM OF PHRONESIS

86%
Kubok D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
|
issue 5
345 – 356
EN
The following article is an attempt at indicating the influence Parmenides’ thought had on later Greek philosophy (especially that of Aristotle) from the perspective of the meaning of “phronesis”. Beginning with an analysis of passages from Heraclitus connected with this category the semantic context of the understanding of phronesis in Parmenides’ thought is presented. The key in these considerations is Parmenides’ distinction between two ways of inquiry, which is given the name of methodological criticism in this article. On the basis of this distinction, it is possible to explain why phronesis belongs to the way of opinions, as well as to justify Parmenides’ influence on the thought of Aristotle, culminating in the latter’s distinction between episteme and phronesis.
4

FRONÉSIS A SVOBODNÉ ROZHODNUTÍ

86%
Boháček K.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
|
vol. 71
|
issue 5
389 – 400
EN
The article deals with the topic of free decision in Aristotleʼs moral psychology. First, Aristotleʼs conception of psychological powers as a whole is outlined followed by a more detailed examination of his understanding of phronesis. Scrutinized is also the question to what extent the freedom of action is allowed for by Aristotleʼs practical reason. In order to answer this question Aristotleʼs analyses of decision making (including considering, the central decision as well as its hidden moving reasons) is reconstructed. In conclusion, the concept reconstructed in terms of Nicomachean Ethics is incorporated in a wider context of human action – all that in opposition to McIntyreʼs exclusivist interpretation.
5

TERMÍN PRUDENTIA V SPISOCH MARCA TULLIA CICERONA

86%
Fraňo P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 5
401 - 409
EN
The term prudentia has been introduced into Latin philosophical writings by M. Tullius Cicero as a counterpart of the Greek virtue phronesis. Probably he used it in order to underline his intellectual affinity with some ethical and physical aspects of Plato’s, Aristotleʼs or Stoic thought; or maybe he let himself inspire by the older Latin intellectual tradition. As far as the content of his writings, Cicero holds to the Stoic definition of phronesis in the sense of a practical aspect of knowledge, which should be the virtue mainly of the people involved in politics. Unlike sophia prudentia was related to human community: it included rhetorical, intellectual, anticipatory, acting as well as decision making capacities. All of these competences should be practically achieved in the course of one’s life; however, the climax of their improvement was supposed to come in mature years. Cicero’s prudentia thus embodied the ethical aspect of human self-fulfilment for the benefit of the rest of the community.
6

RICOEUR O PRAKTICKOM ROZUME

72%
Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 4
295 – 306
EN
The article deals with Ricoeurʼs idea of how we use reason in our praxis, i.e. with what in Kantian vocabulary is referred to as practical reason and in Aristotelian terminology as practical wisdom (phronesis). The question is whether this mode of reason, as incommensurable with the rigorous theoretical reason as it is, can be taken as valid. Can Ricoeurʼs approach, trying to reconcile the two incompatible conceptions mentioned above, be of help in resolving this question? Here we have to test the arguments in support of two Ricoeur’s ideas: 1) Practical reason is to be preserved as a specific mode of reason, which is irreducible to any other one. 2) The role of practical reason is not implemented by keeping its distance from practical experience (as demanded by Kant), but rather by being a prudent moral judgement in a particular situation. This, however, does not mean disregarding the morality of duty.
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