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EN
The main task in this paper is to tackle a problem in the Protagoras whose solution is long overdue - the one posed by the fact that in stating and defending his doctrine of ''the unity of the virtues'' Socrates employs formulae which seem hopelessly at odds both with common sense and with the procedural assumptions of his own dialectic. The proportions of this problem are obscured in standard discussions of this passage.
EN
In this paper the dialogue Protagoras is analyzed in light of Aristotle's conception of dialectic as described in the Topics. The aim is to follow those argumentative strategies and other features of discussion between Socrates and Protagoras which represent rules or characteristic steps of dialectical discussions in Plato's and Aristotle's times. This approach to Plato's dialogues (including Protagoras) could extend our understanding of these writings. In the Protagoras the paper detected these dialectical motives described in the Topics: dialectical problems and questions, strategies recommended for questioner as well as for answerer, allusion to all three goals of dialectical discussions, allusion to ''rules and rights'' for both participants of discussion, the opposition of the views of the many and the wise.
EN
The essay investigates the interpretative possibilities inherent in the Homeric undertone of the descriptive introduction to the great debate in the Protagoras, its exploitation of the katabastic motives known from the earlier literary tradition and possible allusions to the contemporary dramatic art. Should we take those allusions as indication of the authorial intent, it seems arguable that the references to the underworld voyages of Odysseus (explicit) and Dionysus (possible) may reveal Plato's highly negative opinion concerning the sophistic training and prepare the ground for the imminent clash between the Socratic elenchus and Protagorean sophistry, thus being of particular value in any attempt to reconstruct Platonic psychagogic techniques.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 3
181 – 191
EN
The idea of homo interior (inner man) was widespread in the ancient world. The term „o` e;sw a;nqrwpoj“ was first used in an invariant form by Plato to describe the inner nature of man, his highest rational capabilities. This was afterwards accepted and transformed by various authors, especially by Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria, and Greek Church Fathers Origenes and Gregory of Nyssa. St. Augustine was the first one among them, however, who transformed established hermeneutical approach to “homo interior” by shifting the ontological perspective towards interiority. The aim of the present article is a more detailed analysis of some of Augustine’s texts concerned with “homo interior”, which could be brought to some relevant conclusions.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 2
128 – 139
EN
The paper re-examines the traditional view of the relationship between Diogenes of Sinope and Plato. The first part analyses one particular anecdote about Plato’s labelling Diogenes „Socrates who has gone mad“. This narration serves as a starting point of a closer examination of the whole anecdotal tradition of Plato’s encounters with Diogenes. The next part focuses on the Platonic themes of guardians in his Republic and madness in Phaedrus. In the last part of the study it is argued that due to the similarities between Diogenes’ religious beliefs and the opinions of Socrates’ devotees as well as of Socrates himself, Plato’s designating Diogenes with the label of Socratic madness is rather positive than negative.
EN
This study investigates Plato's so-called theory of ideas. The starting point of the investigation is an analysis of the first part of the 'Parmenides', where Parmenides presents a broad and thorough criticism of ideas. This analysis shows, firstly, that the usual rendering of the Greek terms 'eidos' and 'idea' as 'Idea' (in a metaphysical or Platonic way) is misleading and that it is more appropriate to render these Greek terms using the phrases 'characteristic kind' or 'generic nature'. In the course of a short excursion into the middle dialogues it is shown that Plato's 'theory of ideas' - that is, Socrates' conception of independent 'Eide' which Parmenides criticises in the dialogue of the same name - has two sources. (1) In the early dialogues the terms 'eidos' and 'idea' denoted the characteristic features common to a group of things - in particular, virtues. (2) In the middle dialogues 'ideas' were conceived above all as objects of knowledge (cf. the doctrine of reminiscence), which accounts for the use of substantialising adjectives and for the qualifier 'in itself' (cf. auto to kalon).
EN
The subject of the paper is Plotinus' theory of the 'One'. The motif to work on the issue was the need of a systematic treatment of this problem, still missing in the writings of Slovak historians of philosophy. The intention of the paper is the presentation, analysis and critical interpretation of the remarkable origins of Plotinus' theory. The paper deals further with the question of the sources of Plotinus' theory of the 'One' in Plato. The introductory general theoretical reflections on the origins of Plotinus' theory (the first part of the paper) is followed by a detailed text analysis of the books 6 and 7 of Plato's Republic (the second part) and by the analysis of the first and second hypotheses of the second part of the dialogue Parmenides (the third part of the paper).
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 2
119 – 132
EN
This paper focuses on the crafting of the mortal type of the human soul in the Timaeus. The demiurge entrusts to his divine assistants the forging of this mortal type – consisting of two “parts”: the irascible-aggressive (thumós) and the desiderative-appetitive (epithumía) – in order to enable the connection of the immortal soul, coming from the first mixture, with the mortal body. The immortal, i.e. divine soul, was sowed and produced by the demiurge himself to animate the world as a whole, and so were the stars. Additionally, auxiliary demiurges make the plants, which also possess a soul (the type which is present in living beings); they serve as food for men, without transgressing the process of transmigration of souls established by the gods.
EN
The myth of autochthony was one of the key elements of ancient Athenian democratic ideology. Therefore, it is not surprising that two clever critics and observers of Athenian democratic society – Euripides and Plato – paid particular attention to this myth. According to the myth of autochthony, the citizens (or the ancestors of the citizens) were not born of human mothers and fathers but fashioned in the earth. What are the political implications of the myth of autochthony in general? First, it provides the unity of political society and strictly separates citizens from non-citizens. Second, it explains the equal rights of the citizens. Third, it pretends that the boundaries of the cities in the world are dictated by nature itself and not by human contract or agreements. Fourth, it legitimises the exclusion of women from politics – the earth is the only mother of all citizens. Fifth, the myth of autochthony definitely resolves the permanent question: to whom does or did the land belong? In his tragedy Ion, Euripides questions the myth of autochthony and its implications for the foundation of a political society without women (the character of Creusa). He also suggests that Athenian society which thinks of itself as tolerant and open, is, in fact, on the basis of this myth, intolerant and xenophobic (the character of the old Tutor). On the one hand, the myth of autochthony provides order to the city, but on the other hand it closes and limits the possibilities of the city. Plato’s attitude is a little different. In the Republic he obviously acknowledges the value of this myth for the unity and stability of the political society, but he tries to eliminate the egalitarian implications of this noble lie, as Socrates calls it (Rep. 414c). So he introduces his own autochthony myth concerning the three classes of citizens (gold, silver, and iron-copper), thus legitimating a hierarchical political society.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 2
133 – 144
EN
A passionate discussion between Roger D. Masters and Anton Hermann Chroust concerning the case of Aristotle’s missing dialogues, namely The Stateman and The Sophist (commonly attributed to Plato), started in the second half of the 20th century on the pages of the scientific journal Political Theory. Masters offered two assumptions on the authorship of the dialogues which gave rise to the whole polemic: A) the author of the fourth to sixth books of Aristotle’s Politics is Theofrastos; B) Plato’s Stateman and Sophist are works of the young Aristotle. The aim of this paper is to confront Masters’ and Chroust’s arguments with the arguments from Aristotle’s Politics and Plato’s dialogues. On the basis of the textual evidence we will try to determine which of the two authors offers stronger arguments.
EN
The principal aim of this paper is to investigate the first uses of the metaphor of sleep and dream. This leads first to the general conclusion that the origins of the metaphor are to be looked for in philosophical texts, namely of Heraclitus and Plato. In the writings of the former it is related to the specific concept of the nature of man, characterized by unification and centralization - new in the period - of the cognitive functions. Heraclitus is apparently the first who uses the image of sleep to depict a state of cognitive or perceptive imperfection (basically an incapacity to see the reality), whereas Plato later establishes the similar use of the image of dream. In the course of the analysis more particular problem emerges, namely ambiguity related to the metaphor. In Heraclitus it is primarily the ambiguity due to his way of expression which invokes certain uncertainty whether the references to sleep found in the fragments are metaphorical at all. The conclusion is that this uncertainty is non-accidental and is to be connected to a more general ambiguity in Heraclitus writings concerning the question whether his perspective is normative or descriptive. Moreover, it is claimed in the paper that Heraclitus's lack of clarity corresponds to an even more general ambivalence with which Greek culture regarded sleep and dream in their literal sense and which appears much more clearly in Plato for whom (following Heraclitus) the metaphor of dream had not only a negative meaning but also a positive one (in the sense of pre-cognition). In the subsequent tradition, however, what primarily obtains is rather the negative meaning through which both authors together influenced the subsequent use of the metaphor, as seen, for example, in the case of Philo of Alexandria.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 5
426 – 440
EN
Since ancient Greek philosophers like Gorgias, Plato or Aristotle called the art of poetry a (magic) form of fiction that contradicts scientific forms of knowledge, a historical abyss has been introduced between the arts and the sciences, which still haunts us today. It was Nietzsche who first questioned the legitimacy of this distinction by calling the sciences a special form of art. My article will claim that Nietzsche was the philosopher who first assumed that science and philosophy are art-based-research practices. Philosophy is not representing a given truth but has to create it by staging it both, on a conceptual AND a fleshly level. Philosophy on Stage such becomes a post-socratic attempt to perform philosophy as the creation of a certain mode of living rather than a dialectic form of communication for the exchange of scientific arguments.
EN
The paper’s aim is to claim that Socrates’ philosophy according to Plato’s dialogue should be taken as a dialectic therapy. Socrates’ dialectic therapy as a care of the self is not an isolated inspection of the individual conscience. As long as the Socratic therapy is dialectical, the possibility of the interlocutor’s self-transparency is possible through dialogical cooperation. This self-transparency is not the possessing of the good, but the very dialogue and mutual examination of the self. The therapeutic dialogue demands that the interlocutor be able to recognise himself in the dialectic of defining what he wants. Therefore, the dialogue enables the person to know his own good through the dialogue’s activity.
EN
Protagoras belongs to one of Plato’s most commonly staged dialogues of Plato. Ancient Greeks characterized it as agonistic (competitive) and endeictic, i.e., merely hinting at, but not offering the final settlement of the dispute in question. In the dialogue, we face an incredible controversy (agon) between Socrates and Protagoras. While the controversy concerns the value of the Sophist’s teaching of civil virtue for money, it is combined with numerous other themes and tensions which culminate in the philosopher’s ensnaring of his interlocutor. Thus, the dialogue is characterized by its dramatic composition with a (double) prologue, four agons (controversies), a humorous interlude, an ingenious anagnorismos and an epilogue which concludes with a perplexing reversal of Protagoras’ and Socrates’ positions. At the end, there are several remarks about possible interpretations of this and other dialogues of Plato.
EN
The authoress asks two questions. The first, is war really the best action of a polis how the introductory conversation of the 'Timaeus' (19b -c) suggests. The second, has been the Sokrates' desire to see his ideal polis in action fulfilled in the 'Timaeus-Critias' sequence. The approach to the problems seems to be found in the 'Laws', where these two questions are turned to this one: might war be the pattern for a lawgiver.
EN
The most obvious paradox of Plato's dialogue Protagoras is statement that no one does not consciously make evil. The statement is connected with the rejection of two phenomena: an acrasia and the free will. It seems that Plato has made a considerable correction of the intellectualistic position in the Republic, but he repeats this paradox also in the late dialogue Timaeus. So it should be asked: what is the sense of the ethical intellectualism in the Protagoras? Does the ethical intellectualism deny the self-evident facts concerning human behavior? Did Plato really change his view? Is Aristotle's criticism of the ethical intellectualism accurate? The answers can be found in this paper.
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Filozofia jako meditatio mortis (Platon – Montaigne)

80%
Filo-Sofija
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2006
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vol. 6
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issue 6
43-58
EN
The idea of philosophy as meditatio mortis is illustrated with the examples of Plato’s and Montaigne’s views. According to Plato, life within body is a kind of evil, and death is the way of release and return to divine life. Philosophy regarded as seeking the truth is at the same time an exercise in dying because it consists in taking off reason from body and senses. Philosophy as meditatio mortis is then preparing to true and eternal life. According to Montaigne, death is the necessary end of human existence, which we should accept without reservation and fear. Philosophy lies in preparing to death as a natural biological event, common to all living creatures. Human dying should be liberated from all ceremonies and cultural rituals because they are the main reasons of our fear and prevent us from accepting death as a natural event.
18
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Stulecie Sporu o Platona

80%
Filo-Sofija
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2011
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vol. 11
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issue 2-3(13-14)
559-571
EN
The aim of this paper is to present the main theses and the importance of Tatarkiewicz’s article The dispute about Plato (Spór o Platona) in polish reception of Plato’s philosophy. This article – which was published by Tatarkiewicz a hundred yeas ago (1911) – was the first presentation of the new and interesting interpretation of Plato’s theory of ideas which was inspired by Marburg neo-Kantian school. In Tatarkiewicz’s view the Plato’s philosophy is not some kind of metaphysics but it is generally the theory of knowledge. We can agree this is still unusual approach to Plato and we have a good reason to remind this early Tatarkiewicz’s essay.
EN
The article investigates the relation between dialectic and rhetoric in Plato's Protagoras exemplified in the dialogue by the eristic agon between Socrates and the sophist. The one of the very theme of this agon is the agon alone i.e. reflection about its conditions, methods and purposes. Consequently the dialogue can actually be seen as Plato's attempt to transform egocentric type of struggle base on archaic, traditional ethos and establish a new kind of agon - the philosophical one - which is concentrated on dialectical search for truth and can be associated with Plato's ideal of symposium. Moreover in the end of dialogue Plato through his concept of metretikē technē try to polemically indicate essential error in the Sophistic thought and especially in the Protagoras's famous dictum about anthrōpos metron. Simultaneously this concept is directly related to the truth and in this way seems to by closely connected with Plato's dialectical method.
Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 3(18)
103-124
EN
In spite of the apparent opposition to Plato, Aristotle accepted a lot from the thought of his master. The intuition, which plays the key role in the system of Plato, was understood by Aristotle in terms of how we grasp the middle term of syllogism. It is not, therefore, the intuition of being, but the reasoning, departing from the experience (nature’s “intention”), which is the way of the cognition of the ultimate. The teleology of being, which Plato was so keen on finding, was found by Aristotle in the physical world as a counterpart of motion. Alas, Aristotle lost sight of what is most valuable in Plato: the sense of being that transgresses the categories. According to Thomas, being is what is the most perfect in things; so, consequently, what is the proper effect of the Ultimate Cause, and what is Its primary aim. It is better to be, i.e. to exist. Each thing craves for being. Being, however, is, in the Dionysius’ sense, a problem; it might guide us to God, but veil Him before us as well. It is a perfection, but not the Perfection itself, Plato was right at this point.
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