Generally, the article is dedicated to the crisis management on the part of the communist elites, as exemplified by the events of June 1976. The social genesis of the protest is sketched in the introduction: the hopes accompanying the Polish version of 'goulash socialism' and the gradual deterioration of the economic situation after 1973. The elections to the Sejm, which were held in early 1976, and where the turnout, according to the official data, amounted to 98.27% of those entitled to vote, are also recalled. It goes on to describe the behind the scenes preparation for the 'prices operation', its course and the scale of the price rises, and thus eventually arrives at the workers' protest. The final section is dedicated to the rulers' attempts to restore their prestige by arranging rallies in support of 'Comrade Gierek'.
The paper throws some light behind the scenes of the management of the so-called propaganda of success under the rule of Edward Gierek. Decisions, even in minute matters, were taken by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, which specialised in working with the media, or by the Secretary of the CC, Jerzy Lukaszewicz, who supervised its operations, in person. The most frequent forms of communicating with the media included cyclical collective meetings with editors and leading commentators, daily phone conversations between the Central Committee and editors. The journalists were also controlled by means of numerous summaries and comments to the articles and programmes, as well as by general assessments of the mass media market and particular editorial offices. CC functionaries edited, or rejected, controversial texts prior to their publication and manipulated radio and TV watersheds prior to their transmission. In general, these mechanisms, in combination with the censorship office's operations, prevented unapproved contents from appearing in the media (to what degree the propaganda of the Gierek years was successful, is another matter). Not everything, however, went as the authorities intended. Evidence for this is even provided in books by Leszek Moczulski, Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, Martia Turlejska and Jerzy Holzer, which challenged the official version of Poland's history. Their publication was deemed to be a serious oversight by the party and its placemen in the publishing houses.
The text is dedicated to the role of those people who had no formal entitlement to make decisions but, because of their professional achievements (mainly in science), enjoyed prestige in articulating the current or long-term policy of the party and the state authorities in the 1970s. The factors which increased the demand for the services of experts included the awareness of a scientific and technological revolution underway in the developed countries, resulting in support for consulting procedures, something which can be observed in the most important programmatic documents of the PUWP, as well as in the duplicated power structures of the party and the state. A yardstick which may be used to measure the impact of the expert bodies on the actions of state and party authorities is provided by the quantity and nature of the documents submitted to the deliberations of particular bodies of the party and the state. In the case of the state, the decision-making bodies were the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the government; in the case of the party, it was the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PUWP. In general, it may be said that they were not the primary recipients of papers generated by the various types of experts. Such papers were put to use more at a lower level (e.g. that of particular ministries) or in the offices of their particular members (e.g. that of Edward Gierek). The most renowned case of experts being brought in to the decision making process by the centre of power was the appointment, in 1971, of an economic advisor to the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUPW, in the person of Mr. Zdzislaw Rurarz (formally, he was given a full-time position as an inspector at the CC); he was later to be replaced by Professor Pawel Bozyk. In May 1997, an entire team of scientific advisors to the 1st Secretary was appointed, chaired by Professor Bozyk. It may be said that the influence of the advisors to the 1st Secretary was scant; this resulted, to a large degree, from the concentration of the most of the decision-making power, as far as the economy was concerned, in the hands of Prime Minister, Piotr Jaroszewicz, and the deputy Prime Ministers who reported to him i.e., Mieczyslaw Jagielski and (in the years when the team of advisors was active), Tadeusz Pyka and Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk. The fact that the management of the economy was dominated by the government implied that the greatest influence was held by specialists from within its own structures, namely the lower rank clerks and the directors of the industrial groups and enterprises who acted en masse and drafted documents to meet the needs of their supervisors. Paradoxically, the activity of the team of advisors proved most significant for the further career of some of its members in the state and party structures.
According to its bylaws, the plenary sittings of the Central Committee of the PUWP were the highest authority in the party between the latter's conferences. Although in the 1970s they were convened almost one and a half times as frequently as in the Wladyslaw Gomulka years, it is difficult to ascertain whether this change signified that the importance of this body was reduced or enhanced. Supplementing the plenary debates by issue-oriented debates, carried out in working groups, was undoubtedly a significant contribution made by Gierek to history of this institution. The role performed by the plenary sitting of the Central Committee in the political system of PPR may be considered on two planes. Most researchers agree that the meetings of the full members and alternate members of the Central Committee, held every few months, were a manifestation of the ritualisation of official life; they were thus a typical example of a 'feigned institution', as described by professor Jan Lutynski. The long, but generality-filled speeches, devoid of a punch line, and the unanimous voting, all this is persuasive of the argument that the plenary sittings served neither decision making nor agreeing positions but were rather more an imitation of 'collegiality' in running the party and the state. On the other hand, the significance of the plenary sittings increased in times of crisis. It was at the sittings of the CC that 1st Secretaries were recalled and their successors were appointed. It was not by accident that, in the periods of social disturbance, both Gomulka and Gierek attempted to prevent the plenary sittings to be convened. A careful analysis of the transcribed reports also indicates that not all the CC's sittings proceeded according to the leaders' expectation. These conclusions are confirmed in the reminiscences of the former PUWP dignitaries. They admit that the ritual of the plenary sitting made it possible for the participants to communicate their expectations and opinions to the Politburo. Every plenary sitting thus had its hidden dimension, visible only to those observers who belonged to the political elite and were well familiar with the nuances of party Newspeak. A CC meeting was a unique institution, in view of its multilayered structure, which served to establish, as described by Krzysztof Dabek, 'a fragile hierarchy of influence' among the members of the elite.
The political crisis of the summer of 1989, which began in a way similar to its predecessors in the years 1956, 1970 and 1976, differed from them most of all in that it ended in a truce and concessions on the part of the authorities. This paper is not guided by an ambition to analyse all the factors and is limited to a description of the PUWP leaders' mode of operating. It is based on little-known source materials of different kinds and provenance (CC PUWP, Ministry of the Interior and the General Staff), as well as on the reminiscences of the main actors of these events. One of the main motives underlying the way they acted was a fear of that the events of December 1970 would be repeated as regards both the casualties and the destabilisation at the top of the power structure. By granting concessions to the wages demand, the authorities had brought about an 'upsetting' of social discipline and when, in the wake of the strike in the Tri-City (from the 14th of August), the movement changed in character and took on a political overtone, they thought that the previous policy may be continued for some time yet. The article focuses on the PUPW leaders' new operating formula; while, in December 1970, decisions were made by a narrow, semi-formal body and, essentially, the 1st Secretary (Gomulka) personally, in summer 1980, the modus procedendi was entirely different; decisions were taken collectively by the entire Politburo sitting in almost permanent session. A permanent team to monitor the events (known as the Kania Commission) was also appointed. This mechanism favoured pragmatism in action and realism in the assessment of situation; it also made it possible to 'cushion' pressure on the part of Moscow, which insisted on solving the crisis by force.
The text presents the social and political history of Kosovo from the moment of pivotal system changes in the Yugoslavia of Tito (the 1970s) onwards. Among others, the following problems are tackled: centuries-old conflicts between the most populous nations inhabiting the land, i.e. Albanians and Serbs (special attention being paid to tensions in the 19th and 20th centuries) and the evolution of the status of Kosovo in the 20th century in the states of Serbia (1912-1918) and Yugoslavia. The following major issues are highlighted: a) transformations of the demographic and ethnic structure of Kosovo; b) legitimization by Albanians and Serbs of their right to a political domination in Kosovo based on myths of their ancient origin and earlier presence on the disputed territories (Albanians), and the medieval 'golden age' of their statehood, of which the disputed territory was the political and spiritual centre (Serbs); c) the socio-political circumstances of the functioning of communities of Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in the Osman and Yugoslavian states. One of the main factors responsible for generating a spectrum of conflicts in Kosovo over the centuries, most importantly a permanent, multi-level Albanian-Serbian confrontation are, according to the author, differences in the social and political status of the inhabitants of this province, depending on their religious and/or ethnic affinity. The different status of Muslims (a majority of Albanians and all the Turks inhabiting Kosovo) and Christians (mostly Serbs) had already been decreed by Osman laws, and some Serbian and Yugoslavian regulations and political praxis in force until mid-1970s endorsed the unequal treatment of Kosovo Serbs and other inhabitants of Kosovo (especially Albanians, who were often subjected to repressive policies).
This study treates the last phase of the Hashimite monarchy In Iraq, where from 1941 until the 1958 revolution, Nuri as-Sa´id Pasha either headed or controlled most government coalitions. After World War II he tried to make a long term agreement with Great Britain by means of a new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty but so vehement were public demonstrations against it that the treaty was never ratified. The Arab defeat in Palestine war of 1948 had serious political and economic repercussions in Iraq. The defeat gave the regime the opportunity to impose martial law on the country. Nuri as-Sa´id continued his traditional pro-British policy and, in 1955, aligned Iraq with the Western defence system through the Baghdad Pact, extending British military privileges in the country. Failures in domestic affairs were matched by foreign policy failures. The new alliance with the West achieved through relentless domestic suppression only served to intensify the desire for independence and the nationalist sentiments. The opposition succeeded in bringing the regime down in 1958.
The history of the Hungarian Party in the first Slovak Republic has not been studied up to now. The leading figure in Hungarian politics in Slovakia was János Esterházy, who had to manoeuvre between the expectations of Bratislava, Budapest and Berlin. His rightist, Christian – conservative politics, which contained many contradictions and were not entirely compatible with the political orientation of Slovakia at the time, also had critics within his own party. The present study is concerned with internal disputes within the Hungarian Party and with attempts to reconstruct the party according to national socialist principles. The text also devotes detailed attention to the attempts to remove J. Esterházy from the leadership of the party and the views of Budapest and Berlin on this process.
All communities largely care about their own political history, as this is a part of their common identity. It is natural for politicians and political parties to seek legitimacy for their own power and political position in historical events, regardless of whether they identify with the Right or with the Left. Societies usually recall events inspiring pride and conjuring up memories of the struggles for freedom. After1989, as a result of the change of the social and political situation, post-communist countries began to put a very strong emphasis on political history. Politicians have utilised legislation to push for a binding political interpretation of history ever since the collapse of communist regimes, which has naturally generated conflicts in a democratic system, particularly among social scientists and diverse segments of civil society, who often present the views of a particular political line. Proclamation of a new beginning once again became the most acceptable solution, acknowledged by the absolute majority of society. Dealing with the past is never a purely individual problem; it is always a collective issue, for the history of an individual coincides with the history of a collective and vice versa. There will be always a dispute about whether individual or collective dealing with the past are sufficient and whether institutionalization of the problem and the adopted legislation are able to adequately reflect the real attitude of society towards totalitarian regimes.
The study is concerned with the political activities of Jozef Lenárt, Czechoslovak premier and member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Analysis of his relations with Antonín Novotný and Alexander Dubček serves as a starting point. Lenárt’s televised speech from March 1968, when he strove to explain his actions in January 1968, is considered. From May 1968, Lenárt inclined to the Soviet vision of political developments in Czechoslovakia. The paper analyses Lenárt’s activities after 21 August 1968 with the conclusion that by gradually changing his political orientation he secured the continuation of his political career.
Tribal grievances in Iraq had mostly been triggered by glaring injustice connected with the land and irrigation rights of particular tribes. However, some of the issues related to the grievances of the Shīca as a whole. The sheikhs also drew up a petition asking the king to dismiss the Prime Minister cAlī Jawdat al-Ayyūbī and to dissolve parliament. When this produced no result, direct action followed. In January 1935 unrest erupted in the mid-Euphrates region. It was at this point that Ḥikmat Sulaymān, an opponent of the prime minister and a leading member of the Patriotic Brotherhood Party, urged his old friend General Bakr Ṣidqī (commanding officer of the southern region) to refuse to suppress the tribal unrest. Faced by this and by dissent within his cabinet, cAlī Jawdat al-Ayyūbī resigned. His successor Jamīl al-Midfacī was then confronted by a growing tribal rebellion in the Dīwānīya region, led by two powerful tribal shaykhs, cAbdalwāḥid al-Ḥājj Sikkar and Shaclān al-cAṭīya, which had been in close touch with Yāsīn al-Hāshimī, leader of the Patriotic Brotherhood Party. When Ṭāhā al-Hāshimī, the chief of staff of the Iraqi army and brother of Yāsīn, refused to crush the revolt, Jamīl al-Midfacī’s suspicions of a plot were confirmed and he too resigned. Yāsīn al-Hāshimī, portrayed as the only man who could save the situation (because he had largely instigated it), was then asked by the king to form a government in March 1935, having effectively carried out a coup d’état against his rivals.
The article describes the institution of the Professors' General Meeting which constituted the highest collegial self-government body at universities in the Second Polish Republic. The basic formal and legal conditions for the functioning of the institution are described. The body of the article is divided into six parts. The introduction points to the unique nature of the General Meeting in the context of Polish academic legislation of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century as well as the grounds for commencing the research from the date of 15 September 1920. Subsequently, the system of public academic education is described, including the classification of universities within the scope relevant for the subject of the research, and academic privileges considered unique in comparison with other research and education units are specified. The second chapter discusses the institution of the Professors' General Meeting and its three stages of development that can be identified in the interwar period. The author also analyzes the member roster and its changes in time as well as the impact that the academic groups (teachers, administrative employees and students, including all ranks and categories) exercised upon the functioning of the university, comparing the 1920-1939 period and the Third Polish Republic. The next chapter describes the basic procedures of the Professors' General Meeting. The further deliberations concern the detailed competences of the body with special emphasis put on the reduction of these competences and their classification in terms of dependence on or independence from the approval of the Minister of Religious Denominations and Public Education. Additionally, the specific character of the Professors' General Meeting in one-faculty universities in 1933-1937 is also discussed since the rights of that body in such cases were extended by the responsibilities of the faculty council and the university senate. The article is concluded with a summary of basic facts from the history of the institution of the Professors' General Meeting at public universities in the interwar Poland and an attempt to explain the conspicuous tendencies in its development and the reasons for this development.
(Polish title: Królestwo Cypru jako obiekt zainteresowan panstw sródziemnomorskich w latach 1192-1489. Próba zarysowania). Under the rule of the French Lusignan dynasty, Cyprus quickly became the focus of interest to other countries: Sicily under the reign of the Hohenstaufen, Anjou and Aragon houses, Italian countries of Genoa, Venice and Duchy of Savoy, England and African Mamluk Sultanate. Initially the interest was based on political reasons, however, with the arrival of the Crusaders to the Holy Land and then the development of trade with Muslims there were economic reasons for seizing power over the island. What is more, the above deliberation clearly reveals the declining political position of the Lusignan dynasty who starting from the end of the 14thcentury could only observe how Mediterranean countries fought for control over Cyprus. After the death of Peter I of Cyprus (1359-1369), the most prominent king and the conqueror of Alexandria, the period of glory, when the island infl uenced international policy mostly - though not only - in the eastern region of the Mediterranean Sea, came to an end. From then on Cyprus was merely a subject of diplomatic, economic as well as military efforts and conflicts undertaken by Mediterranean countries. The present paper does not assume to exhaust the subject. However, it is an introduction to a broader research on the matter in question which is immensely relevant for depicting the medieval political and economic situation in the Mediterranean Sea region.
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