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EN
I explain how Karl Popper resolved the problem of induction but not the pragmatic problem of induction. I show that Popper’s proposed solution to the pragmatic problem of induction is inconsistent with his solution to the problem of induction. I explain how Popper’s falsificationist epistemology can solve the pragmatic problem of induction in the same negative way that it solves the problem of induction.
ARS
|
2015
|
vol. 48
|
issue 1
3 – 21
EN
The main thesis of the article is that there are good reasons for seeing the pre-modernist architectural and design idioms as still valid and feasible visual inventions, in contrast to the modernist view that has considered them as stone-dead expressions of past historical periods. The thesis is backed up by philosophical arguments developed by the late British philosopher Karl Popper. The present author concludes that there are no reasonable arguments for why the present schools of architecture and design should keep limiting the education of future architects and designers to the modernist visual idiom alone, as they have been doing since the 1950s.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2007
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vol. 62
|
issue 2
122-135
EN
The paper deals with two mistakes ascribed to the Popper's theory of the verisimilitude. The first is the well known critique of the Popper's qualitative definition of the verisimilitude produced independently by D. Miller and P. Tichy which argues that that definition is false. The second is the claim that due to the Popper's theory of verisimilitude and his theory of corroboration inductive and the justificatory elements enter his theory of science. This accusation was raised e.g. by I. Lakatos and J. Watkins. The paper tries to show that while the first critique is true, the second is false.
EN
The paper summarizes both the division of the world and the approach towards things of different philosophers (Plato, Hegel, Moore, Russel, Whitehead, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Reichenbach, Patočka). Special attention is given to the system of three worlds (material, psychic, and real – ideal, immaterial) of Karl Popper. Those approaches are applied to the understanding of a museum collection in both theoretical and practical sense.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2020
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vol. 75
|
issue 6
474 – 489
EN
There is not much in the open society to suggest that Karl Popper was a moral objectivist. Yet, that is exactly what he himself claimed later in life. Was the widespread “decisionistic” reading of the open society just a grand misunderstanding, or did Popper change his meta-ethical views without acknowledging it? I give reasons as to why we should hold the latter to be true. I also argue that even were the former the case, decisionism would still be more compatible with the open society ideal.
EN
First part of the text presents a historical excursion searching for the genesis of Popper’s philosophical views in the interwar Vienna. It analyses the actual writing process and circumstances that surrounded Popper’s work on Die beiden Grund-probleme der Erkenntnistheorie. The aim of this section is to evaluate Popper’s reception and intellectual self-development through the denial of logical positivism. The second “internalist” segment of this article further examines the Grundprobleme itself through the analysis of Popper’s specific interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. We will confront Seubert’s claim that through Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie Popper definitely and knowingly accepts Kant’s stance. We show that even though Popper adopted Kant’s transcendental method of questioning, he had later criticized certain aspects of Kant’s transcendental method. As a result, Popper establishes the so called genetic apriorism, which dwells on his own version of the deductive psychology of knowledge.
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