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POPULISM ON CONTEMPORARY THEATRE

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EN
If the choice of plays such as Ubu Roi or Macbeth was not rare in productions denouncing dictatorship in Latin America or in some communist countries during the seventies and eighties of the 20th century, we can notice that during the last five years several classical texts have been chosen through Europe to speak about religious pressure and political hypocrisy (Tartuffe) or populist tendencies (Coriolanus). Some of them were theatre plays, some were novels (The Trial by Franz Kafka staged by Krystian Lupa), some productions strictly followed the text, and others widely adapted it (The Curse by Stanisław Wyspiański, staged by Oliver Frljić). I would like to examine a few examples of these performances and question their impact on theatre and society.
EN
The article discusses the processes of formation of a political stratum in Poland and the results of their actions in the years 1989-2004. The author points to several (direct and indirect) causes of the deficiencies of that stratum: party fragmentation, insufficient programmatic work, fluidity in the composition of successive parliaments. This last development negatively affects the quality of legislative work. At the same time, instability of the executive branch has an adverse impact on the quality of governance. As a consequence of these developments democratic legitimacy of the system is under pressure, populism creeps in and oligarchic tendencies appear in economy. The author suggests that if the political stratum is to perform beneficial role for the social and political system, the party structure and quality of work of individual members must improve. At the end of the article the author discusses the conditions of democratic consolidation and the conditions of effective functioning of Polish politicians in the institutions of European Union.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 2
97 – 111
EN
Over the last few years, philosophers and other researchers have been focusing on a post-truth era and its symptoms across society and various disciplines. One of the most glaring manifestations is the declining trust in science experts and the rise of populist attacks on professional communities. Historical sciences are encountering a similar onslaught as well. This paper aims to examine one particular clash between a professional discourse regarding a new archaeological discovery with ground breaking potential and a populist reaction to it. The study utilises contemporary theory and philosophy of history and its view of historical inquiry to tackle its main goal – uncover strategies populists use to vilify experts and professionals. Even though historiography has been abused throughout its existence, it is argued that recent attacks are substantially different and potentially more dangerous.
EN
ust within sixteen years since its emergence the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti) has reached the status of the third biggest political party in Denmark. Gaining such considerable voter's support by a new far-right, populist party in Denmark, a country having a reputation of a stable, well-established democracy provokes a broader analysis of this phenomenon. The main goal of the paper is therefore to find an answer to the question about possible factors that have contributed to the popularity of the new far-right in Denmark. In the paper I make an effort to prove that an essential influence on the popularity of the new far-right has the culture clash. I analyse the term culture clash on two planes - as a clash of the ideas of postmaterialism with the traditional sociocultural values and as a clash between Western culture and the values represented by immigrants coming to Denmark from mostly muslim countries.
EN
In the introduction, we discuss theories and theoretical perspectives on social media. On the one hand, we show some problematic aspects of emerging theories and theoretical perspectives and on the other hand, we show the relative usefulness of some older communication and sociological theories. Then we briefly discuss populism from communication and sociological perspectives. In the next part, we provide an overview of theories and theoretical and empirical perspectives on the role played by social media, and in particular FB, in communication of populist political parties and leaders. We discuss structural opportunity factors for populist communication and summarise findings that confirm that different types of social media have different impacts in political communication by populists as well as among different audiences. Also there is consensus that social media do not cause populism but rather create an opportunity for easier, cheap and fast dissemination of populist messages. Furthermore, we identify theories and findings related and relevant to networks in general, and political networks on social media in particular. Finally, we present an emerging theory on populism and social media.
EN
The study examines the peculiarities of populism in Slovakia, which distinguish it from populisms in Western European countries. To show the differences, Slovak populists are compared with those from Austria, with examples from the political discourses on the refugee crisis and on minorities being brought in. The similarities and differences are elaborated by looking at three central characteristics of populism: flexibility and variability of the content of populism, political relevance, and graduality and non-binarity. The comparative perspective shows that these universal features of populism are particularly pronounced in Slovakia. Although Slovakia and Austria have both very distinctive experiences with politically successful populists, the populisms in the two countries are not the same. The comparison brings to light the differences between the post-socialist political landscapes on the one hand and the Western ones on the other, which are reflected in the different manifestations of populism in Slovakia and in Austria.
Sociológia (Sociology)
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2023
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vol. 55
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issue 2
244 – 265
EN
Populism and the post-truth: two concepts often used simultaneously or interchangeably to explain current developments in contemporary politics, yet the demarcation line between them remains blurry. Building on definitions of populism that describe it as a style of political communication, ‘post-truth populism’ can be regarded as a specific type of populist communication which shares the characteristics of post-truth politics. How the two phenomena intertwine, and how the aesthetic transformation of the public sphere and the rise of social media had a role in their appearance will be discussed. The theoretical framework is illustrated by two cases during the COVID-19 pandemic.
EN
The term knowledge society refers to the specific form assumed by the capitalist system in the last forty years, and it also represents its specific social, economic, ideological, and political systems. Although there is a strong rhetoric denying it, it is quite obvious that politics and economics are interconnected and that their relationship influences the social dynamics by establishing specific patterns of ideological dominance. One characteristic of the knowledge society is the negation of any form of connection between these variables while denying its ideological character. The alleged separation of the political from the economic and the social forms the basis of Schumpeterian democracy, which becomes the knowledge society's political model, just as neoliberalism becomes its economic model. This paper analyses the specific patterns of this model in Latvia.
EN
Although the Czech Republic has experienced an unprecedented rise of anti-establishment political parties in recent decades, a systematic examination of anti-establishment attitudes among the public is still missing from the scholarly literature. This paper tests different explanation for anti-establishment attitudes among the voting population. It is working with the concepts of anti-political establishment parties, populism, and taking into account the specific national context. Using original data from the 2017 Czech National Election Study (N = 919), we show that anti-establishment attitudes among the Czech public stem from feelings of low political efficacy, the perceived salience of corruption, and anti-immigration attitudes. These results demonstrate that researchers need to consider contextual specifics, including the nature of diverse anti-establishment actors, when searching for the causes of anti-establishment attitudes in a particular country or region.
Sociológia (Sociology)
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2018
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vol. 50
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issue 5
491 – 523
EN
This study can be seen as a contribution to contemporary debate about political populism in Europe and focuses on CAQDAS related interpretation of election programmes of political parties that have succeeded in parliamentary elections held in October 2017 in Czech Republic. In the light of moral panic related to so called “immigration crisis” almost all participating parties were influenced by this topic. Our analysis tries to provide interpretation of election discourse with focus on the issues of nation, migration and their discursive relation created via election programme of analysed political parties. It is possible to say, that we used the topics of migration and nation (more specifically portrait of migration as a threat to nation) as a symbolic line to distinguish between populist and non-populist political parties. As we argue, the most significant representative of populist political style is Freedom and Direct Democracy Party led by Tomio Okamura.
EN
The aim of the study is to describe and to examine the notion of 'nepiseg' (populism), which was one of the central conceptions of socialist realism and the major political requirement of the so-called new literature in the Stalinist era as declared by political and cultural leaders. This notion has not been researched thoroughly. The authoress of the present study, therefore, expresses her own reservations as far as her definition of the term, which eludes a precise definition, is concerned. 'Nepiesseg' (folksiness, traditionalism) describes the 'appearance of traditional elements in the elite culture' and it belongs to the authentic folkloristic/traditional elements of the culture. On the other hand, 'nepiseg' (populism) means 'traditionalism' which has turned into a 'political ideology' in the 'nepi' (populist) movement. It is obvious that only the latter can be applied to socialist realism. The authoress of the study tries to examine the ideological and cultural roots of these notions, concentrating on the ideological and critical aspects of the problem. The notion originated with Herder. In his 'Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit' (1784-1791), the German philosopher claimed that every nation has its own specific character rooted in prehistoric times and that language, popular tales, songs and customs preserve 'the spirit of the people'. This is 'the essence of the nation' and is articulated in several ways according to the members of the 'nepiesseg' literary trend. The idea of the core part of 'nepiesseg', of 'people' itself, however, remained unclear in both the 19th and the 20th centuries. In this way the works of Janos Horvath (1922) and many others following his theory canonized the notion in literary history. This undefined meaning of 'people' was one of the main issues of socialist realism. In the second part of the study, some case studies are presented, presupposing that 'nepiseg' is the most significant link between Hungarian and Czech socialist realism, and it is demonstrated how different the appearance of 'nepiseg' in these national versions of socialist realism was.
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75%
EN
This text contributes to current discussion related to political populism. From Zeman's inauguration speech, we deduced three thematic areas (corruption, extremism and media). Based on these issues and using CAQDAS, we examined the correlation between Zeman's rhetoric and theoretical framework of populism. The dataset for our analysis consists of whole Zeman's textual production during his first presidential term. Our effort was focused on how Miloš Zeman creates basic elements of populism (the people, the elites, the others) in relation to corruption, extremism, and media. Our analysis has shown that some basic principles of political populism have been frequently present in his speeches. Contrary to some other quite often cases of overusing of the concept of populism and using this concept without any proper empirical evidence, the main goal of our article was (based on the transparently explained theoretical and methodological framework) to clearly show that Miloš Zeman is populist. Our research can be used as a standpoint for broader comparative research of populism.
EN
The treatise outlines the issue of immigration in the politics of Swiss People Party (SVP). It is argued, that immigration is one of the most important issues of actual SVP-policy. Accordingly this assumption the article seeks to answer the question of what tactics and methods of campaigning the party is using by presentation of this theme. At first it will be discussed the context of SVP´s change from mass to catchall-party, at second it will be presented its anti-immigrant positions in the last ten years.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 4
268 – 282
EN
Ideologically different alternative media define themselves in opposition to mainstream journalism, and attacks on the perceived lack of objectivity of its authors are especially common for them. This paper examines their role in the context of Habermasian concept of the public sphere and distinguishes between alternative media as institutions of the counter public or anti-public. It also presents a proposal for a typology of contemporary attacks on journalistic objectivity (emancipatory, postmodernist, populist) and analyses their main features in more detail. On the basis of standpoint theory, we conclude that members of counter publics, due to their strategic position in society, have a unique potential for constructive emancipatory critique, which can reveal that an apparently objective stance represents only the perspective of the dominant class. Concerning postmodernist and populist attacks, we, on the contrary, draw attention to the fact that these are purely antagonistic positions misused for political propaganda, especially by the representatives of the right-wing populism movements constituting an anti-public rejecting the norms of rational democratic discourse. Postmodernist critique describes objectivity as a myth and resigns on its pursuit in advance or makes demands for public broadcasting to present various perspectives without considering the criteria of truthfulness. Populist criticism of the alleged liberal bias of the mainstream media relies in turn primarily on evoking negative emotions, misinterpretations of various notions (e.g., censorship, fake news), and paranoid condemnation of elites or expert knowledge.
EN
National-conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS) is seen as quite open to the innovative use of social media. Moreover, the government led by PiS is aiming at regulating social media in a dual way – on the one hand to prevent blocking by social media platforms, on the other hand to allow intervention and blocking by authorities. Regarding our findings, not surprisingly, the preferred source of information for both PiS and Confederation (Konfederacja) were digital sources. TV was the least often linked media outlet for PiS and radio for Confederation, respectively. All the linked media were national or with mixed origin, there were no links to European/supranational media. The overwhelming majority of links were websites and social media accounts of Confederation and PiS, their individual politicians or YouTube materials produced by these two groupings. Left and liberal media were systematically ignored when around 10% were common to both profiles, including FaceBook (FB). These were mostly mainstream media of diverse type (news websites, YouTube, radio, TV) and left, centre and centre-right ideological leanings. The political orientation of the shared sources reflected the inclination of populist parties and their coalitions to promote right wing discourses. PiS as a large party oriented towards the centre represents centre-right and Confederation represents radical right. The references to the media classified as centre-right constituted 96% of PiS sample and 66% of Confederation sample. The network analysis showed that both parties were embedded in two almost separate bubbles which are linked together by a very limited set of sources. They stayed in reciprocal relations mostly with their own separated structures, organizations, politicians or FB discussion groups.
EN
Social media (Facebook, WhatsApp and YouTube) seem to be the key tool for accessing news in Italy. Coincidentally, they are also the key tool for communication and (internet-based) organisational aspects of two rather different populist parties (5SM and League) and their leaders, Di Maio (until January 2020) and Salvini. Salvini and Di Maio's FB pages shared contents that were not exactly analogous but still they present some similar characteristics. Among differences one can note that Salvini in contrast to Di Maio shared more frequently local content. Moreover, Salvini virtually ignored European sources. Network analysis showed that Salvini's FB page network was relatively far more extensive than Di Maio's. Interestingly, FB groups and pages sharing Di Maio’s posts were rather symbolic in numbers and mainly organized as bottom-up initiatives by small groups of militants that were not directly or formally linked to the 5SM. Conversely, those FB pages and groups more prone to share Salvini's contents tended to perceive themselves as local sections of the party. Both leaders tended to share content that supported their arguments, or at least content that they could use to support their own interpretation.
EN
Greek politicians tend to more intensively use their social media accounts during the pre-electoral periods. In general, Syriza had to fight both established mainstream parties and the mainstream media since it´s founding, including while in power. Yet Syriza's campaign on the Internet between 2006 and 2015 relied mainly on alternative media activists. In 2019, Alexis Tsipras prioritized sharing content from digital sources (mainly own created content such as comments or videos posted on his FB page) and occasionally articles from the websites of newspapers or links from the Syriza website or FB account. Not surprisingly, there were no links shared from radio or TV stations. The content shared by Tsipras, other than his own messaging which constituted the vast majority of his posts, came from predominantly left or centre-left publications. The reciprocity network of Tsipras was limited to posts shared between the account of Alexis Tsipras and the official account of his party. The accounts that shared the posts of Alexis Tsipras were either accounts or pages dedicated to Alexis Tsipras or Syriza. The communication strategy of Alexis Tsipras lacked a discernible “populist pattern” of communication, at least in terms of the types of sources shared and the type of social media network that the leader of Syriza participates in.
EN
The case study undergoes an analysis of the FaceBook (FB) activity of two Slovak populist entities, leader Boris Kollár and OĽaNO movement. The aim was to explore whether and how they construct a populist network and draw on media sources that are out of the mainstream or associated with a populist style. Both selected entities were highly active and quite successful in their communication on FB throughout most of the last five years at least. The study finds that these parties publish sources and connect with other FB pages that mostly confirm their parties’ positions and alliances. Yet there was no preference for alternative sources, understood as disseminating hyper-partisan or fake news and hoaxes, often associated with populist parties. Rather, OĽaNO had some reciprocity in media visibility with mainstream liberal media, in the sense that the party drew on liberal mainstream sources, which also covered the parties’ activities. In sharing posts, Boris Kollár had the most intensive dissemination network, while movements WAF and OĽaNO were very similar in terms of size of their network. There was a rather low cross-promotion. OĽaNO supporters were more appreciative of the efforts made by murdered journalist Ján Kuciak, and showed a stronger focus against Smer-SD (Direction-Social Democracy). In contrast, Kollár was associated more with pro-Christian, national and social rhetoric.
EN
It is becoming increasingly clear that emotions play a crucial role in voting decisions. This is especially true when it comes to choosing populist parties. This article uses a unique dataset to analyse the interplay between emotions and support for various types of populist parties in Slovakia. It contributes to the discourse by testing the competing hypotheses on what kinds of emotions matter in a post-communist country with multiple types of populist parties. Our results show that although previous studies have tended to concentrate on emotions toward the political or economic situation, feelings toward political leaders actually have greater importance, at least in the Slovak, post-communist context. Our study also indicates that the types of emotions differ depending on whether the populist party has already been in power or not. Contrary to expectations, fear has played a more important role than anger and in general, emotions are more important for right wing and left wing populist parties than for non-populist or centrist populist parties.
EN
This article uses semiotics to study two audio-visual spots produced by populist political actors (Marine Le Pen, in France, and Unidas Podemos, in Spain) with the purpose of unveiling the multimodal discursive strategies they use. The analysis presented in the article focuses on the auditive dimension and studies how Le Pen and Unidas Podemos use orchestral music as a semiotic resource for meaning- and sense-making. The analysis proposes that the use these two political actors do of orchestral music in the analysed spots is not random, but strategic. Moreover, it is argued that these strategic uses are aligned with recent scholarship on right- and left-wing populism: while – an example of right-wing populism – Le Pen draws on a discursive strategy aimed at provoking emotions like fear and anxiety based on exclusion, Unidas Podemos – an example of left-wing populism – uses one aimed at conveying the emotions of hope and possibility of change based on inclusion.
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