Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  PRACTICAL REALISM
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

ON THE PRACTICAL REALISM

100%
Przelecki M.
Etyka (Ethics)
|
2006
|
issue 39
15-20
EN
Practical realism is the ethical conception of Tadeusz Kotarbinski, which has met with serious criticism - first of all by Henryk Elzenberg. The author of the article considers some aspects of that criticism correct. He also tries to show how the criticism can be avoided by offering an interpretation of the postulate of practical realism suggested by some earlier texts of Kotarbinski. So understood, the postulate is not seen as the main ideal of life, but as a moral condition which our striving for that ideal should satisfy. The condition requires us to care for others, especially by 'defending them against misfortune'.
2

CONSTITUTION THEORY OF INTENTION-DEPENDENT OBJECTS AND THE PROBLEM OF ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVISM

70%
Tahmasbi M. R.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2016
|
vol. 23
|
issue 1
21 – 31
EN
According to Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution theory, all artworks and artefacts are constituted intention-dependent (ID) objects which are irreducibly real and cannot be reduced to the collections of particles which make them up. The constitution theory of ID objects is based on Baker’s theory of practical realism according to which our everyday life-world is a resource for metaphysics. This paper will focus on the problem of ontological relativism entailed by the constitution theory of intention-dependent objects. The author will argue, by way of an example, that the constitution theory of intention-dependent objects entails ontological relativism. That is because everyday life worlds vary from culture to culture. Finally, he examines if there is any possibility for the constitution theorist to avoid the problem of ontological relativism. The author discusses Baker’s idea of a thin common sense framework.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.