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  1. 2 Filo-Sofija

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  1. 2 2012

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  1. 1 Hubaczek K.

  2. 1 Łukasiewicz D.

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Molinizm a problem zła moralnego

100%
Hubaczek K.
Filo-Sofija
|
2012
|
vol. 12
|
issue 4(19)
143-156
EN
One of the best known solutions to the problem of evil is the free will theodicy. The aim of Molinism is to reconcile the libertarian notion of free will and the traditional idea of Divine Providence. But Molinism is based on the assumption that God has a middle knowledge, i.e. He knows the truth value of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. The possibility of such knowledge has been called into question by contemporary critics of Molinism. The problem is that without middle knowledge, the Molinist account of Providence and the free will theodicy is impossible. My claim is that even if it is taken for granted that middle knowledge is possible, a Molinist needs more than simple free will theodicy to solve the problem of evil.
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Wszechwiedza Boża a problem zła z perspektywy teizmu otwartego

86%
Łukasiewicz D.
Filo-Sofija
|
2012
|
vol. 12
|
issue 4(19)
117-130
EN
In the first part of the article, I present the argument for theological fatalism consisting in the thesis that if God has an infallible knowledge of future contingents, then whatever happens in the world happens necessarily. Next, I discuss the open theism view, whose rejection of theological fatalism rests on the claim that God does not know future contingents in advance. In the second part of the paper, I analyze the open theism view in the context of the evidential argument from evil. The evidential argument from evil says that the occurrence of great and pointless suffering in the world makes the existence of God very improbable. The open theism view implies that since God does not know the future contingents (great and pointless evils included), the occurrence of such evils does not compromise his omnipotence or his benevolence, and, hence, it does not make his existence improbable. In the last part of the article, I make some critical remarks on the theodicy of open theism recently put forth by William Hasker and I emphasize that this theodicy is based on axiological assumptions which are not evident enough in themselves.
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