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The issue of psychophysical health, mental diseases, their etiology and forms of therapy gives rise to many legal, ethical and deontological problems. A lot of cases of mental disturbances analyzed from the therapeutic perspective not only assume referring to deontological and legal reflection, but demand bioethical analysis as well. This especially concerns the use of therapies based on contemporary biotechniques, biotechnologies and neurophysiology that attempt to reach not only the sphere of symptoms, but also the sphere of causes of mental disturbances and diseases. Attempts to make the expectations for psychology and psychiatry objective have been verbalized in numerous deontological, ethical and legal documents. The ethical perspective presents as the main aim rescuing the patient's mental health as the ability to be a free and conscious subject of his acts. The choice of methods and therapeutic techniques should have the integral good of the person as its aim, with simultaneously minimizing unfavorable side effects. Hence one has to be cautious about such treatments as electroconvulsive therapy or psycho-surgical interference. It is unethical to use mentally ill persons in non-therapeutic medical experiments and as organ donors in transplant operations.
EN
Contemporary inquiry of the ontological status of a person is a matter of both philosophy and neurosciences. This article examines the question of persons ontology from two interconnected perspectives. The first one is a philosophical perspective represented by J. Searle, T. Nagel, D. Dennett and T. Metzinger; the other one is the perspective of the neuroscientific researches. The neuroscientific studies are founded on the data which are taken from the results of psychosurgical operations and of the brain tissue transplantations. The question of preservation and alteration of personal identity is one of the central subjects of further analysis and therapy which follow the mentioned medical operations. Both adherents and opponents of such surgical operations refer to the same concepts; however, they represent different understanding of the terms: 'numerical' or 'qualitative identity' of the person and his or her brain. I conclude that a comprehensive analysis of personal identity requires both philosophical and scientific approach, which would result in a new kind of neurophilosophy, similar to that what G. Northoff and A. Heinzel call 'the First-Person Neuroscience'.
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