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PRESENTATIONISM IN THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND REALISM

100%
Debowski J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2005
|
issue 2
73-111
EN
The difficulties with justification of the thesis of realism in the theory of knowledge (scilicet belief that we gain or we are capable of gaining knowledge about objects transcendent to the mind) are well known since long. Those difficulties caused many kinds of realism to exist nowadays - kinds discordant among themselves or even excluding each other. As is well known, since Descartes the main problem of every kind of realism and perhaps even of the whole theory of knowledge became so called 'transcendency problem' or 'the bridge problem'. How to come from perceptions to the things themselves? Or: how to come from 'the knowledge of knowledge' to 'the knowledge of things'? These are some examples of questions being in close relation with the transcendency issue and 'the bridge problem'. Since Descartes, in order to solve the above-mentioned problem, there have been created several standpoints, which tried to justify the thesis of realism in the theory of knowledge in an indirect manner, basing on other theses (for instance the principle of causality or referring to the term of cognitive intermediators). The author claims that defending the realism from the standpoint of representational theory of knowledge is inefficient. Representationism rather assumes the thesis of realism than proves it. It means that representationism can be defended efficiently only from the standpoint of presentational theory of knowledge. In other words, to prove transcendency and ontological objectivity of conceived objects, we need to refer to various kinds of immediate cognition, and to take into consideration the selfpresentation of objects. Whoever neglects that, deprives himself of a good opportunity to justify thesis of realism. The standpoint of Putnam (his internal realism) and the discussion about the realistic character of the semantic theory of knowledge (especially the distinction between weak and strong correspondence) make a good illustration of the difficulties, to which lead the standpoints ignoring the above-mentioned 'principle of all principles'.
2

Pragmatyzm: trywializm i purytanizm

88%
Leszczyński D.
Lectiones & Acroases Philosophicae
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2011
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vol. 4
|
issue 2
235-262
EN
There is an interesting common feature of all pragmatic philosophers. Their subtle considerations, accurate analysis and brilliant criticism often lead to trivial conclusions. The consequence of this is methodological trivialism whose examples we can find in the leading representatives of pragmatism: James, Dewey, Rorty and Putnam. In this article I am trying to characterize this trivialism as well as to answer a question about its source. I defend the hypothesis that this trivialism results from the fact that pragmatists do not have theoretical goals, but practical ones – very often political. Their attitude can be described as a variant of puritanism, because by promising to liberate from repressive philosophical tradition they ultimately offer a much more doctrinaire position.
3
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'PUTNAMISATION OF ABSOLUTELY EVERYTHING' AND ITS EPISTEMOLOGICAL REPERCUSIONS ('Putnamizacja absolutnie wszystkiego' i jej epistemologiczne reperkusje)

63%
Debowski J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2009
|
issue 9
35-59
EN
In the article inspired by Putnam's thesis of 'skolemisation of absolutely everything' (which is so called theory-modelling argument about semantic anti-realism) the author tries to describe Hilary Putnam's style of philosophy, especially his argumentation in benefit of 'internal realism', epistemic understanding of truth and (alleged) anti-relativism. On the base of delved analysis he states that undertaken by Putnam strategy of realism defence - because of reasons that can be together called 'Putnamism of absolutely everything' - is totally inefficient. Moreover, despite of all differences and declared by Putnam divergences, it is, at least in a tendency, coherent with Rorty's neo-pragmatism, later Wittgenstein's conception of 'language games' and Derrida's open postmodernism. Although Rorty's neo-pragmatism should be called 'hard neo-pragmatism' (contesting neo-pragmatism), Putnam's neo-pragmatism can be at a pinch called 'soft neo-pragmatism'. It is caused by the fact that he does not resign from the notion of truth completely, and keeps a lot of reserve towards the thesis about incoherence of discourses. In debt of it Putnam's position becomes open for probable modifications and amendments, also concerning issue of internal realism (global or local?).
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