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1

The 'Brains in a Vat' - hypothesis and the internal realism

100%

Kertesz G.

Magyar Filozofiai Szemle (Hungarian Review of Philosophy)

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2004

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vol. 48

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issue 4

409-443

EN

This paper investigates Hilary Putnam's famous 'Brains in a vat' hypothesis. In the literature of the problem, it is mostly discussed as an antisceptic hypothesis. It was introduced firstly in 1981 in the book 'Reason, Truth and History'. No doubt it is not self evident at first sight that the real point of the argument is not the refutation of scepticism, but the grounding of the author's own epistemological view. In part he launched an attack on the view he termed 'metaphysical realism', in another part he wanted to ground his own internal realism. The author claims Putnam's argument is imperfect either if we think of his thinking experiment as an antisceptic hypothesis or if in correspondence to the previous approach we investigate it as a review of metaphysical realism. And the last but no less important thing is that it fails to sufficiently support Putnam's own epistemology.

2

PUTNAM’S VIEW ON REFERENCE CHANGE IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF KRIPKE’S

88%

Moreno L. F.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2016

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vol. 23

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issue 3

367 – 383

EN

A usual objection put forward against the causal theory of reference is that it cannot explain the reference changes that terms may undergo. The main aim of this paper is to examine the position on reference change of one of the classic supporters of the causal theory, Hilary Putnam. It is usually claimed that Putnam’s causal theory of reference of natural kind terms is closely related to Kripke’s theory and can be conceived as a development of the same. The motivation of this paper is to allege that there is at least one important difference between both theories, consisting of their explanation of reference changes or at least in the way in which those theories make reference changes possible. After dealing with the problem of reference change within the framework of Kripke’s theory and reconstructing Kripke’s proposal to account for it, we will allege that there are components of Putnam’s theory which make reference changes possible, although they are different from those present in Kripke’s theory.

3

THREE PROBLEMS WITH SCIENTIFIC REALISM (O trzech problemach realizmu naukowego)

63%

Pospiszyl M.

Semina Scientiarum

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2009

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vol. 8

91-122

EN

The article consists of five parts. In the first part the author concentrates on the problem of realism in its philosophical context, on disputes from which it derives and it corresponds with. Afterwards, he analyzes and correct the canonical version of Putnam's No-miracle argument, viewed as the strongest argument in favour of scientific realism. In the next part, he is trying to confront the objections that can be raised against this type of argumentation. It will relate to an attempt to resolve the three questions, asked from three different perspectives: 1) An empiricist (The Vienna Circle) will ask if the success of the science needs an explanation 2) Next, a 'neutral' anti-realist or a critical realist will investigate: is the presented argument, logically coherent and historically adequate? 3) Finally, a constructionist (The sociology of knowledge / Postmodernism) will ask: is the success (understood approaching to the truth) of science is a fact, or the a (meta)fact? In the end, the author tries to explain why he did not succeed in giving unambiguous answer to those three questions.

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1 Magyar Filozofiai Szemle (Hungarian Review of Philosophy)

1 Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

1 Semina Scientiarum

1 2016

1 2009

1 2004

1 Kertesz G.

1 Moreno L. F.

1 Pospiszyl M.

The 'Brains in a Vat' - hypothesis and the internal realism

PUTNAM’S VIEW ON REFERENCE CHANGE IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF KRIPKE’S

THREE PROBLEMS WITH SCIENTIFIC REALISM (O trzech problemach realizmu naukowego)