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Nitrosvětské účely, transcendentní motiv

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The victim is a central theme in Patočka’s late philosophy. Patočka first presented his conception of the victim in a house-seminar in 1973; even then it provoked a discussion which pointed to certain problematic features. This article works with the assumption that it is the unexplicated religious implications of the concept of victim that constitute the core problem. The author attempts to show that, in Patočka’s non-religious interpretation, the victim loses the “two-way” character of the religious concept. It is this character which enables it to fulfill a particular wordly aim, while being directed beyond the human. In Patočka’s conception (at least in its most radical formulation) a victim can only have one determination, and it is not clear how victims can be sacrificed for a worldly aim while going beyond the level of worldly entities. A solution to this problem is sought in Jaspers’ conception of conditionless behaviour; this allows us to distinguish between behaviour itself, which can be part of the economy of wordliness, and its motive, which can, at the same time, transcend the sphere of worldly motivation.
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Patočkovo rozlišení mezi Sókratem a Platónem

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The subject of the article is Patočka’s distinction between Socrates and Plato. In two texts written in the 1930’s (Platonism and Politics and Plato and Popularisation), Patočka declares his allegiance to Platonism as the true philosophy, although he does not yet distinguish betwen Plato and Socrates. These texts of Patočka’s are concerned with an attempt to discover a „philosophy of praxis“, which would free itself from modern intellectualism as well as from the understanding of man as homo faber. In the second half of the forties Patočka develops a distinction between Socrates and Plato in which, initially, in the voluminous study Eternity and Historicity and in the lecture Socrates, he clearly takes Socrates’ side. Socrates, for Patočka, now presents the quintessential philosophical life and thus provides the basis for a „philosophy of praxis“ (humanism), which Patočka had been seeking in Platonism in his articles of the thirties. Plato for Patočka now poses a threat not unlike modern intellectualism: this is because Good for him exists in itself, regardless of man and his moral endeavour. Patočka’s philosophical programme consists in attempts to repeat the basic philosophical questions. Socrates poses the question of human „good“. In order that we may repeat it, in its whole intensity, we must purge it of Plato’s account. Socrates was, in Patočka’s view, capable of raising the question of „true human being“. Insistence on this question is „care for the soul“ and the soul is the single authority on which this question is based. Plato, in Patočka’s view, poses the question of „the true basis of everything“. Socrates’ anthropological concepts gain, in Plato’s work, cosmological significance. A relation to the whole of the world is, however, for Patočka an integral part of the spiritual life, and from this perspective Socrates’ philosophy is shown to be inadequate. Socrates is not capable, in reality, of addressing the question of the whole world. Socrates’ relation to the world is not led by a conscious question, but by a „divine voice“ (daimonion). For Patočka, however, reliance on divine help was an abdication of a philosophical position. As a result, Patočka in Negative Platonism returns to Platonism, so that he might extract its philosophical will and develop it further in a purified form.
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According to Jan Patočka, phenomenology considers the human body as phenomenon. In Body, Community, Language and World Patočka concentrates on the body as a living and subjective entity, which represents the condition of our existence in the world, i.e. also the condition of apparition. As a consequence, the body itself is the condition of its own appearance. If this conclusion is not absurd, than in what sense? In the two cases, are we dealing with the same body or do we necessarily speak about two different entities? How are these entities characterized and how do they eventually differ? And if we speak about the same body, how is this body to be taken into account? May the phenomenological method be applied on an entity which seems to condition the existence of phenomena? Is it not rather a blind spot from which the phenomena arise and in which they disappear? And last but not least, what are the consequences of Patočka’s conception of corporeality in the realm on interpersonal relationships and what possibilities of understanding oneself as well as the other do they open?
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Jan Patočka, in a text about Charta 77 written for a special occasion, appeals to Kant’s idea of the duties which a human being has to himself. In the first part of this study, an attempt is made to relate this text to other places where Patočka reflects on the philosophical motivation of political action. In the second part, it is then shown which elements of Kant’s doctrine of virtue and doctrine of right that Patočka is actually appealing to. Patočka’s reading of Kant is, on the one hand, a fascinating attempt to link the doctrine of right with the doctrine of virtue; on the other hand, however, it is a rather selective interpretation which obscures Kant’s sense of the specific cha­racter of the legislation of right (rather than ethics) which arises where there is a co-existence of people and which would encompass of the famous principle of legality on which Charta 77 was based. In conclusion, the author poses the question of why exac­tly Patočka does not exploit this principle of legality and the verdict is reached that it is because of Patočka’s – rather than Kant’s – characteristic conception of freedom as transcending the given.
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„The body as a subject – this paradox which is a phenomenon at the same time,“ writes Patočka in the article entitled „Phenomenology and Metaphysics of Movement“. In this article, Patočka develops the given paradox on the phenomenological basis, presenting the theses concerning the non-objectifiable foundation of the constitution of the world and its givenness. According to Patočka, the world conforms, in a certain sense, to the intentions of subjective movement. Thus, the subjective movement of the body and the movement of the apparition of the world, i.e. the entry of the invisible to the realm of the apparition, correspond to each other. In different contexts, Patočka goes even further and interprets the subjective movement of the body from the perspective of vital structures. The primary „feeling“ of finitude takes place in the instinctive-affective motricity of the body, in the so-called first movement of existence. It is here, in the sensory perception and affectivity, below the threshold of consciousness and understanding of being that the resonance with the world takes place, as well as the perception of this world as a strange and destructive power. In this sense, it is already the body and its anxiety rather than the anticipation of death in the understanding of being that represents the basis of our feeling of finitude.
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Patočka’s philosophical work is very extensive; therefore, it is necessary to pay special attention to each area of his interest. It seems that the most important thing in his philosophical heritage is his effort to bridge political and philosophical thought. The aim of this article is to describe the influence of the philosophy of Jan Patočka on the Charter 77 programme. His role was revealed mainly in providing Charter 77 with the moral and existential context.
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The purpose of this study is to suggest a way of making phenomenology available for the study of social phenomena like authority, which the subject experiences in a public space. Phenomenology is ideally suited to the purpose – except for its inherent tendency to subjectivism. Neither Husserl’s solution – the transcendental ego – nor Heidegger’s solution – the entschlossene Dasein – will do. The problem remains insolvable as long as we regard the world as initially meaningless. It disappears when we set out with a vitalist conception of the world as intrinsically meaningful in virtue of the initial purposive orientation of life to fulfilment. Neither a transcendental ego, nor a determined Dasein, but life itself is the key to prereflective intelligibility, as in the work of French phenomenologists or in Jan Patočka’s a-subjective phenomenology.
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Autor naznačuje způsob, jak uplatnit fenomenologii při studiu takových společenských jevů, jako je autorita. Ty představují osobní zážitky ve veřejném prostoru, zároveň subjektivní a objektivní, tedy doslova fenomena. Potíž s fenomenologií je její sklon k subjektivismu, který Husserl neúspěšně řeší pojetím transcendentálního ega a Heidegger pojetím rozhodné přítomnosti. Problém se jeví jako neřešitelný, pokud chápeme svět jako prvotně nesmyslný. Řešení je možné, pokud svět chápeme vitalisticky jako z podstaty smysluplně uspořádaný teleologickým zaměřením života k naplnění. Ani transcendentální ego, ani rozhodné Dasein nepotřebuje svět osmyslnit. Svět je předreflektivně smysluplný jako svět života, jak vystupuje u francouzských fenomenologů či v a-subjektivní fenomenologii Jana Patočky.
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Hegel’s history of philosophy has irreplaceable place within the whole of his philosophizing and this fact grounds its philosophical importance. It has become the organ of the self-knowing mind in time as an integral component of philosophy of objective mind. Patočka was very precise with defining four main dimensions of Hegel’s philosophy of the history of philosophy: 1. The development of philosophy is organic. Different philosophies are different stages of the same organism development. 2. The role of individuality is subordinate; it does not belong to philosophical contents. 3. Time is but a mere external milieu, a mirror of inner development in the organism of mind. Philosophy and other aspects of mind in different periods are certain manifestations of the very same stage in the development of spiritual substance. Each historical period can be expressed rationally. Time thus doesn´t have positive, content meaning. 4. Advance of philosophical systems corresponds with the logical development of thought. The crucial core of Hegel’s philosophy of the history of philosophy as Patočka identified it couldn´t be even put forward in a better way. According to Patočka, Hegel is right that history of philosophy lives a life of systematic philosophy; it reflects our systematic nature, our tendency to system. History of philosophy and philosophy itself for Patočka, as well as for Hegel, create unity – a kind of organic totality. 
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The work tackles the question of wheter, and in what sense, Patočka's phenomenology is first philosophy and strict science. It does this by considering the problem ot the relationship of phenomenology, as a doctrine about appearing, to epistomology and to ontology. After an analysis of the conceptation of phenomenology which Patočka works with his dissertation and habilitation on the natural world, the study moves on to Patočka's late thinking, especially to the conception of an "asubjective phenomenology". The interpretation distinguishes various phenomenological approaches which are intertwined in the project of asubjective phenomenology, and its points to their weak points. Finally it identifies an acceptable conception of phenomenology in that which is presented in Patočka's lecture cycle Tělo, společenství, svět (Body, Community, Language, World).
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Socrates as a philosopher is present in Patočka’s thinking in irreplaceable manner, and in all periods of his philosophical life. Patočka mainly accepts the Socratic idea of knowing the unknown. He is developing this idea step by step throughout the various periods of his philosophical work. Socratic knowing of the unknown, transformed through the problematisation and the moment of negativity successively into the principle of historicity, means for Patočka the essential resort for his own conception of philosophy of history in its top form. Within this conception he is attempting for a new, historical understanding of the sense of human life, and also of the sense of history. For Patočka, the history is understood on the basis of constant problematisation, it’s infinite, unresolved and opened – but it must remain this way, if we don’t want to think about the end of history.
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In framing a question about meaning of man, respectively human history, Patočka uses a historical-philosophical aspect as well as a phenomenological aspect. By tracking the genesis of the concept of eternity from Kant to the 20th century he concludes, that human meaning cannot be derived from moral postulates which exceed finitness of man. By deleting the concept of eternity Patočka concludes, that the question of meaning cannot be bound by human targets, because filled purpose is already objectified, existing, without the horizon of your being and in this its takes the form of a relative meaning. The meaning, according to Patočka is phenomenologically bound to being, which is non-objective, implying that the meaning is problematic, unreal, yet constantly perpetuated. This attitude has served Patočka to the criticism of nihilism and in it especially to the unacceptability of active nihilism, the concept which Nietzsche introduced into the philosophy. Patočka transferred a critique of Nietzsche´s understanding of realized meaning in terms of superman by rejection of his idea of will to power (he understood it in the definition of gross and ruthless animal life, namely in the form of the highest being) and the doubtful idea of eternal return. Patočka with his attitude to Nietzsche only echoed the opinion presented by Heidegger, which called Nietzsche the consummator of modern subjectivity.In terms of the present (Kouba) it shows, that phenomenology will profit more if it converts both Nietzsche´s thoughts to its own area and use them in the analysis of situational meaning that is constantly (by contradiction) bound to the horizon of possibility of the situation without a sense – that is in meaningful situation suppressed, not realized, but its validity and consistency with the horizon of meaning does not lose. In this view, it appears that Nietzsche´s understanding of the meaning is also problematic, but this problematic natureis not bound to absolute meaning.
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Patočka´s and Rorty´s philosophy offer a foundation for the reconstruction of liberalism and a possibility of fulfilling individual´s freedom. Patočka intends to assess the value of transcendence and its relevance to life. He tries to save the metaphysics for it does not need to become necessarily dogmatic. Contemporary people may find Patočka´s reflections on freedom beneficial. Patočka invites people to connect their spirituality with skepticism and modesty, and according to Socratic knowing of unknowing, along with humility which makes man non-dogmatically open to transcendence. In the reflections on man, Rorty holds to moral responsibility and tries to bring man to self-awareness and taking responsibility for his acting, because it is only man who disposes of unique possibilities and abilities to shape his own authentic way of life. Rorty´s concept of freedom as an accidental phenomenon is based on the concept of history of Western philosophy and is closely linked with the problem of metaphysics and truth. Despite timeless reflections of both philosophers, any timeless ideal of human freedom is determined by the context in which we are thinking.
PL
W artykule staram się zrekonstruować i zbadać przyczyny, które skłoniły Patočkę do silnej ekspozycji problemu poświęcenia w swojej myśli filozoficznej. Aby to zrobić, naświetlam relację pomiędzy poświęceniem, sensem życia oraz trzeba platońskim ideami dobra, piękna i prawy, rozpatrując poświęcenie jako idealne narzędzie ich ucieleśnienia. Na koniec przekonuję, że natura poświęcenia jest głęboko wieloznaczna i wszystkie badania, które jej dotyczą, powinny uwzględniać jego negatywne aspekty.
EN
In the paper I try to reconstruct and investigate the reasons which inclined Patočka to strongly expose the problem of sacrifice in his philosophical thought. To do so, I highlight the relationship between sacrifice, the meaning of life and three platonic ideas of goodness, beauty and truth, assuming sacrifice to be a perfect instrument of incorporating them. Finally, I argue that the nature of sacrifice is inherently equivocal and all studies concerning it should include its negative aspects.
PL
W artykule staram się zrekonstruować i zbadać przyczyny, które skłoniły Patočkę do silnej ekspozycji problemu poświęcenia w swojej myśli filozoficznej. Aby to zrobić, naświetlam relację pomiędzy poświęceniem, sensem życia oraz trzeba platońskim ideami dobra, piękna i prawy, rozpatrując poświęcenie jako idealne narzędzie ich ucieleśnienia. Na koniec przekonuję, że natura poświęcenia jest głęboko wieloznaczna i wszystkie badania, które jej dotyczą, powinny uwzględniać jego negatywne aspekty.
EN
In the paper I try to reconstruct and investigate the reasons which inclined Patočka to strongly expose the problem of sacrifice in his philosophical thought. To do so, I highlight the relationship between sacrifice, the meaning of life and three platonic ideas of goodness, beauty and truth, assuming sacrifice to be a perfect instrument of incorporating them. Finally, I argue that the nature of sacrifice is inherently equivocal and all studies concerning it should include its negative aspects.
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