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All’incrocio tra semantica e pragmatica (parte 1): le espressioni deittiche da Peirce a Reichenbach

100%
Szantyka I. A.
Lublin Studies in Modern Languages and Literature
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2009
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issue 33
140-156
EN
The objective of this work divided in two parts is to review, in the most objective way and in accordance to the chronological order, different approches to the problematical question of the deicitc expressions, theories sometimes divergent, other times convergent between themselves and in relation to the approach inspired by the results of Bar-Hillel’s, Kaplan’s, Perry’s and Kleiber’s theoretical research, and announced in expressis verbis in the first part of this contribution’s title. The tentative to treat the deictic expressions as units which belong at the same time to the semantics’ and the pragmatics’ domain can be discreetly observed already in the Bühler’s (indexicals as signals and symbols) and Burks’ (deictics as indexical symbols) philosophical and semiotic thought, but also in the reductionist token-reflexivity theory of Reichenbach (division type / token). The results of Peirce’s and Russell’s research are also relevant, because, being diametrically opposed respect to the approaches mentioned above, they inspired, according to the principle of contradiction, the philosophical and linguistic theories, to which methodologies we explicitly refer.
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Społeczne konteksty kształtowania się wiedzy w pragmatyzmie Ch. S. Peirce’a

80%
Miklas M.
Kultura i Wartości
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2012
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issue 4
71-80
EN
One of the most important problems in philosophy is the question: how to justify our scientific knowledge – and more specifically – of synthetic inferences? C. S. Peirce disagrees with the solutions proposed by Kant or Mill. An integral part of his philosophy is the triadic concept of the sign, which is constitutive for Peirce’s epistemology. Building scientific knowledge is an endless process in the interpretation of signs. It does not grasp the object directly and in its entirety, but rather requires interpretation from the perspective of various researchers. There is no scientific procedure which leads to the necessary and ultimate results. This opinion implies that only a community – and more closely an unrestricted community of researchers – can be the subject of really valid and true knowledge. Scientific practice is a form of public discourse which is based on, not only methodological, but above all ethical principles. The success of science depends largely on the ethics of cooperation framed by this discourse.
PL
Jednym z najważniejszym problemów filozofii jest pytanie o uprawomocnienie wiedzy naukowej lub wnioskowań syntetycznych. Peirce nie zgadzał się z rozwiązaniami zaproponowanymi przez Kanta lub Milla. Przyjmował za konstytutywną dla własnej epistemologii triadyczną koncepcję znaku. Budowanie wiedzy naukowej jest jego zdaniem nieskończonym procesem interpretacji znaków. Przedmiot poznania nie może być uchwycony bezpośrednio i w całości, ale wymaga interpretacji z perspektywy różnych badaczy - podmiotów. Nie istnieje naukowa procedura, która prowadzi do koniecznych i ostatecznych rezultatów. Taka opinia prowadzi do stwierdzenia, że jedynie nieograniczona wspólnota badaczy może być podmiotem prawomocnej i prawdziwej wiedzy. Praktyka naukowa jest formą dyskursu publicznego, opartego na zasadach metodologicznych, ale także na etycznych. Sukces nauki za leży w dużej mierze od etyki kooperacji w ramach dyskursu.
3
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Some remarks concerning the reference of mental and language representations

80%
Buczkowska J.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2020
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vol. 56
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issue S1
123-145
EN
This paper is an attempt to answer the question, what is exactly represented by our thoughts or language expressions. At the beginning, the article presents the main philosophical problems regarding the understanding of the nature of the subject of reference of such representations as names or descriptions. Is the name directly referred to the real object or rather to the content of thought? What about cases when the name cannot be referred to the real object? What is the relation between the intentional subject connected with every name (or description) and the external object to which only some names can be referred to, and which one is prior to the constitution of representation? The idea to understand the subject of mental or language representations as a complex structure which has a relational nature is the solution proposed in this paper. This structure is constituted by cognition and ties internal elements of a given representation such as the content with the elements which are external with regard to this given representation. This structure reflects such elements as the content of representation, the way in which this content is given, the correlate of the content and its mode of existence as well as additional systemic information coordinated with given representation. Some consequences of this proposal are discussed at the end of the article. It is explained how the differentiation of the elements of this structure can lead to different types of reference. The basis to understand the issue in question is the relation between internal and external object of reference. It can be interpreted (as is suggested in the paper) as a connection between internal elements of the described structure.
4
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Charlesa Peirce’a „zaniedbany argument” za rzeczywistością Boga

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Krzos B.
Studia Sandomierskie. Teologia-Filozofia-Historia
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2021
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vol. 28
203-217
EN
In this text, I have focused on the second of three parts of Charles S. Peirce’s argument for the reality of God. The analysis of Peirce’s inquiry by which he justifies his belief will be based on his work entitled Neglected Argument. The content has been organized as follows: first, the thought process described by Peirce, called: „the play of muse” which humbly leads many people to „God hypothesis”, has been justified as natural for a man. Secondly, „God hypothesis” itself has been validated as a natural result of „the play of muse”. Thirdly, the author of the argument listed three properties of this idea, thanks to which it becomes credible, and thus it comes much closer to the truth. I consider these issues interesting and worthy of further research and scientific work.
PL
Niniejszy tekst skupia się na drugiej z trzech części argumentu Charlesa S. Peirce’a za rzeczywistością Boga. Analiza rozumowania Peirce’a, na mocy którego uzasadnia on swoje przekonanie, opiera się na jego artykule zatytułowanym Neglected Argument (Zaniedbany argument). Uporządkowano ją następująco: Po pierwsze, opisany przez Peirce’a proces myślowy nazwany „zabawą dumania”, który wielu ludzi w pokorny sposób prowadzi do hipotezy Boga, został usprawiedliwiony jako naturalny dla człowieka. Po drugie, sama hipoteza Boga została uprawomocniona jako naturalny efekt „zabawy dumania”. Po trzecie, autor argumentu wymienił trzy własności tej idei, dzięki którym staje się ona wiarygodna, a więc w znaczny sposób przybliża się do prawdy. To interesujące zagadnienie wymaga dalszych badań i prac naukowych.
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On evolution of thinking about semiosis: semiotics meets cognitive science

70%
Konderak P.
Avant
|
2016
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vol. 7
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issue 2
EN
The aim of the paper is to sketch an idea-seen from the point of view of a cognitive scientist-of cognitive semiotics as a discipline. Consequently, the article presents aspects of the relationship between the two disciplines: semi- otics and cognitive science. The main assumption of the argumentation is that at least some semiotic processes are also cognitive processes. At the methodo- logical level, this claim allows for application of cognitive models as explana- tions of selected semiotic processes. In particular, the processes of embedded interpretation (in contrast to interpretability in principle) are considered: belief revision, dynamic organization of meaning and metaknowledge. The explanations are formulated in terms of artificial cognitive agents of the GLAIR/SNePS cognitive architecture. Finally, it is suggested that even if some- one rejects the idea of artificial cognitive systems as simulations of semiotic processes, they may acknowledge the usefulness of cognitive modeling in analysis of semiotic processes in virtual, simulated worlds and in the area of “new media”.
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On evolution of thinking about semiosis: semiotics meets cognitive science

70%
Konderak P.
Avant
|
2016
|
vol. 7
|
issue 2
EN
The aim of the paper is to sketch an idea-seen from the point of view of a cognitive scientist-of cognitive semiotics as a discipline. Consequently, the article presents aspects of the relationship between the two disciplines: semi- otics and cognitive science. The main assumption of the argumentation is that at least some semiotic processes are also cognitive processes. At the methodo- logical level, this claim allows for application of cognitive models as explana- tions of selected semiotic processes. In particular, the processes of embedded interpretation (in contrast to interpretability in principle) are considered: belief revision, dynamic organization of meaning and metaknowledge. The explanations are formulated in terms of artificial cognitive agents of the GLAIR/SNePS cognitive architecture. Finally, it is suggested that even if some- one rejects the idea of artificial cognitive systems as simulations of semiotic processes, they may acknowledge the usefulness of cognitive modeling in analysis of semiotic processes in virtual, simulated worlds and in the area of “new media”.
7
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A Note on Iconicity and Motivation of Expression

70%
Pawelec A.
Research in Language
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2007
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vol. 5
205-212
EN
While iconic effects can be detected at all levels of linguistic analysis, according to the standard position they have little, if any, relevance for the system of language. I would like to show that iconicity seems marginal only in static approaches. Motivation of form is central whenever a new way of expressing things is looked for. Once we see that language is about finding new means of expression, the obvious question to ask is what makes these means suitable: why they are accepted as satisfactory ‘vehicles’ of meaning. From this point of view, the issue of iconicity – correspondence of form and meaning – turns out to be an instance of a more general phenomenon: adequacy of symbols for novel tasks. The interactive theory of metaphor will be presented to substantiate the claim that conventional forms and meanings can be viewed as a reservoir of motives for expressive purposes.
8
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A Note on Iconicity and Motivation of Expression

70%
Pawelec A.
Research in Language
|
2007
|
vol. 5
205-212
EN
While iconic effects can be detected at all levels of linguistic analysis, according to the standard position they have little, if any, relevance for the system of language. I would like to show that iconicity seems marginal only in static approaches. Motivation of form is central whenever a new way of expressing things is looked for. Once we see that language is about finding new means of expression, the obvious question to ask is what makes these means suitable: why they are accepted as satisfactory ‘vehicles’ of meaning. From this point of view, the issue of iconicity - correspondence of form and meaning - turns out to be an instance of a more general phenomenon: adequacy of symbols for novel tasks. The interactive theory of metaphor will be presented to substantiate the claim that conventional forms and meanings can be viewed as a reservoir of motives for expressive purposes.
9
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Fashioning Episodes Through Virtual Habit: The Efficacy of Pre-Lived Experience

70%
West D. E.
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2018
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vol. 7
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issue 1
81-99
EN
In MS 620 (1909), C. S. Peirce crafts his ultimate statement regarding habit-formation. Here he defines and illustrates the influence of specific vivid virtual habits with the objective of changing future beliefs/actions. The specificity of the protoplans as determinations invites immediate implementation of action interventions, or recommendations to change action approaches. In this way, virtual habits transcend mere possibility for implementation of the action strategy; their vividity and specificity uniquely qualify them as soon to be actualized episodes.
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On a Cognitive Model of Semiosis

61%
Konderak P.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2015
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vol. 40
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issue 1
129-144
EN
What is the class of possible semiotic systems? What kinds of systems could count as such systems? The human mind is naturally considered the prototypical semiotic system. During years of research in semiotics the class has been broadened to include i.e. living systems (Zlatev, 2002) like animals, or even plants (Krampen, 1992). It is suggested in the literature on artificial intelligence that artificial agents are typical examples of symbol-processing entities. It also seems that (at least some) semiotic processes are in fact cognitive processes. In consequence, it is natural to ask the question about the relation between semiotic studies and research on artificial cognitive systems within cognitive science. Consequently, my main question concerns the problem of inclusion or exclusion from the semiotic spectrum at least some artificial (computational) systems. I would like to consider some arguments against the possibility of artificial semiotic systems and I will try to repeal them. Then I will present an existing natural-language using agent of the SNePS system and interpret it in terms of Peircean theory of signs. I would like also to show that some properties of semiotic systems in Peircean sense could be also found in a discussed artificial system. Finally, I will have some remarks on the status of semiotics in general.
11
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A Peircean approach to musicality

61%
Ojala J.
Interdisciplinary Studies in Musicology
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2015
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issue 14
175-191
PL
Musicality is central to musical processes and music research. Yet, there is no consensus of what is understood by the term. It can be assumed that in large populations musicality is distributed according to a bell curve - just as any trait of personality. It is also clear that musical skills can be improved, regardless of a possible stigma of unmusicality. Depending on the conception of musicality, musicality research confronts issues and trade-offs relating to ecological validity of the concept (how musicality connects to actual music), methodology (which methods of study yield valid and reliable results), epistemology (how the gain knowledge of musicality), and ontology of music (what processes pertain to music, what not, and what is possible shared). These issues are reflected in the primarily psychological theories and tests of musicality. This article makes an attempt at a Peircean analysis of musicality. It has been suggested that the traditional psychometric approach to musicality is followed by a semiotic approach, and assuming musicality has to do with how subjects make sense in musical processes, the semiotic analysis of musicality is critical. This analysis applies Peirce’s notion of thought-sign and his tenfold classification of the sign (suggesting a three-dimensional exemplification of Peirce’s trichotomous, three dimensional model). The ten classes are differentiated by six transitions, that seem to have their correlates in the psychological understanding of cognition: manifestation, definition, filtering, binding, associating and understanding of the sign. The six transitions appear useful in analyzing the concept of musicality. Correspondingly, the conditions for musical signification extend from ability of auditory sensation to those of dynamical memory, auditory filtering, auditory structuring, association sound objects and ability to understand and manage communicational situations in music. In order to understand musicality, all these aspects should be studied with good ecological and methodological validity in mind.
12
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Peirce on the Symbolical Foundation of Personhood

61%
De Tienne A.
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
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2021
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vol. 5
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issue 4
79-100
EN
This paper discusses the semiotic and metaphysical framework within which Peirce elaborated a symbolical and dynamical conception of personhood. It exhibits the centrality of Peirce’s early conception of the “unity of consistency” along with its decentering advantages. It describes how this gave rise to a metaphysics of personhood that questions the singularity of individuals. It then conducts a semiotic study of the evolutive process across which something indeterminate evolves into something determinate that increasingly personifies itself following the logic of symbolization, taking into account two major types of indetermination: generality and vagueness. It then considers the kind of teleology at work within personification. It concludes that personhood so conceived is not restricted to only individual human beings, for the process of symbolization at work is not confined to a particular species-specific application.
13
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Humanity and inhumanity of the sign: two views of man

61%
Švantner M.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2023
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vol. 71
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issue Special_issue_1
9-39
EN
The present article centers its focus on the conceptual clash involving selected definitions of the human and the non-human within the field of sign theory, particularly examining two nearly paradigmatic perspectives: structuralist semiology and Peircean semiotics. The text’s argumentation critically departs from the conventional viewpoint put forth by Ernest Cassirer. This perspective, widely prevalent not only in the humanities but also in the social sciences (e.g., M. Weber, T. Parsons) and even the natural sciences (e.g., T. Deacon), frequently regards the “symbol” as the defining boundary between the human and the non-human. The discussion further delves into the context of structuralist anti-humanism, which endeavors to redefine subjectivity by drawing from structural linguistics. Offering an alternative perspective to both Cassirerian and structuralist views of representation, the article introduces the semiotics of C. S. Peirce. According to John Deely, who serves as the primary source of inspiration for this paper, Peirce’s semiotics opens the door to a distinct, inferentialist, and methodologically more comprehensive understanding of the sign and the symbol, reshaping the understanding of the relationship between humans and the world inhabited by entities that, while they do not possess language, are capable of making inferences and employing signs – whether they be animals or machines. These nonlinguistic, non-representational yet communicative entities largely remained inconspicuous within structuralist semiology. Asubjective structures, seemingly waiting to be infused with human meaning, to be fully represented within the concept of language, to become subjects in a supposedly universal science of signs. At this juncture, the text departs from structuralist premises and, aligning with Peirce’s perspective, follows Deely in proposing that what sets apart human comprehension of signs from other forms of sign-interpretating agencies is the capacity to understand the sign as a sign. In essence, this represents the unique ability of human animals, even if unconscious, to engage in semiotics.
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Struggle of a description: Peirce and his late semiotics

51%
Švantner M.
Human Affairs
|
2014
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vol. 24
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issue 2
204-214
EN
The paper deals with the problem of Peirce’s theory of signs, placing it within the context of modern semiotics (comparing it with Saussurean semiology, in particular), and considers Peirce’s semiotics from the point of view of his theory of categories (phaneroscopy) and in the terms of his classification of signs. The article emphasizes the complicated system of Peirce’s late, “mature”, semeiotic and his theory (classification) of Interpretant.
15
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Philosophical Constraints on Normativity

51%
Margolis J.
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
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2019
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vol. 3
|
issue 4(10)
101-113
EN
This essay is an exploratory reflection on a theme drawn from the work of Pierre Hadot and Juliusz Domański regarding “philosophy as a way of life.” I approach the matter from the naturalistic outlook of classic pragmatism and its own limitations. This approach stresses the possible improvement of the analysis of normativity by way of some neglected contributions regarding the nature of history and the evolution of Homo sapiens applied to the formation of the human self or person. I take Hadot’s proposal seriously, therefore, as contributing to a mature conception of philosophy. But I deliberately restrict my own conjectures to naturalistic constraints, which begins to suggest an enlargement of pragmatism itself and an assessment of Hadot’s Greco-Roman and Christian themes.
16
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Thirdness along the Intuitional Path: Reflections from Maritain and Peirce

51%
West D. E.
|
2019
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vol. 8
|
issue 2
431-475
EN
This article exposits Maritain’s and Peirce’s account of the preconditions for emergence of event relations. It spotlights Maritain’s model of how to prepare for the receipt of objective intellection, as well as Peirce’s treatment of abductive inferencing. It further identifies the foundational representations (signs) which compel the intuitional/inferencing process. Both Peirce and Maritain advocate that inferring event relations depends upon two distinct kinds of knowledge: from empirical sources in Secondness/sensible experiences, as well as from an objective transcendental state in Firstness. In the latter, intuitions emerge from unbidden pictures vividly flashing across the mind’s eye, while in the former, embodied action templates trace lived experiential paths with objective import.
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Peirce i Wittgenstein o życiu znaków

43%
Hensoldt A.
Diametros
|
2014
|
issue 41
38-55
PL
Celem tego artykułu jest zbadanie i porównanie poglądów Peirce'a i Wittgensteina na naturę znaków. Przeprowadzone badanie pokazuje, że istnieją przynajmniej cztery punkty w powyższej kwestii, co do których Peirce i Wittgenstein pozostają zgodni: triadyczna natura znaków, obecność i szczególna rola w naszych dyskursach znaków zdegenerowanych, rola reguł w konstytuowaniu znaczenia znaków, a także niezbywalna rola społeczności w tworzeniu i podtrzymywaniu procesu semiozy. Fakt istnienia znaczących podobieństw w poglądach Peirce'a i Wittgensteina na naturę znaków nie sprawia jednak, że ich koncepcje semiotyczne są identyczne. Koncepcje te opierają się bowiem na odmiennych założeniach np. co do celów semiozy. Mimo tego wnioski, do jakich dochodzą Peirce i Wittgenstein, są w dużej mierze zbieżne, co może być argumentem na rzecz ich istotności i ważności.
EN
The aim of the paper is to examine some important features of Peirce's and Wittgenstein's accounts of the nature of signs. The analysis shows that there are at least four points , regarding the nature of signs, on which Peirce and Wittgenstein agree. These are: the triadic nature of signs, the presence (and the specific role) of degenerate signs in our discourses, the role of rules in the constitution of meaning, and the indispensable role of a community in creating and maintaining the network of signs. Discovering these similarities does not mean that Peirce's and Wittgenstein's conceptions of semiotics are identical, as their authors make different assumptions about e.g. the aims of semiosis, but they nevertheless reach very similar conclusions.
18

Reconsidering philosophical questions and neuroscientific answers: Two pillars of inquiry

41%
Tschaepe M.
Human Affairs
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2013
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vol. 23
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issue 4
606-615
EN
I propose the next steps in the neuropragmatic approach to philosophy that has been advocated by Solymosi and Shook (2013). My focus is the initial process of inquiry implicit in addressing philosophical questions of cognition and mind by utilizing the tools of neuroscientific research. I combine John Dewey’s pattern of inquiry with Charles Peirce’s three forms of inference in order to outline a methodological schema for neuropragmatic inquiry. My goal is to establish ignorance and guessing as well-defined pillars of methodology upon which to build a neuropragmatic approach to inquiry. First, I outline Dewey’s pattern of inquiry, highlighting the initial problematic phase in which recognized ignorance provides the basis upon which to frame a philosophical problem and initiate the trajectory by which philosophical questions may be addressed with the assistance of neuroscientific evidence. Second, I provide an outline of Peirce’s three forms of inference, focusing upon the first phase of abduction: guessing. Third, I explain the transition between ignorance and guessing, urging the benefit of attending to these two aspects of inquiry. Finally, I provide an initial sketch indicating the next steps concerning a pragmatic reconstruction of neurophilosophy, pointing towards the need for a more thorough examination of scientific methodology within and following analyses of philosophical problems and neuroscientific evidence.
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Quia Ego Nominor Leo: Barthes, Stereotypes and Aesop’s Animals

31%
Tyler T.
Dialogue and Universalism
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2014
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issue 1
193-208
EN
Taking Barthes’ discussion of Aesop’s lion as my starting point, I examine the notion of the stereotype as it applies to the use of animals in philosophy and cultural theory. By employing an illustrative selection of animal ciphers from Saussure and Austin, and animal indices from Peirce and Schopenhauer, I argue that theory’s beasts are always at risk of becoming either exemplars of a deadening, generic Animal or mere stultifying stereotypes. Gilbert Ryle’s faithful dog, Fido, as well as a number of Aesop’s edifying animals, help to demonstrate that these two dangers are not inescapable, however. I close by indicating two strategies for preventing the unnecessary inhibition of the creatures of critical theory, focusing on Derrida’s individual and gently unruly cat.
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