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Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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2014
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vol. 5
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issue 1
139-162
EN
This article is primarily concerned with Platoʼs later dialogue, the Sophist, and the reception of the megista-gēnē-dialectic in Neoplatonism (especially Plotinus and Proclus). The present paper offers a historical comparative study that consists of three parts. The first one gives a short summary concerning Platoʼs request regarding the concept of inverse and complex Ideas. The second one examines Plotinus’ conception of the νοῦς (Enn. VI 2, 7–8), in which the megista gēnē στάσις, κίνησις, ὄν, ταὐτόν and ἕτερον constitute the realm of the intellect. While the third and final part of the article investigates Proclusʼ extrapolation of the Platonic dialectic, it focuses on selected passages from the Commentary on the Parmenides. The paper concludes with a summary of the results.
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PL
There seem to be two tendencies in the Plotinian scholarship concerning spiritual method of the Enneads. First is more general and the other more specific and focused on the analysis of the text. The paper follows the second type of study and attempts to present and analyze Plotinian use of aporia as a spiritual exercise. Traditionally aporia was used as a point of departure for philosophical discussion (e.g. by Aristotle) and sometimes Plotinus follows this tradition. But at other times he uses aporia as a point of arrival – he creates a painful tension due to the fact that discursive thought is unable to know the nature of the One (or, less frequently, also Intellect). The tension becomes a sort of spiritual labor in which the contemplation is born and the tension is released. Several passages from the Enneads are analyzed to show various uses of that method.
EN
The subject of this article is the role of chôrismos (separation) in the philosophy of Plotinus. Its primary aim is to explore relationships between chôrismos, dialectical method and noetic knowledge. The first part of this article demonstrate metaphysical and methodological function of chôrismos, the essence of which is to establish the subject matter of metaphysics (i.e. ontos on). The second part contains an analysis of the anagogic way of a soul to self-knowledge in the context of chôrismos and Plotinus’ aretology. The third part sums up our investigations. It develops relationships, extracted in previous sections, especially connections between dialectic and functions of chôrismos.
EN
The purpose of this paper is to analyze Plotinus’ Ennead I,6 [1] 6,13–32, where the complex terminology in reference to beauty renders significant nuances about the different levels of reality in which the beautiful manifests itself. In fact, Plotinus begins by adopting an ascending approach, and postulates that the beauty of soul consists in being purely and entirely what it is: an incorporeal, intellective and divine form (6,13–21). Further on, in 6,25, he changes his perspective and proposes a hierarchy of beauties in descending order, departing from the Good, identified with the beautifulness, followed by the Intellect that is the beautiful, passing through the soul, made something beautiful by the Intellect, up to the sense objects, which are made beautiful by the soul (6,25–32). A close reading of the cited passage unveils how the general terms referring to beauty, at times overlapped, are better defined if considered within the frame the henological-processional schema of Plotinus’ ontology.
EN
Looking at Rembrandt’s self-portraits we follow the course of his artistic development, which clearly reflects three significant stages of the artist’s life. But can these stages be applied to the life of any man? We ask this question because of the main problem discussed in this article – the problem of the essence, which Rembrandt fulfilled in his work. In general, the topics, Rembrandt undertakes, concern the ethos, and similarly in his self-portraits we encounter the ethos of an adolescent, mature and elderly man.
EN
Plotinus’ mysticism is a controversial field of study. While some scholars see in it the essential aspect of his system, others consider it to be of little importance. Interpretations of the “mystical union” with the One also differ from monistic to theistic, and the debate seems to be far from an ultimate conclusions. This paper is an attempt to find a different approach to this problem, namely, by examining relationships between contemplation (which appears to be a more useful term than “mystical experience”) and knowledge in the system of Plotinus. It is suggested that the two main types of contemplation are “noetic” contemplation, which is a paradigm for knowledge and derives from Plato’s and Aristotle’s account of noesis, and “hypernoetic” contemplation which is a borderline phenomenon for ancient philosophy, because it is a state of beatifying unknowing. While noetic contemplation is more typical of Western philosophy, hypernoetic contemplation is a phenomenon similar to what Eastern mystical religions strive for. Even though Plotinus’ philosophy seems to incorporate an experience that is central to the Eastern thought, the author of the Enneads remains a profoundly Western thinker, trying to put the state of contemplative unknowing in the context of intellectual, rational pursuit of truth and happiness.
PL
The subject of the article is analysis of mystical experience in Plotinus’ philosophy from the perspective of the experience of the self. The author point to two distinct levels of contemplation present in Plotinu: the noetic and the hypernoetic one. The first is an intellectual intuition of the true being, while the latter is a union with the One above being through unknowing. Hypernoetic experience is discusses in terms of an experience of the core of the human self, which is inseparably united to the One in such a way that the ultimate experience of the self is, at the same time, the experience of the One as indistinct from the self. Plotinus, however, does not interpret this experience as a testimony to the objective identity of the One and the soul, but in terms of a subjective state which is, in a way, contradictory to the metaphysical state of affairs. The One is distinct from the soul, but in the ultimate experience become indistinguishable from it. The mysticism of the self within philosophy brings about an inevitable tension which is overcome by Plotinus through the use of distinction between the experience of reality and reality in itself. 
Verbum Vitae
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2021
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vol. 39
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issue 3
1007-1024
EN
The writings of Corpus Dionysiacum present a concept of life which is different from the one that we profess nowadays. Its view is backed up mainly by the Platonic tradition, which since the times of Plato has tended to see life as an intellectual principle. Therefore, in the Neoplatonic system we can find the conviction that life, in its fullest sense, is intellectual and at its peak is a vision of the One. In the system of Proclus, life, apart from being a principle, is also a god and the main principle of the whole world of intellectual and intellective gods. Pseudo-Dionysius in his writings exploits the concept of the unparticipable and participable principle, and since God is for him Trinity completely beyond participation and knowledge, the divine names play the role of participable henads. However, for Dionysius, names are neither hypostases nor living gods, which is clearly visible in case of the name of Life. All things participate in the name of life and in this name God is the only principle of life in the universe. However, life is not a property to own, but rather a constant struggle to approach the Trinity. Therefore, by committing a sin, an angel or a man loses life, which in the case of a man can be regained through sacramental activity. An analysis of the thoughts of Pseudo-Dionysius reveals a conception of life which is unified contrary to its shattered modern understanding. While biological, mental, moral lives fundamentally differ for us, for Dionysius those are merely aspects of the same thing, and therefore in his view life can be lost and regained not only in the metaphorical, but also the ontological sense.
EN
The aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato’s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., “parasitic” or “collateral” existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the “privative” role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism. 
IT
The aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato’s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., “parasitic” or “collateral” existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the “privative” role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism.
EN
The article presents an interpretation of Plotinius’ concept of eternity, which is defined in his treatise On Eternity and Time III.7 [45] as the “life of being.” The textual and philosophical analysis of a number of related passages from Plotinus’ Enneads concludes that the description of eternity as the life of being is neither metaphorical nor analogical. It should be understood in a technical philosophical sense, which contains direct metaphysical and phenomenological implications. Life is not an effect of intelligible reality but an ontological condition, the limit, source of activity, background for the identity of Intellect. The life of being is not identical with partial aspects of the intelligible universe, but is implied and covered by them. In the context of the Plotinian noetics, the notion of life expresses the wholeness of being in its totality—this is applicable not only to the life of intelligible being, but also true for the life of Soul, which assumes the totality of Soul’s time. Life is recognizable and experienced by living and existing beings on the basis of common liveliness and their common ontological status, so life establishes, develops and intensifies the connection of our own being with eternity via eternal in us. There are notable functional similarities between the Plotinian concept of eternity as the life of being and the image of Aion as reconstructed from fragments of Chaldean oracles—a mystical philosophical text widely read by later Neoplatonic philosophers, albeit never openly referred to by Plotinus. The comparative analysis and philosophical interpretation of the Plotinian and Chaldean concepts and images related to eternity suggest that both the sources maintain similar metaphysical roles of mediation, the transfer of unifying and animating light, causing the motion of reality. It is also significant that the Plotinian parallelism of eternity and “eternal in us” is comparable to the Chaldean image of “flower of the mind,” which is described both as a metaphysical attribute of Aion and as a specific power of Soul, which could be used by a person to acquire knowledge of divine reality.
EN
One of the main difficulties that Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle face is the different treatment that the Categories and the Metaphysics offer to the question of the substance. After describing briefly the status quaestionis ousiae in Aristotle, and after tracing the main Neoplatonic interpretations of this doctrine (from Plotinus’ negative one to Porphyry’s positive and “conciliatory” one), this article attempts to demonstrate that the Neoplatonists of Athens and Alexandria, Syrianus and Ammonius, inaugurate a new interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine. With regard to the category of substance in general and to the question of substantiality of “immanent form” in particular, this new interpretation goes beyond the positions of Plotinus and Porphyry and returns the ontological value to the Aristotelian substances. Unlike Plotinus, who recognized as ousia only that one intelligible, that is five genres of the Platonic Sophist, and unlike Porphyry, who defused the anti–Platonic fuse of the Categories, giving to this treaty a mainly semantic skopos, these philosophers, through their original study of the theory of the three states of katholou, already shed in the Porphyrian Eisagôgê, fit the immanent forms of Aristotle, recognized as substances and as a reflection of the transcendental universal, into the late antique Neoplatonic metaphysical triadic structure.
EN
The purpose of the paper is to examine the role of the senses in contempla­tion in Book Seven and Nine of Augustine’s Confessions. The bishop of Hippo’s conception of contemplation is deeply influenced by Plotinus, especially in the early period, and this influence is present e.g. in the distiniguishing of two forms of contemplation: the one in which all sensible objects are eliminated from aware­ness and the one in which they are present or used as a medium of contempla­tion. A method which leads to contemplation in which the senses are completely absent is the Plotinian method of „agnoetic meditation”. The method appears in Augustine as well, both in Book Seven and Book Nine. The forms of the contem­plation of God, which are described there, do not involve the senses, and their sole object is God. It generates a paradoxical situation especially in the vision of Ostia, where the „beyond body” contemplation is impossible to reconcile with the resurrection of the body and seeing God in the body. Augustine does not solve the paradox which is of a great importance, since it shows the tension between Platonic philosophy and Christian revelation.
EN
The four cardinal virtues (prudence, moderation, justice and bravery) are frequently mentioned in the writings by the Bishop of Caesarea. Basil, as a theologian, writes about them in the context of Christian ethic and moral principles. The cardinal virtues are to help human beings achieve salvation, which is the main aim in the life of every confessor of Christ. Thus, one can say that these virtues are christocentrically directed. Basil based his analyses mainly on the ethical ideas of Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus. However, as a Christian intellectual, h4e went far beyond the scheme of these four virtues suggested by the Greek thinkers. The article consists of two parts. The first part contains mainly bibliographical information on the meaning of two notions: ἀρετή and virtus. The second part is the analysis of cardinal virtues in Basil’s writings and connections of Bishop of Caesarea’s aretology with Greek philosophy. Also here a lot of space is devoted to bibliographical information contained in the footnotes. In this way the article fulfils two functions: on one hand it gives the reader a useful bibliography, while on the other it presents the idea of cardinal virtues on the basis of the writings by Basil of Caesarea. 
PL
Cztery cnoty kardynalne (roztropność, umiarkowanie, sprawiedliwość i męstwo) są często wspominane w pismach biskupa Cezarei. Bazyli jako teolog pisze o nich w kontekście chrześcijańskich zasad etyczno-moralnych. Cnoty kardynalne mają pomóc człowiekowi w osiągnięciu zbawienia, które jest głównym celem życia każdego wyznawcy Chrystusa. Można więc powiedzieć, że cnoty te są ukierunkowane chrystocentrycznie. Bazyli oparł swe analizy przede wszystkim na etycznych koncepcjach Platona, Arystotelesa i Plotyna. Jednak jako intelektualista chrześcijański wyszedł daleko poza schemat czterech cnót proponowany przez tych myślicieli greckich. Artykuł składa się z dwóch części. Część pierwsza zawiera głównie informacje bibliograficzne na temat znaczenia dwóch pojęć: ἀρετή i virtus. Druga część analizuje cnoty kardynalne w pismach Bazylego oraz związki aretologii  biskupa Cezarei z filozofią grecką. Również i tutaj wiele miejsca poświęcono informacjom bibliograficznym,  które umieszczono w przypisach. W ten sposób artykuł spełnia dwie funkcje: z jednej strony daje czytelnikowi użyteczną bibliografię, z drugiej zaś przedstawia koncepcję cnót kardynalnych na bazie pism Bazylego z Cezarei. 
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EN
The traditional view of the cause of Plotinus’ death was leprosy. The analysis of the biographical sources, however, point to another hypothesis, that of „Cyprian’s plague”. The last months of Plotinus life and work coincided with the end of this great ancient pandemic and he produced four treatises, focused primarily on ethical problems. The last treatise, On the primal Good (1.7) is a short and concentrated meditation on the First Principle and the soul’s ascent to it.
EN
Plotinus demonstrated his commitment to energeia by having devoted an entire treatise to the energeia/dynamis distinction, which seems to be important to Plotinus’ philosophical project as a whole. The article attempts to demonstrate that energeia, which is synonymous with contempla-tion (noēsis) and being (ousia, eidos, to on, noēton), should be translated in various ways out of respect for the fact that there are different levels of contemplation and being and that there are different ways of looking at being. It also maintains that Plotinus’ handling of energeia is gener-ally a reaction, in both positive and negative ways, to the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. On account of delivered commentary on Enneads II, 5 (25) and VI, 2 (43), conjoined to its conclu-sions, the article strives for showing that Plotinus’ doctrine of energeia/dynamis unlocks his entire philosophy.
EN
For Porphyry, the human being is a compound of soul, its divine and immortal part, which represents the essence of man, and body, its perishable part, that is only the im-age of the soul, its headquarters and sensitive instrument. Man can achieve happiness only by a spiritual life, according to its nature, a life free of physical needs as much as it is possible. The methods used in this sense imply the weakening of the link between mind and body. In this way the soul of man returns to the sky, meaning the sphere of God, which is its native country.
EN
The starting point of the article is a critical analysis of the possible interpretations of the famous excerpt of Enn. IV 8[6],1,1–11, on the basis of which the image of the ecstasy of Plotinus as a momentary rapture, which Plotinus apparently experienced a certain number of times in his life, was formed. In the next part of the article this analysis becomes a pretext for considering, on the one hand, the elements which show the closely philosophical, rational character of the Plotinian system, yet on the other hand the irrational elements appearing in the text of Enneads. The author also tackles the problem of the continuity of the irrational component of Neoplatonic tradition. In this way she tries to answer the question whether Postplotinian Neoplatonism – sinking to irrationalist positions – broke with the rationalist premises of the philosophy of Plotinus, or, on the contrary, has its basis in certain philosophical assumptions which develop Plotinus’ views.
PL
Augustine of Hippo was the most eminent Church theologian at the close of antiquity. His influence is perceptible until the present day. The path which led him to Christianity was typical for the period of the late Roman Empire, when various religious currents would contend. It seems that the problems of antique culture were of secondary significance in his conversion.  
EN
Understanding the human soul was one of the basic problems discussed by ancient philosophers. The most important issue concerning the relation of the soul to the human body was widely considered in Plato’s dialogues. Discussion of this issue arose once again among Neoplatonists during the last period of pagan philosophy. In Plotinus’ Enneads and the writings of his pupils we can observe that discussion of the nature of the soul and its relationship to body is linked to the problem of how the soul can be individual. Plotinus underlined the perfection of the soul and diminished the role of the human body and at the same time he explained the origins of intellectual reality by the theory of procession of hypostases. As a result he claimed that the primal state of the soul is hypostasis of the soul, which leads to monopsychism, which in the case of Plotinus was neither clear nor radical. It was his pupil, Amelius, who formulated the radical monopsychic idea. At the same time, the second of Plotinus’ closest pupils, Porphyry, made an attempt to reconcile the individuality of the soul with its almost absolute independence of the body. The growing influence of Aristotle and his theory of the substantial unity of the body and soul made the rejection of monopsychism possible. This influence most notable in the writings of Iamblichus, who agreed first, that connection with the body is substantial. His accordance with Aristotle was possible only thanks to theurgical rites, practiced by neoplatonic philosophers. The idea of substantial unity caused inevitable claims of the mortality of the soul united in this way with the body. Nevertheless, thanks to theurgical rites, immortality could be regained and the individual character of the human soul could be claimed without rejecting its immortality. Although monopsychism did not return in Neoplatonism, it did resurface in some form in the writings of Arabic medieval thinkers, who were well acquainted with neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle.
PL
Zagadnienie duszy ludzkiej stanowi jeden z podstawowych problemów dyskutowanych przez starożytnych filozofów. Najważniejsze aporie dotyczyły tego, jaka jest relacja duszy do ciała i zostały po raz pierwszy wyraźnie sformułowane w dialogach Platona. Dyskusja na ten temat ożywa w ostatnim okresie istnienia filozofii pogańskiej – w nurcie neoplatońskim. Rozważania Plotyna i jego uczniów pokazują, że problem ten bardzo mocno łączy się z zagadnieniem indywidualności ludzkiej duszy. Podkreślanie doskonałości duszy i umniejszanie roli ludzkiego ciała, przy jednoczesnym wprowadzeniu pochodzenia, jako wyjaśnienia sposobu istnienia duchowego świata, doprowadziło w filozofii Plotyna do stwierdzenia, że dusza w istocie jest jedną duchową hipostazą. Pogląd ten zwany monopsychizmem jest u Plotyna jeszcze niewyraźny, jednak jego uczeń Ameliusz przedstawi go w bardziej radykalnej postaci. Jednocześnie drugi z najbliższych uczniów Plotyna – Porfiriusz podkreślając niezależność duszy od ciała, będzie szukał pogodzenia takiego twierdzenia z traktowaniem duszy na sposób indywidualny. Dokonuje się to w dużej mierze dzięki powiększaniu się wpływu filozofii Arystotelesa. Wpływ ten osiągnie swoją największą intensywność w pismach ucznia Porfiriusza – Jamblicha, który jako pierwszy pośród neoplatoników stwierdzi, że połączenie duszy z ciałem jest substancjalne. Pociąga to jednak za sobą konieczność przyznania, że dusza ludzka po przyjęciu ciała jest śmiertelna i może odzyskać swoją nieśmiertelność tylko dzięki praktykowaniu przez filozofa rytów teurgicznych. Choć w pismach neoplatoników ostatecznie zwycięża pogląd, że dusza ludzka jest indywidualna, to jednak monopsychizm w mniej radykalnej postaci powróci jeszcze w dziełach filozofów arabskich, którzy korzystali z neoplatońskich komentarzy do dzieł Arystotelesa.
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Augustine’s Socratic method

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EN
The article discusses a seldom investigated problem of Socrates’s influence on Augustine’s intellectual development. It is shown that Augustine started with an intense use of the Socratic method utilizing its elenctic and maieutic questioning to expose the truth hidden in the soul. Also, just as the Socratic method led to ontological developments in Plato and Plotinus, it led Augustine to the development of his Christian ontology.
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