Search results

1

Back to the Concrete: A Pragmatist Response to Oppression

100%

Morse D.

Human Affairs

|

2009

|

vol. 19

|

issue 1

28-35

EN

Pragmatism is a vital tool for society today, both because it addresses our more pressing social problems and because it advances beyond other available solutions. As a good deal of recent European philosophy has shown, as in the cases of Adorno and Agamben, for example, our social life is mediated by abstractions that oppress us. With its focus on the immediacy of experience, pragmatism enables us to overcome these abstractions and return to concrete life in a liberating way. I argue against Agamben, however, that the return to concrete life amounts to anarchism. I show that it leads to liberalism instead, along the lines laid out by Dewey in Liberalism and Social Action, in which freed individuality is compatible with the exercise of social intelligence and planning.

2

Moral Perfectionism: Ethical Theory from a Pragmatic Approach

100%

Mougán C.

Human Affairs

|

2009

|

vol. 19

|

issue 1

44-51

EN

This article tries to rescue the perfectionist approach to moral theory from the pragmatic tradition and inspiration. Based on the philosophy of Dewey and taking into account authors like H. Putnam or S. Cavell, it tries to defend the idea that pragmatism allows us to understand moral perfectionism in a new way. In that way, perfectionism is bound to a certain interpretation of practical rationality, and a new understanding of moral objectivity and human subjectivity. Finally, moral perfectionism is not a theory that aims to solve all moral dilemmas but provides an understanding of how to face up to the problems of ordinary moral life.

3

Rorty's Neopragmatism and the Imperative of the Discourse of African Epistemology

88%

Udefi A.

Human Affairs

|

2009

|

vol. 19

|

issue 1

78-86

EN

Pragmatism, as a philosophical movement, was a dominant orientation in the Anglo-American philosophical circles in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Pragmatism, as expressed by its classical advocates, namely, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey, emphasized the primacy of practice or action over speculative thought and a priori reasoning. The central thesis of pragmatism (though there exist other variants) is the belief that the meaning of an idea or a proposition lies in its "observable practical consequences", And as a theory of truth, it diverges from the correspondence and coherence theories which see truth in terms of correspondence of a proposition to facts and coherence of propositions to other propositions within the web respectively, but instead contends that "truth is to be found in the process of verification". In other words, pragmatists would emphasize the practical utility or "cash value", as it were, of knowledge and ideas as instruments for understanding reality. Neopragmatism is used to refer to some contemporary thinkers whose views incorporate in a significant way, though with minor differences bordering on methodology and conceptual analysis, the insights of the classical pragmatists. Our intention in this paper is to explore Rorty's neopragmatism, particularly his critique of analytic philosophy and then argue that his views have potential for the establishment of African epistemology as an emerging discourse within the African philosophical tradition.

4

Adjectival and Generic Pragmatism: Problems and Possibilities

88%

Eldridge M.

Human Affairs

|

2009

|

vol. 19

|

issue 1

10-18

EN

While honoring the suggestion that one should always use an adjective with "pragmatism," I explore the possibility of a generic use of the term, contending that an orientation to habit or revisable practice is a useful indicator.

5

Ku społeczeństwu obywatelskiemu. Czego dziś może nas nauczyć pragmatyzm?

88%

Kilanowski M.

Kultura i Edukacja

|

2017

|

issue 1(115)

50-62

EN

It can be striking for us today that when so little divides us there is still so much that separates us from each other. We observe the fragility of social cohesion and witness the degradation of social capital even though some say that our religious belief as well as material conditions or differences in political rights no longer divide us. In the light of critical observations, one can say that there is a need to reconcile people with each other, to establish bonds between us, that we need to establish civil society. When trying to establish a well-functioning civil society we have to ask ourselves a few crucial questions. These questions include: How can Western individualism be combined with the values of community and social solidarity? What are the necessary conditions for freedom and solidarity among people? To answer these questions it is worth reaching the philosophical thought of John Dewey and Roberto Unger. In his text Roberto Unger points out that today’s social and political order is not something solid and stable. Even our democratic order that I was referring to in this paper faces challenges that may undermine its base. Without the right preparation to face these challenges-through responsible and critical public participation and deliberation-it is possible that instead of us having some sort of possibility of steering the growth of our societies and having an impact on political and economic evolution, the evolving situations will steer us. If this happens, we will be left behind, being unable to grasp and handle the different new situations.

6

Pragmatismus jako filozofický základ smíšeného výzkumného designu

75%

Složilová E.

Pedagogická orientace (Journal of the Czech Pedagogical Society)

|

2011

|

vol. 21

|

issue 1

51-69

EN

The paper aims at presenting the philosophy of pragmatism as an epistemological framework for mixed methods research. The author starts with brief characteristics of this relatively recent approach to research in the social sciences and uses Morgan’s clarification of the genesis of „metaphysical“ paradigm for qualitative research as a platform for analysing the main reasons why mixed methods research has been strongly criticized and refused. Then she shifts her attention to classical pragmatists – W. James, J. Dewey and Ch. S. Pierce, and makes an attempt to show mixed methods research as a legitimate approach to research in the social sciences having equally important status as quantitative or qualitative research. In order to prove her point, the author gives a detailed analysis of the pragmatists’ theory of inquiry, their understanding of truth, experience and other philosophical categories. She concludes that mixed methods research has great potential to solve research questions whose solution proves impossible for rigid advocates of either of the two currently dominant approaches.

7

Spiritual Transcendence in Psychotherapy: A Relational, Pragmatic, and Semiotic Approach

75%

Salimi B., Sandage S. J., Stavros G. S.

Open Theology

|

2016

|

vol. 2

|

issue 1

EN

The last several decades have ushered in an abundance of creative activity and wisdom with regard to spiritually and/or religiously informed psychotherapy. Most of these pursuits have led to significant and positive changes, both in thought and practice, in the way that human psychology is seen as intersecting (and interacting) with religious, theological, and spiritual dimensions of experience. At the same time much has been neglected amidst these advances. In the present paper, we submit that one vital area of neglect may be found in an implicit retreat from sacred encounter in favor of instrumentalized approaches to psychotherapy. We argue for a spiritually transcendent psychotherapy that implicitly attends to relational and semiotic phenomenology while retaining pragmatic gain.

8

Pragmatism and Science

75%

Marsonet M.

Academicus. International Scientific Journal

|

2013

|

issue 08

101-109

EN

Logical empiricism gave rise to a powerful paradigm and it took some decades to overthrow it, even though it should be judged respectfully since, after all, philosophy of science and logic as we know them stemmed from that ground. The basic assumptions on which the paradigm of the “received view” rested are essentially the following. In the first place, verificationism seemed almost a truth of faith. Secondly, logical empiricists never offered good arguments in support of their thesis that assertive discourse must be preferred to more pragmatic forms of language. Thirdly, they too easily assumed that something like “objective truth” really exists. Last but certainly not least, the logical empiricists did not fully recognize the historical dimension of the scientific enterprise, which subsequently turned to be something different from the “universal science” they were talking about. In the paper it is argued that scientific realism (and the nature of scientific knowledge at large) is a theme where the originality of pragmatist positions clearly emerge. Nicholas Rescher, for example, claims - against any form of instrumentalism and many postmodern authors as well - that natural science can indeed validate a plausible commitment to the actual existence of its theoretical entities. Scientific conceptions aim at what really exists in the world, but only hit it imperfectly and “well off the mark”. What we can get is, at most, a rough consonance between our scientific ideas and reality itself. This means that the scientific knowledge at our disposal in any particular moment of the history of mankind must be held to be “putative”, while its relations to the truth (i.e. how things really stand in the world) should be conceived in terms of tentative and provisional estimation. Even the optimistic visions that see science as growingly approaching the “real” truth have, at this point, to be rejected on pragmatic grounds.

9

Pragmatic Objectivity

75%

Marsonet M.

Academicus. International Scientific Journal

|

2014

|

issue 09

43-54

EN

Nicholas Rescher writes that “objectivity is not something we infer from the data; it is something we must presuppose. It is something that we postulate or presume from the very outset of our dealings with people’s claims about the world’s facts”. Such definition is just the opposite of objectivity conceived of in classical terms, but it cannot be equated with an idealistic viewpoint according to which objectivity is something that our mind simply creates in the process of reflection. It is, rather, a sort of cross-product of the encounter between our mind-shaped capacities, and a surrounding reality made up of things that are real in the usual meaning of the term. Science itself gives us some crucial insights in this direction, since it shows that we see, say, tables and trees in a certain way which, however, does not match the image that scientific instruments are able to attain. Does this mean that our commonsense view of the world is totally wrong and that nature deceives us? This is not the case. The difference between the commonsense and the scientific image of the world is explainable by the fact that we are evolutionary creatures. Nature has simply endowed human beings with tools and capacities that enable them to survive in an environment which - at least in remote eras - was largely hostile. Our way of seeing tables and trees is what is requested for carrying on a successful fight for the survival of the species: nothing more - and nothing less - is needed for achieving this fundamental goal. Turning once again to the problem of ontological objectivity, the picture has now gained both strength and clarity. If we recall that human endeavors, although occurring in a largely autonomous social and linguistic world, are nevertheless limited by the constraints that natural reality forces upon us, we begin to understand that the social-linguistic world itself is not a boat freely floating without directions. If the boat is there, it means that an explanation of its presence is likely to be obtained if only we are patient enough to look for it. Some kind of hand must be on the wheel, giving the boat indications on Contrary to other pragmatist-flavored positions popular nowadays, this approach maintains that universality has a fundamental and unavoidable function in our rational endeavors. This is due to the fact that “presupposition” and “hypothetical reasoning” are key ingredients of our very capacity to rationalize the world in which we live. Indeed, there can be no rationality without universality.

10

Pragmatismus Johna Deweyho a literární teorie Wolfganga Isera

63%

Kaplický M.

Svět literatury – Časopis pro novodobé literatury (World of Literature – Journal for Modern Literatures)

|

2016

|

vol. 53

|

issue 26

102-112

EN

The main aim of the text is to show the close relations between John Deweyʼs pragmatist theory of art and Wolfgang Iserʼs literary theory. Although there is a little theoretical attention paid to the connection of Deweyʼs and Iserʼs theories, the study tries to show that there are striking similarities between both theories. The study traces them in two subsequent parts. The first one shows the urge of both authors to overcome traditional dualities in philosophy and literary theory and to point out the underlying processes, which make such dualities possible. The second part tries to concretize the effect of an experience of an artwork on its recipient in the theories of both authors.

11

Generating, Intensifying, and Redirecting Emotionality: Conceptual and Ethnographic Implications of Aristotle’s Rhetoric

63%

Prus R.

Przegląd Socjologii Jakościowej

|

2013

|

vol. 9

|

issue 2

10-45

EN

In contrast to those who more characteristically approach emotion as an individual realm of experience of more distinctive physiological and/or psychological sorts, this paper addresses emotionality as a socially experienced, linguistically enabled, activity-based process. While conceptually and methodologically situated within contemporary symbolic interactionist thought (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Strauss 1993; Prus 1996; 1997; 1999; Prus and Grills 2003), this statement is centrally informed by the pragmatist considerations of emotionality that Aristotle (circa 384-322 BCE) develops in Rhetoric. Although barely known to those in the human sciences, Aristotle’s Rhetoric provides a great deal of insight into people’s definitions of, and experiences with, a wide array of emotions. Addressing matters of persuasive interchange in political, judicial, and evaluative contexts, Aristotle gives particular attention to the intensification and neutralization of people’s emotional states. This includes (1) anger and calm, (2) friendship and enmity, (3) fear and confidence, (4) shame and shamelessness, (5) kindness and inconsideration, (6) pity and indignation, and (7) envy and emulation. Following an introduction to “rhetoric” (as the study of persuasive interchange) and “emotionality,” this paper briefly (1) outlines a pragmatist/interactionist approach to the study of emotionality, (2) considers Aristotle as a sociological pragmatist, (3) locates Aristotle’s work within the context of classical Greek thought, (4) acknowledges the relationship of emotionality and morality, and (5) addresses emotionality as a generic social process. Following (6) a more sustained consideration of emotionality within the context of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the paper concludes with (7) a short discussion of the importance of Aristotle’s work for studying emotionality as a realm of human lived experience on a contemporary plane.

12

Redefining the Sociological Paradigm: Emile Durkheim and the Scientific Study of Morality

51%

Prus R.

Qualitative Sociology Review

|

2019

|

vol. 15

|

issue 1

6-34

EN

Whereas Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) has long been envisioned as a structuralist, quantitative, and positivist sociologist, some materials that Durkheim produced in the later stages of his career-namely, Moral Education (1961 [1902-1903]), The Evolution of Educational Thought (1977 [1904-1905]), The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915 [1912]), and Pragmatism and Sociology (1983 [1913-1914]) attest to a very different conception of sociology-one with particular relevance to the study of human knowing, acting, and interchange. Although scarcely known in the social sciences, Emile Durkheim’s (1993 [1887]) “La Science Positive de la Morale en Allemagne” [“The Scientific Study of Morality in Germany”] is an exceptionally important statement for establishing the base of much of Durkheim’s subsequent social thought and for comprehending the field of sociology more generally. This includes the structuralist-pragmatist divide and the more distinctively humanist approach to the study of community life that Durkheim most visibly develops later (1961 [1902-1903]; 1977 [1904-1905]; 1915 [1912]; 1983 [1913-1914]) in his career.

Refine search results

Back to the Concrete: A Pragmatist Response to Oppression

Moral Perfectionism: Ethical Theory from a Pragmatic Approach

Rorty's Neopragmatism and the Imperative of the Discourse of African Epistemology

Adjectival and Generic Pragmatism: Problems and Possibilities

Ku społeczeństwu obywatelskiemu. Czego dziś może nas nauczyć pragmatyzm?

Pragmatismus jako filozofický základ smíšeného výzkumného designu

Spiritual Transcendence in Psychotherapy: A Relational, Pragmatic, and Semiotic Approach

Pragmatism and Science

Pragmatic Objectivity

Pragmatismus Johna Deweyho a literární teorie Wolfganga Isera

Generating, Intensifying, and Redirecting Emotionality: Conceptual and Ethnographic Implications of Aristotle’s Rhetoric

Redefining the Sociological Paradigm: Emile Durkheim and the Scientific Study of Morality