Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Refine search results

Journals help
Years help
Authors help

Results found: 39

first rewind previous Page / 2 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  President
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 2 next fast forward last
EN
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova decided that due to the parliamentary system of governance there prevails the necessity to ensure a parliamentary majority able to appoint the government. According to the Moldovan Constitutional Court, under present circumstances excluding the possibility of dissolving the parliament by the President during the last six months of the President’s term of office has no systemic justification, which in the presidential system of governance was preventing the President elected in universal elections from dissolving the parliament and holding presidential and parliamentary elections simultaneously, a political consequence of which would be the domination of the head of state’s adherents in the parliament. Since the President is elected in direct elections by the parliament, such restriction has no grounds. The Constitutional Court is of the opinion that the President has the right to dissolve the parliament, after seeking advice of parliamentary factions, also during the last six months of his/her term of office. This allows to overcome a political crisis and to establish, as a result of new elections, a parliament able to appoint a government to conduct the policy of the state.
PL
The aim of the article is to discuss the prominent features of French constitutionalism that were formed in the last quarter of the 19th century. The author underlines the particular importance of the constitutional experience of France and notes that the form of government and the several political institutions established with the proclamation of the Third Republic also exist in general terms at the present time. Further in the text, the author observes that the practice of the state and legal construction of the French Third Republic was in many ways rather distant from constitutional establishments. It is emphasized that in the practical implementation of the Constitution, the Parliament (mainly the Chamber of Deputies) came to play a major role in the system of government and that in turn has been largely responsible for the durability of the basic constitutional and legal institutions of the Third Republic.
EN
The article focuses on the question of the creation of the U.S. Department of State and its functions. We surveyed historiography (works by Mihalkanin E., Plischke E., West R.,Glad B. and so on). For over 200 years, the Department of State has conducted American diplomacy through war and peace, amidst the competing currents of isolationism and internationalism that have shaped American foreign policy and its commitment to liberty and democracy. The Department of State was established as the Department of Foreign Affairs by the act of July 27, 1789 and became the first Federal agency to be created under the new Constitution. In September 1789, additional legislation changed the name of the agency to the Department of State and assigned to it a variety of duties. There are 5 main periods of existence of the U.S. Department of State: the emerging State Department (1789–1860), the Department comes of age (1861–1895), managing the foreign affairs of a great power (1900–1940), the Department of state and the U.S. as a Superpower (1945–1960), the Department of State's role in the U.S. Foreign Affairs Community (1961–2000). Special attention is paid to the positions of the Secretary of State who is in charge of defining and implementing U.S. foreign policy. Thomas Jefferson, Henry Kissinger, John Quincy Adams, William Jennings Bryan, Henry Clay, James Madison, George C. Marshall, George Schultz, and Daniel Webster are just a few of the Secretaries who played the greatest role in the providing of the USA’ foreign affairs. Then author gives the illustration of the secretary relations with the President, Cabinet and Congress.
EN
The study focuses on the issue of legal effects of regulations. It indicates the legal context of the proposed solutions and signals possi-ble legal problems related to the introduction of the proposed regulations into the legal system. The study points out, inter alia, that the current Article 114 § 1 of the Act of 25 February 1964 — Family and Guardianship Code — assuming one of the possible inter-pretations of the notion of a ‘child’ — may be inconsistent with the proposed Article 72(2a) of the Fundamental Law to the extent to which it excludes the admissibility of adoption of a woman who at the time of filing an application for adoption was under 18 years of age, but became of age through marriage.
EN
This article is focused on the evolution of the constitutional position of the President of Lithuania in the Lithuanian Basic Laws. The analysis concerns the regulations of the three Lithuanian Basic Laws of the interwar period (of 1922, 1928 and 1938), two of which were an attempt to legitimize the political situation after the coup d’état against the constitutional government of the Republic of Lithuania in 1926 and also to implement the authoritarian government of President Antanas Smetona. The article also assesses the most important legal provisions concerning the constitutional position of the President, as well as compares the Lithuanian constitutional provisions with constitutions of other countries, primarily with the Polish Constitution of 1935. The research goals have been achieved thanks to the applied research methods, especially the comparative method, supplemented with the historical method and the method of institutional and legal analysis, which is used to analyse normative acts elaborated by legal bodies.
6
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Orędzia prezydenckie

75%
PL
Konstytucja RP z 1997 roku przewiduje pośród licznych prerogatyw Prezydenta możliwość wygłaszania przez niego orędzi kierowanych do Sejmu, Senatu i Zgromadzenia Narodowego. Nie jest to jednak instytucja obecna we wszystkich państwach demokratycznych. W pierwszej części autor przybliża regulacje prawne odnoszące się do tego uprawnienia w wybranych państwach: USA, Ukrainie, Francji i Irlandii, wskazując na pewne odmienności normujące instytucję orędziową. Następnie zostali omówieni adresaci wystąpień orędziowych. Warto bowiem zauważyć, że Zgromadzenie Narodowego może być adresatem tylko przy okazji zaprzysiężenia głowy państwa. Ponadto w Polsce utrwalił się zwyczaj występowania z orędziami do narodu. Kolejna część pracy dotyczy istoty orędzia. Poruszona została kwestia częstotliwości korzystania z tego uprawnienia, formy, obowiązku wysłuchania, charakteru prawnego orędzia i jego treści. Całość wieńczy zakończenie, w którym autor wskazuje, iż mimo braku władczego charakteru tego uprawnienia Prezydent może za jego pomocą skutecznie prowadzić politykę, eksponując i krytykując publicznie sprawy dla niego istotne i przekonując do swoich poglądów nie tylko parlamentarzystów, ale i obywateli.
EN
The Polish constitution from 1997 provides amongst numerous prerogatives for the President possibility of delivering directed addresses to the Seym by him, the Senate and the National Assembly. However it isn’t current institution in all democracies. In the first part the author is moving referring regulations closer to this entitlement in chosen states: showing the USA, Ukraine, France and Ireland to certain dissimilarities standardizing the address. Next the author discussed addressees of addresses. It is worthwhile because noticing, that Assembly National can be an addressee only while swearing the head of state in. Moreover in Poland a custom of appearing with addresses to the nation became established. The next section of the work considers nature of the address. An issue of frequency of exercising this entitlement, form, duty of hearing out, legal nature and their contents were addressed. The whole is crowned by the end, in which the author shows that in spite of the lack of lordly character of this entitlement the President can with its help effectively pursue the politics exhibiting and criticizing cases significant for him publicly and convincing not only members of parliament, but also citizens to his views.
EN
A coup d’etat is defined as “a sudden and decisive action in politics, especially one resulting in a change of government illegally or by force.” As one looks through all the coup d’etats that have occurred throughout the history in various parts of the world, one can observe that often the protagonists of such events are political enemies, military leaders, or distressed insiders. Indeed, one is hard pressed to find where a coup d’etat has been executed by way of a poor legal reasoning of a Constitutional Court. Well, that is until now! In the newest country in Europe, the Republic of Kosovo, major international and domestic investments are being made on institution building. One of the beneficiaries of such investments has been the newly formed Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo. Soon after its establishment, this young court faced its first tough decision, namely a challenge to the President of the country regarding his alleged serious violation of the Constitution by holding posts as President of the country and Chairman of his party. In a highly controversial case, marred with procedural irregularities, judicial misconduct, lack of due process, human rights violations, regular media leaks, and behind-the-scenes international and domestic political influences on the Court, a split Court decided that the President had seriously violated the Constitution. This decision led to the President’s resignation, which caused a political imbalance that still lingers, further harming Kosovo’s long term interests and prospects. But more importantly, some argue that this marks the first case where a coup d’etat that took down a President was executed by a Constitutional Court. This paper argues that the Court should have dismissed the claim of the MPs as inadmissible on procedural grounds, specifically that it was filed by the MPs after the time permitted by law and that the MPs never maintained the number of 30 members that were needed for the group to be an authorized party. Additionally, even on the merits, the Court failed to distinguish between the constitutional requirement to not exercise a party function, which the President in this case did not do, but rather simply held the position in a suspended mode. Moreover, even had the President’s holding of the position amounted to a violation of the Constitution, in no way did that equate to a serious constitutional violation. Still, the Court held contrary to the Constitution, applicable laws, and the available evidence before it and found that the President had seriously violated the Constitution.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł podejmuje temat procedury odwołania głowy państwa w krajach Ameryki Południowej. Autorki przyglądają się genezie wprowadzenia impeachmentu do konstytucji państw leżących w tej części świata, zwracając uwagę na szczególne uwarunkowania historyczne zachodniej półkuli, a następnie skupiają się na kategoryzacji i systematyzacji samej procedury. W oparciu o kryterium dotyczące tego jakie ciało wnosi oskarżenie a jakie odpowiada za proces i decyzję o ewentualnym pozbawieniu urzędu, autorki wyróżniają trzy modele impeachmentu prezydenta w Ameryce Południowej: sądowniczy, dwuizbowy oraz jednoizbowy. Wykorzystując podejście kontekstualne, metodę dogmatyczno-prawną, metodę porównawczą oraz strategię budowania teorii, autorki omawiają ogólne cechy każdego z modeli, jak również jego specyfikę w krajach kontynentu.
EN
This article systematises procedures for dismissing a Head of State in the countries of South America. We look at the genesis of introducing impeachment to the constitutions of countries in this part of the world, paying close attention to the specific historical background of the Western Hemisphere, then focusing on the categorization and systematisation of the procedure itself. We present three models of the presidential impeachment in South America: Judicial, Bicameral and Unicameral. Using a contextual approach, doctrinal research, comparative method and theory-building strategy, we discuss the general features of these models and the specificities of use in each country of the continent.
PL
Artykuł dotyczy udziału prezydenta Republiki Litewskiej w procedurze ustawodawczej na gruncie obowiązującej Konstytucji przyjętej w referendum z dnia 25 października 1992, a także, tytułem wstępu i w bardzo ograniczonym zakresie, na tle poprzednich uregulowań konstytucyjnych, począwszy od odzyskania niepodległości przez Litwę dnia 16 lutego 1918 r. Konstytucja Republiki Litewskiej zapewnia prezydentowi udział w stanowieniu prawa już na etapie inicjatywy ustawodawczej, a także przy promulgacji ustaw, która wiąże się z obowiązkiem podpisania i ogłoszenia ustawy, ewentualnie zwrócenia ustawy do Sejmu w celu jej ponownego uchwalenia (weto). W treści artykułu przedstawione zostały konkretne regulacje konstytucyjne dotyczące tych instytucji, jak również wątpliwości, które mogą powstać bądź powstały na gruncie tych przepisów. W tekście uwzględniono również przepisy innych obowiązujących ustaw oraz regulaminów, w zakresie, w jakim wyznaczają one ramy korzystania przez prezydenta z jego kompetencji w procedurze ustawodawczej. Z uwagi na odrębność uregulowań ustawy zasadniczej oddzielnie omówiono kwestie związane z udziałem prezydenta w zmianie bądź uzupełnieniu Konstytucji.
EN
The paper describes the participation of the president of the Republic of Lithuania in the legislative procedure, in relation to the Constitution in force adopted by the referendum on October 25th, 1992. The paper also presents the president’s participation regarding former constitutional regulations, starting from restoration of Lithuania’s independence on February 16th, 1918. This is presented mainly as an introduction and in significantly limited scope. The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania stipulates that the President participates in establishing law as early as at the stage of the legislative initiative, and also at the promulgation of the acts which is related to the obligation to sign and promulgate the act, respectively to refer it back to the Seimas in order to have it reconsidered (a veto). Particular constitutional regulations related to those institutions, and also the doubts that may arise or have arisen due to those laws, have been presented in this paper. The regulations of other acts and laws in force have been also described in the paper regarding determining the rights that the President may exercise in relation to his or her competences in legislative procedure. Due to the separateness of the basic law regulations, the issues related to the President’s participation in the change or amendment of the Constitution have been discussed severally.
PL
W artykule poruszono problematykę dotyczącą zakresu odpowiedzialności Prezydenta RP za wykroczenia i ewentualnej jurysdykcji nad nimi. Dostrzegając brak wyraźnej regulacji tych zagadnień, autor wskazuje, iż – w związku z zakazem domniemywania immunitetów – zakres odpowiedzialności Prezydenta RP za wykroczenia musi być tożsamy jak w przypadku innych obywateli. Z uwagi jednak na szerokie niebezpieczeństwa nierozerwalnie związane z realizacją tej formy odpowiedzialności, proponuje objęcie jurysdykcji nad nimi przez Trybunał Stanu. Dla przyjęcia takiego stanowiska autora skłaniają zarówno treści obowiązującego porządku prawnego, jak również liczne argumenty natury funkcjonalnej i językowej. W konsekwencji zarysowuje on tezę, iż „przestępstwo” w rozumieniu art. 145 ust. 1 Konstytucji stanowi w istocie nazwę dla szeroko rozumianej odpowiedzialności karnej.
EN
The article discusses the scope of legal responsibility on the part of The President of the Republic of Poland. The lack of precise legal regulations concerning the matter in question leads to the following conclusion: taking into consideration the present prohibitionof implicit immunity the President of the Republic of Poland ought to share the same realm of legal responsibility as do other Polish citizens. Yet, due to the apparent dangers inherent in the execution of the legal responsibility the author proposes for the jurisdiction in question to be under the supervision of the State Tribunal. The author’s argument is founded on the present legal order as well as in numerous functional and language oriented factors. As a consequence, the author claims “the offense” as defined in the 145th article of the Constitution is in reality a general notion for criminal responsibility.
EN
The opinion explains that “time of war” begins at the moment of taking the decision to declare a state of war under the procedure provided by Article 116 of the Constitution. “The time of war” implies the ability to exercise the powers by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The author puts a thesis that the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces may be appointed in peacetime, but will assume his/her only after the declaration of the state of war.
EN
The article deals with the prerogatives of the President of Republic to appoint judges on the motion of the National Council of the Judiciary. Its aim is to give arguments in favor of the thesis that neither Article 179 nor Article 144, para. 3, subpara. 17 of the Constitution cannot provide a basis for the President’s decision refusing to appoint the judge. In a democratic state ruled by law and implementing the principle of legality in the exercise of powers of public authorities, one cannot unquestioningly accept the thesis that the prerogative is a personal privilege of the President, which may be enjoyed irrespective of the constitutional regulation of rights and without a specifi c legal procedure. Article 179 in conjunction with Article 144 para. 3, subpara. 17 of the Constitution provides a basis for the reconstruction of two norms: a competence norm and a norm requiring President to make use of the powers granted to the him. This provision cannot provide a basis for the president’s decision refusing to appoint the judge. The National Council of the Judiciary, due to its constitutional authority to safeguard the independence of courts and judges, is competent to carry out a detailed and substantive evaluation of the candidate for the position of judge. However, in view of the limitations of Article 10 in conjunction with Article 173 of the Constitution, the President may apply to the National Council of the Judiciary to reconsider the case.
EN
The current political-military situation enforces verifi cation of existing structural and procedural arrangements relating to the functioning of Polish defense system. According to a number of conceptual documents (including National Security Strategy of 2014) the system consists of two kinds of subsystems: the controlling and the executive. The latter kind of subsystems includes operational and supporting sorts. The Polish Armed Forces (PAF) are the key element of the national defence system and are subject to civilian supervision of the democratic authorities. With regard to this kind of supervision there are two primary (fundamental) notions that deserve particular attention: headship and control. Both forms of supervision are reserved for civilian authorities during peacetime, respectively for the President of Poland and the Minister of National Defence. During the war time, the Council of Ministers gains greater importance in controlling the state defence. In this context, the category that invariably remains in the PAF domain is command understood as a specifi cform of control. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that the war-time PAF command structure, considering existing legal regulations, does not seem fully optimized. Therefore the reform of PAF control and command system, initiated in 2014, requires continuation and completion.
14
75%
EN
The adoption of the April Constitution (1935) manifested Poland’s departure from the existing constitutional regulation and a response to the malfunctioning of its parliamentary system established in 1921 by the March Constitution. It was also symptomatic of the trend, well-known in European countries in 1920s when various constitutional experiments were undertaken to overcome faults of parliamentary democracy. Among different areas of the Polish constitutional transformation, the article focuses on the form of government, seeing it as a good refl ection of the essence of this transformation. Their aims included the rejection of the principle of separation of powers, the subordination of all state authorities to the President, the reduction of the status of parliament within the polity and the release of the government of the disadvantages caused by parliamentary scrutiny. Nevertheless, the system of government enshrined in the Constitution of 1935 was not completely developed due to political inconsistency seen prior to the outbreak of World War II.
EN
The article is devoted to a little-studied side of authority, in particular the authorities of the President of Russia. Exploring the constitutional scope of power, we can say that the President of Russia has a sufficiently large amount of power, backed up by the legal provisions of the Constitution. However, in practice, it has turned out that not only their influence but the power of the President has a wider scope. First of all, the article notes the subjective grounds and mechanisms of power over the chairman of the government and the terms of his appointment. In this case, the key role is played by the political party United Russia, which was created by the President, although the President is outside the party system of Russia. A substantial expansion of the power of the President occurred as a result of the creation of federal districts and the formation of an institution of plenipotentiaries. The rationale is given that the change of legal norms for the election of governors, where the President plays the main role in nominating candidacy, and the procedure for registering them is entirely determined by the United Russia political party under his control, ultimately expanded the scope of authority of the President. In disclosing the subjective grounds for expanding the power of the President of the Russian Federation, so-called “approvals” of candidacy for various senior positions of state and municipal service, as well as of the security and control bodies play a part. The rating of the President was a massive subjective basis that allowed him to expand the scope of his power. The study of public confidence in the President allowed one to see the dependence of the expansion of his power on the level of his support by citizens of the Russian Federation.
PL
Prezydent Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej oraz Rada Ministrów zgodnie z art. 10 Konstytucji RP stanowią władze wykonawczą w Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej. Występujący w Polsce dualizm egzekutywy stwarza problem podziału zadań i kompetencji między rządem a głową państwa. Publikacja poddaje analizie podział kompetencji wewnątrz władzy wykonawczej w sferze bezpieczeństwa państwa oraz w sferze prowadzenia polityki zagranicznej. Analiza przepisów konstytucyjnych oraz praktyka ustrojowa skłaniają do konkluzji, że przyjęty w Konstytucji z 1997 roku model kooperacji Prezydenta i rządu w sferze wykonawczej jest nieefektywny i prowadzi do konfliktów politycznych. Biorąc pod uwagę polskie warunki polityczne wskazanym jest przeprowadzenie nowelizacji konstytucji, w wyniku którego odejdziemy od mieszanego modelu i opowiemy się za prezydenckim lub parlamentarno-gabinetowym modelem egzekutywy.
EN
Pursuant to Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, executive power is vested in the President of the Republic of Poland and the Council of Ministers. Implemented in Poland, the dualism of the executive branch creates a problem with the division of duties and competence between the cabinet and the head of state.  This paper analyses the division of powers within the executive branch in the areas of state security and foreign policy. The analysis of the constitutional provisions and the political practice indicates that the model of cooperation between the President and the cabinet as adopted in the Constitution of 1997 is ineffective and leads to political conflicts. In view of the Polish political conditions, it is advisable to amend the Constitution in order to move away from the mixed model towards either the presidential model or the parliamentary-cabinet model of the executive branch of government.
EN
The article discusses the legal status of the President of the Republic of Poland acting in the capacity of a witness in the course of legal proceedings. Having noted the insufficiency of the current legal regulation, the author begins his research with a detailed analysis of the concept of immunity and the possible legal circumstances which would allow the Head of the Polish state to be summoned as a witness in criminal proceedings. Then, the procedure of questioning the President of the Republic of Poland and the admissibility of imposing penalties on the Head of the State are presented in detail. The conclusion of the discussion is that although the admissibility of summoning the President of the Republic of Poland to witness should be beyond doubt, the  shape of the existing regulations continues to hinder the actual use of the source of evidence in question.
PL
W artykule poruszono problematykę dotyczącą statusu Prezydenta RP jako świadka w postępowaniu karnym. Rozważanie obejmują szczegółową analizę konstrukcji immunitetu, co pozwala zbudować osobliwe dyrektywy interpretacyjne, a także analizę zagadnienia dopuszczalności wezwania urzędującej głowy państwa polskiego na świadka. Następnie szczegółowy przedstawiono tryb przesłuchiwania Prezydenta RP oraz dopuszczalność stosowania wobec niego kar porządkowych. Rozważania kończy zaś konkluzja, że choć dopuszczalność wezwania Prezydenta RP na świadka nie powinna budzić wątpliwości, to jednak kształt obowiązujących regulacji wciąż utrudnia realne wykorzystywanie przedmiotowego źródła dowodowego.
EN
The main purpose of this article is to bring the reader into an atmosphere of intensity created by the political disputes about the need of immigration reform in the United States. It is unquestionable that problems of the immigrants, who for decades were crossing illegally American borders, contribute to internal political turbulences in this country. This article proceeds on the assumption, that the immigration related problems created a social „melting pot” which became one of the most serious challenges for the American policymakers. The confrontation of the President with Congress was inevitable. On the one hand, Obama’s administration started to regulate the status of illegal immigrants by executive orders; on the other hand, the Congress was determined to bloc these actions as illegal attempts of the President violating the prerogatives of the legislative body. The conflict resulted in the stalemates which seriously undermined the effectiveness of the American system of checks and balances. The lack of legal certainty, a necessary component of the reliability of the democratic governments, triggered the dispute over the values of the interpretational flexibility of the Constitution of the United States.
19
63%
EN
The Polish Constitution provides – in its Article 139 – that the President of the Republic “exercises the right of pardon”. The exact meaning of this right and the nature and extent of the activities to be undertaken by the President are not defined in the basic law, though. One’s understanding of the “right of pardon”, however, must not lead to results that produce an unconstitutional interpretation of the Constitution – and this, I believe, is the case with the interpretation to the effect that the exercise of the right of pardon extends beyond the pardoning itself, i.e. absolving a lawfully convicted person of the punishment meted out to them and of other effects of punishment, and that it also permits individual abolition, i.e. exempting the person concerned from responsibility, thus making criminal proceedings impossible. The President is part of the executive branch of government, and his competences in respect of blocking criminal proceedings must not rest on presumption. Under the Constitution, courts are independent and separate from other branches of government. But there are grounds to interpret the right of pardon, referred to in Article 139 of the Constitution, as encompassing limited individual abolition, where the President exempts a person under a criminal proceeding from the outcome of this proceeding (i.e. a lawful sentence, no longer subject to appeal), but where courts are not exempt from their constitutional responsibilities and where there is no demolishing of the right to fair trial – which in fact is the right to seek the truth, enjoyed by everybody, including the society and the court itself. The criminal trial of a person under individual abolition should be crowned with the passing of a lawful sentence, no longer subject to appeal – but in this case a guilty sentence would not be enforced, because of the right of pardon having been granted prior to the passing of the sentence. Legal disputes over exercise of the right of pardon are, in fact, disputes over application of the Constitution – and this application should be founded on respect for the Constitution as the basic law of the Republic of Poland. An interpretation of the Constitution must not justify practices that threaten the democratic identity of a state governed by the rule of law, such state having been proclaimed by the Constitution itself.
PL
Artykuł porusza zagadnienie doradczych organów Prezydenta RP w zakresie bezpieczeństwa państwa. Na podstawie współczesnych przepisów prawnych ustalono funkcjonowanie dwóch tego typu organów: Rady Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego i Biura Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego. Wyjaśniono, że analogiczne struktury funkcjonowały w Polsce od dawna, już w okresie II Rzeczypospolitej (1918–1945). Oba organy poddano analizie, wskazując występujące na tym tle problemy. Na podstawie całokształtu dokonanej analizy sformułowano wnioski końcowe.
EN
The article is bringing up the issue of advisory organs of the President of the Republic of Poland in the state security. Based on contemporary provisions of law there was established functioning of two organs of this type: Advice of the National Security and Offices of the National Security. There was explained, that analogous structures had already functioned in Poland already for ages, in the period of the Second Polish Republic (in 1918–1945). Both organs were analyzed, showing problems appearing against this background. Based on the entirety of made analysis there were expressed final conclusions.
first rewind previous Page / 2 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.