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Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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2014
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vol. 5
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issue 1
139-162
EN
This article is primarily concerned with Platoʼs later dialogue, the Sophist, and the reception of the megista-gēnē-dialectic in Neoplatonism (especially Plotinus and Proclus). The present paper offers a historical comparative study that consists of three parts. The first one gives a short summary concerning Platoʼs request regarding the concept of inverse and complex Ideas. The second one examines Plotinus’ conception of the νοῦς (Enn. VI 2, 7–8), in which the megista gēnē στάσις, κίνησις, ὄν, ταὐτόν and ἕτερον constitute the realm of the intellect. While the third and final part of the article investigates Proclusʼ extrapolation of the Platonic dialectic, it focuses on selected passages from the Commentary on the Parmenides. The paper concludes with a summary of the results.
Verbum Vitae
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2021
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vol. 39
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issue 3
1007-1024
EN
The writings of Corpus Dionysiacum present a concept of life which is different from the one that we profess nowadays. Its view is backed up mainly by the Platonic tradition, which since the times of Plato has tended to see life as an intellectual principle. Therefore, in the Neoplatonic system we can find the conviction that life, in its fullest sense, is intellectual and at its peak is a vision of the One. In the system of Proclus, life, apart from being a principle, is also a god and the main principle of the whole world of intellectual and intellective gods. Pseudo-Dionysius in his writings exploits the concept of the unparticipable and participable principle, and since God is for him Trinity completely beyond participation and knowledge, the divine names play the role of participable henads. However, for Dionysius, names are neither hypostases nor living gods, which is clearly visible in case of the name of Life. All things participate in the name of life and in this name God is the only principle of life in the universe. However, life is not a property to own, but rather a constant struggle to approach the Trinity. Therefore, by committing a sin, an angel or a man loses life, which in the case of a man can be regained through sacramental activity. An analysis of the thoughts of Pseudo-Dionysius reveals a conception of life which is unified contrary to its shattered modern understanding. While biological, mental, moral lives fundamentally differ for us, for Dionysius those are merely aspects of the same thing, and therefore in his view life can be lost and regained not only in the metaphorical, but also the ontological sense.
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88%
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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2020
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vol. 11
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issue 1
143-170
EN
In his reflection on the nature of evil, the Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus affirms that evil itself (to autokakon) is “also beyond the abso­lute non-being” (epekeina kai tou mēdamōs ontos). With this assumption, he intends to reinforce the thesis of the non-existence of absolute evil, conceived as totally separate from good, and contrasted with the collat­eral and parasitic existence of evil mixed with good. He thus maintains a distinction between absolute evil and relative evil, conceived with reference to the distinction between absolute non-being (i.e., nothing­ness) and relative non-being. In Proclus, the thesis of the non-existence of absolute evil is presented as a necessary consequence of the non-dualist theory of evil in the sphere of a protology that identifies the first Principle of all things in the primary Good (identical to the supra-essen­tial One), and which aims to reconcile the absolute primacy of the latter with the presence of evil in some orders of reality.
EN
This study examines the way in which the Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus treats an episode of the dialectic communication between Socrates and Alcibiades in the Platonic dialogue Alcibiades I. More specifically, it refers to how the characteristics and the choices of two different types of lovers – the divinely inspired one and the vulgar one – are displayed in the aforementioned text. The characterization ‘divinely inspired lover’ befits a person who communicates in a pure way with his beloved one and attempts to teach the latter the objective values of the intellect. By contrast, the characterization of the ‘vulgar lover’ befits that individual that approaches another individual exclusively on the basis of his external beauty. The first type of lover is presented within the realms of the permanently qualitative, while the second as someone who satisfies solemnly his subjectivity and his instincts. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Proclus argues that Socrates, whom he considers to represent the very definition of a divinely inspired lover, is inspired by divine powers and attempts to act towards to his fellows – in this instance to Alcibiades – in the way through which the divine providence is revealed.
EN
When commenting on Aristotle Ph. 1.3, 187a1, Simplicius in Ph. 1.3, 146, 29–147,2 establishes an equivalence between the shining «silver egg» (ὤεον ἀργύφεον) of Orpheus (fr. 70 Kern) and the Parmenidean being or, rather, one of the determinations with which Parmenides, in the section of his Poem devoted to the so-called Way of Truth, indicates the ἐόν, i.e., «resembling the mass of a well-rounded sphere» (εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκωι – DK 28 B 8.43). The equivalence established here is found in the great digression about Parmenides (in Ph. 142, 28–148, 24), where Simplicius puts forward an interpretation of Parmenides that identifies the Parmenidean being-one (τὸ ἓν ὄν) with the intelligible (τὸ νοητόν), which, in another passages of the same commentary, is also qualified with the metaphysical concept of “unified” (τὸ ἡνωμένον) that is taken from Damascius. The aim of the present paper is to trace back the Neo-Platonic assumptions of this identification. In particular, we will focus on Damascius Pr. 2.55.40, 14–19 and 3.123.160, 1–3 Westerink, since these passages contain insights into the Orphic theology that is referred to as “usual”, “common” or “rhapsodic”, as well as a contextual “translation” of various Orphic concepts (e.g. ὤεον ἀργύφεον) in terms of Neo-Platonic metaphysics. The metaphysical transposition of the mythical image of the silver egg goes back, however, to Proclus (in Ti. 1.428, 8–9), who assumes the identity between Plato’s being (“being in the primary sense”, τὸ πρώτως [...] ὄν) and the Orphic egg (ταὐτὸν τό τε Πλάτωνος ὂν καὶ τὸ Ὀρφικὸν ὠόν). One cannot, at the same time, exclude a priori the possibility that the Orphic motif of the silver egg circulated in the Magna Graecia of Parmenides already from at least the 6th century BC. It is possible, as Colli hypothesised, that already Ibycus (who certainly knew Orpheus, fr. 25 Page) betrays a certain knowledge of it in fr. 4.4–5 Page, where we find the expression ἐν ὠέωι ἀργυρέωι. This article demonstrates that Proclus and Damascius embedded the Orphic concept of ὤεον ἀργύφεον into their Neo-Platonic metaphysics by showing its potential for speculative order.
EN
The aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato’s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., “parasitic” or “collateral” existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the “privative” role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism. 
IT
The aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato’s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., “parasitic” or “collateral” existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the “privative” role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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2014
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vol. 5
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issue 1
337-350
EN
The article examines how Hegel’s negative view of Byzantium is different from the Enlightenment’s critique and especially from Voltaire’s criticism of medieval history. In order to account for the Hegelian specificity of interpretation an effort is made to translate the chapter on Byzantium from the Philosophy of History in terms of the analysis of the Phenomenology of the Spirit and, more precisely, on the basis of the chapters on sensible certitude and on the domination and servitude. Considering that for Hegel every philosophical school possesses an autonomous value, one has to wonder why the Byzantine moment of the Spirit is destined to stagnation. The question about Hegel’s Neoplatonism, especially his affiliation with Proclus’s system, shows how the distance separating the Hegelian system from the Proclusian one explains the inadequacy of the latter as to drawing the consequences from the Byzantine spiritual stagnation.
FR
The article examines how Hegel’s negative view of Byzantium is different from the Enlightenment’s critique and especially from Voltaire’s criticism of medieval history. In order to account for the Hegelian specificity of interpretation an effort is made to translate the chapter on Byzantium from the Philosophy of History in terms of the analysis of the Phenomenology of the Spirit and, more precisely, on the basis of the chapters on sensible certitude and on the domination and servitude. Considering that for Hegel every philosophical school possesses an autonomous value, one has to wonder why the Byzantine moment of the Spirit is destined to stagnation. The question about Hegel’s Neoplatonism, especially his affiliation with Proclus’s system, shows how the distance separating the Hegelian system from the Proclusian one explains the inadequacy of the latter as to drawing the consequences from the Byzantine spiritual stagnation.
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Hymny Proklosa: filozofia i kult

75%
Vox Patrum
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2013
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vol. 59
487-530
EN
The present paper consists of the introduction to the Neoplatonic and Chaldean systems, the first Polish translation of seven extant Hymns by Proclus (AD 412- 485), and the commentaries on each of them. This essay is a polemic against the well-known book by R.M. Van den Berg entitled Proclus’ Hymns (Leiden 2001, Brill), which shows, above all, the Chaldean influences (cf. The Chaldean Oracles, ed. R. Majercik, Leiden 1989, Brill). I has argued that the philosopher used much more literary patterns than the Chaldean Oracles to illustrate the Neoplatonic „oecumenism” (an expression of P. Athanassiadi), i.e. syncretism of all the late-pa­gan religions. I has argued, further, that the philosopher’s cult-songs had been used in purifications and mystery rites of all the religions, but there is no evidence for the theurgy alone. I disagree with M. Van den Berg in the main thesis of his book that the gods to whom the hymns were adressed should be identified with the lead­er-gods of Proclus’ system. My argumentation leads to the conclusion that the gods of Proclus’ Hymns can be identified with the Great Demiurges (Hymns 2, 6, 7) and the Lesser Demiurges (Hymns 1, 3, 4, 5). The elaborate theological system con­structed by Proclus and the location of gods from the Hymns in it are shown in the special diagram (table 1).
EN
The present article is concerned with Proclus’ highly original and profoundly influential account of the symbolic function of poetry, the pedagogic as well as the hieratic value of myths and the soteriological power of allegorical interpretation. Thus, the paper begins with a brief discussion of Plato’s dismissal of poetry as μέγιστον ψεῦδος. Subsequently, Proclus’ theory of three kinds of poetry is examined, upon which attention is paid to his revolutionary idea that σύμβολα rather than μιμήματα are the tools of the highest kind of poetry. Then, Proclus’ views on the difference between Plato’s and Homer’s μυθοποιΐα are considered. While the article concludes with an analysis of Proclus’ conviction about the functional similarity of symbols in myths and those in magic rites, allegoresis is shown to have the same salvational role that Proclus ascribes to theurgy.
EN
This paper discusses the theoretical relationship between the views of Damascius and those of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. While Damascius’ De principiis is a bold treatise devoted to investigating the hypermetaphysics of apophatism, it anticipates various theoretical positions put forward by Dionysius the Areopagite. The present paper focuses on the following. First, Damascius is the only ancient philoso­pher who systematically demonstrates the first principle to be infinite (traditional Greek thought tended to regard the arkhē as finite). Second, Damascius modifies the concept and in several important passages shows the infinite to be superior and prior to the finite (previously this assumption was held only by Melissus and, sporadically, by Gregory of Nyssa and Plotinus). Third, Damascius’ theory of being (infinite, endless and ultrarational) is the strongest ancient articulation of the nature of the One which is a clear prefiguration of the negative theology developed by Dionysius the Areopagite.
FR
Liber de causis, à savoir Le Livre des Causes c’est une suite d’extraits d’Éléments de théologie de Proclos commentés par un auteur arabe anonyme. Traduit du latin par Gérard de Crémone avant l’an 1187 ce texte était jusqu'à la parution en 1272 de son commentaire effectué par Thomas d’Aquin, attribué à Aristote. Le texte en version arabe a paru probablement à Toledo au début du XIIe siècle ou peut-être encore plus tôt à « l’époque des traductions » initiée par le calife abbasside al-Mamun, fondateur de la « Maison de la sagesse » à Bagdad (vers 830). Pourtant ce n’est pas ça ce qui est le plus important – la grande « carrière » de ce texte résultait du fait que l’on avait attribué à Aristote même. Dans ce fait il n’y aurait rien de spécial si on ne savait pas que le véritable auteur des idées contenues dans Liber de causis – Proclos (412–485) était l’un des plus éminents philosophes néoplatoniciens, disciple de Plutarque, réformateur de l’Académie de Platon, bref quelqu’un se situant presque aux antipodes du Lycée d’Aristote. La genèse de Liber de causis et de son commentaire Thomasien influence le texte. En effet, la philosophie que nous découvrons dans ce texte est extraordinaire. Dans la première couche, celle de Proclos, nous retrouvons le classique néoplatonisme grec, polythéiste et radicalement païen, mais considérablement émoussé par le choix approprié de thèses de Stoichéosis theologiké et le commentaire arabe écrit dans un ésprit monothéiste et créationniste. C’est ce texte néoplatonicien que commente par le suite Thomas d’Aquin – le plus célèbre partisan de l’école d’Aristote au Moyen Age, à qui la doctrine contenue dans Liber de causis devrait être extrêmement étrangère. Thomas ne le dissimule pas en exposant dans l’introduction ses constatations concernant l’attribution de Liber de causis. Néanmoins, il trouve dans le Livre des questions qui l’intéressent. L’une des questions qui intéressent Aquinate est sûrement la problématique d’esse – de l’existence. Aquinate interprète esse du Livre des causes dans l’esprit de sa propre métaphysique ce qui nous apporte la couche suivante du texte – philosophique. Il est pourtant très rare que l’on puisse en un seul texte passer par plusieurs sphères de la pensée et de la langue ainsi que quelques frontières qui les séparent. Nous pouvons aussi examiner comment la problématique qui nous intéresse se transformait depuis la classique version grecque dans Stoichéiosis theologiké de Proclos, à travers les transformations d’un auteur arabe anonyme dans Liber de causis, jusqu'à la version de Thomas d’Aquin dans son commentaire latin. Nous avons aussi « chemin faisant » deux, peut-être trois traductions de l’œuvre de Proclos : du grec à l’arabe (il n’est pas exclu que « entre » elles il existait aussi une version syrienne) et ensuite une traduction de l’arabe au latin (et une version polonaise du latin).
Vox Patrum
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2022
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vol. 82
237-262
EN
In his Commentaries, Proclus (Neoplatonic philosopher, 5th century A.D.) describes the ways in which a teacher can awaken the desire for knowledge and philosophy in a given soul, and help this soul to make cognitive and moral progress. He considers such an intervention to be a case of providence, analogous to both the action of divine Pronoia and the care of one's personal daemon. As the soul being thus educated is still unaware of the merits of rational thought, the teacher needs to use the emotions of his student to stimulate him; he might even want to generate desirable emotions in his soul. I focus here on two emotions: wonder and shock. The first serves to stimulate interest while preserving autonomy. The second allows deeper commitment at the price of reduced autonomy of the pupil. Both are complementary aspects of philosophical perplexity.
EN
The first of these ‘layers’ is hellenistic Neoplatonism of Proclus which is specifically deepened in Aquinas expositio by referring to ‘Stoichéiosis Theologiké’. The second ‘layer’ is monotheistic and creationist neoplatonism of the author of The Book which is sometimes corrected by Thomas Aquinas through depictions of Pseudo-Dionysius. The third and clearly separated doctrinal ‘layer’ of lecture is veritas rerum in which should be seek Aquinas’ views. In this perspective it is easier to unravel terminological difficulties which are in Thomas Aquinas’ text. It seems that many technical terms, such as esse, essentia, existentia, even substantia and ens should be ‘read’ in the ‘layer’ perspective which they located in. The article analyze first of the issue of esse. If we consider this ‘layered’ construction Commentary of Thomas Aquinas recognizing that in veritatis rerum there are the Aquinas own views, without difficulty we will find in it the most important thesis of his own metaphysics: about being as an arrangement from esse, about the esse and essentia, about essentia as an arrangement form and some type of potency, about God as a Ipsum Esse Subsistens, about creation as a giving esse.
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