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1

Selection of Defendants before the ICC: Between the Principle of Opportunism and Legalism

100%

Kuczyńska H.

Polish Yearbook of International Law

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2014

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vol. 34

187-224

EN

International criminal tribunals had to make a choice between the principles of opportunism and legalism or decide to use a mixture of these both. They had to decide whether a prosecutor should become “the minister of justice” (as in the principle of legalism) or “the first judge” (evaluating in the frames of principle of opportunism the reasonable basis for prosecuting). This article addresses prosecutorial discretion before the ICC with respect to selecting defendants. Firstly, it analyzes the main differences between opportunism and legalism of prosecution. It also presents models of accusation functioning before the historical and existing international criminal tribunals – which usually opted for opportunism of prosecution. Before the ICC the conditions on which the Prosecutor may initiate an investigation are set in Art. 53(1) of the Statute: “The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute.” It is interesting to observe that this phrase may be interpreted in many various ways, depending on the model of accusation the author belongs to: those coming from the Anglo-Saxon tradition have tendency to search for elements of opportunism; those from civil law states assume that the model of accusation operates according to the principle of legalism. There is also a number of mixed options presented, according to which the ICC operates according to a mixture of these two principles. Finally, the article presents different rules adopted by the ICC Prosecutor (or proposed), which govern the choice of the defendants.

2

Wszczęcie procesu cywilnego przez prokuratora (kilka uwag de lege ferenda i de lege lata)

86%

Góra-Błaszczykowska A.

Themis Polska Nova

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2014

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issue 2(7)

14-26

EN

The article discusses a prosecutor’s position in the Polish civil proceedings in relation to the form of its participation in civil cases. Prosecutor’s possibilities to participate in the civil procedure depend on whether or not he brought a court action or he joined proceedings already pending. The article focuses on the problem wheather prosecutor’s right to bring the action before the civil court should be considered as proper solution during the amendment processs of the Polish civil procedure code.

3

Lider w niewoli Trójkąta Dramatycznego

72%

Świątek W.

Edukacyjna Analiza Transakcyjna

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2015

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issue 4

13–33

EN

The author of the article attempts to describe the role of the leader within the context of being captured in the Drama Triangle. Basing his argumentation on the two characteristic case studies regarding leaders' behaviour, the author describes various behaviours, emotions, feelings and reactions experienced by leaders. Particular attention is given to the analysis of interpersonal conflicts and their possible solutions. The two case studies are an important part of the article as they present a practical illustration of how leaders act and experience the following roles: Victim, Prosecutor, Rescuer and Avenger. The analysis of the case studies allows the reader to investigate practical aspects of the search for effective solutions, which may help both leaders and their subordinates. The premises examined in the article are well-documented in research, and their detailed descriptions can be found in the rich review of subject literature.

4

Prokuratura a Sejm

58%

Zięba-Załucka H.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego

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2022

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issue 3(67)

173-187

PL

Autorka podnosi w artykule, iż na gruncie stanu prawnego poprzedzającego nowelizację ustawy o prokuraturze z 2009 r., kontrola Sejmu nad działaniami Ministra Sprawiedliwości – Prokuratora Generalnego znajdowała bezpośrednią podstawę w normie konstytucyjnej, która powierza Sejmowi kontrolę nad Radą Ministrów. W modelu prokuratury z 2009 r., gdzie funkcje Prokuratora Generalnego i Ministra Sprawiedliwości zostały rozłączone, Prokurator Generalny, kierujący działalnością prokuratury, był organem „autonomicznym” na zasadach określonych w ustawie względem Rady Ministrów, Prezydenta, Sejmu i Senatu. Ponowne połączenie funkcji Ministra Sprawiedliwości i Prokuratora Generalnego ustawą z 2016 r. daje Sejmowi szerszą możliwość kontroli parlamentarnej Prokuratora Generalnego. Autorka wskazuje instrumenty kontroli parlamentarnej podkreślając, że Sejmowi przysługują tylko takie kompetencje kontrolne, które zostały wyraźnie określone w konstytucji i ustawach. Autorka uzasadnia tezę, iż zróżnicowanie modeli funkcjonowania prokuratury w Polsce jako instytucji wykraczającą poza ramy klasycznej monteskiuszowskiej klasyfikacji, nie odbiera Sejmowi prawa do kontroli prokuratury, a ten realizuje ją przy pomocy zróżnicowanych środków.

EN

Author argues in the article that under the legal status preceding the 2009 amendment to the Act on the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Sejm’s control over the actions of the Minister of Justice – Prosecutor General found a direct basis in the constitutional norm, which entrusts the Sejm with the control over the Council of Ministers. Under the 2009 prosecution model, where the functions of the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice were separated, the Prosecutor General, directing the activities of the prosecution service, was an autonomous body in relation to Council of Ministers, President, Sejm and Senate. The reconnection of the functions of the Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General by the 2016 Act gives the Sejm the possibility of parliamentary control of the Prosecutor General. Author indicates the instruments of parliamentary control emphasizing that the Sejm is entitled only to such powers of control that have been clearly defined in the Constitution and laws. Author justifies the thesis that the diversity of the models of functioning of the prosecutor’s office in Poland, as an institution beyond the framework of the classical Montesquieu classification, does not deprive the Sejm of the right to control the prosecutor’s office, which he realizes with the help of diverse means.

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1 Edukacyjna Analiza Transakcyjna

1 Polish Yearbook of International Law

1 Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego

1 Themis Polska Nova

1 Góra-Błaszczykowska A.

1 Kuczyńska H.

1 Zięba-Załucka H.

1 Świątek W.

1 2022

2 2015

1 2014

Selection of Defendants before the ICC: Between the Principle of Opportunism and Legalism

Wszczęcie procesu cywilnego przez prokuratora (kilka uwag de lege ferenda i de lege lata)

Lider w niewoli Trójkąta Dramatycznego

Prokuratura a Sejm