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1

Siateczkowy model rozwoju nauki a struktura racjonalnego działania

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Michalska A.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2011

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vol. 47

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issue 1(187)

41-58

EN

In the paper I put to analysis the reticulated model of scientific change, introduced by Larry Laudan in his Science and Values, aiming at reconstruction of the concept of rationality it presupposes. In elaborating on the model's structure I draw on Jurgen Habermas' s theory of speech acts and discuss the concept of instrumental rationality. I argue that in the area of philosophy of science, the model heralds the demise of a classical ideal of rationality, based solely on the notion of justification of judgments. My claim is that reticulated model demands that the analytical paradigm, the scope of which remains confined to a semantic dimension of science, should be replaced with a properly understood instrumental model of rationality, displaying both semantic and pragmatic facet of cognition.

2

UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE CONCEPT OF REASON IN HERMANN COHEN'S PHILOSOPHY

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Swiecicka K.

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2008

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vol. 6

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issue 2-3(20)

473-487

EN

The article is devoted to a summarization of philosophy of Hermann Cohen, a Neo-Kantian and the Marburg school founder. It discusses the concept of consciousness and its relation to the unity of culture and its rational character as developed by this eminent and yet less known philosopher. He attempted to unify different levels of rationality: in science, ethics, art and religion; this way, he inspired the later philosophy of symbolical forms in Ernst Cassirer.

3

NEED FOR COGNITION AND RATIONALITY IN DECISION-MAKING

80%

Curseu P. L.

Studia Psychologica

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2006

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vol. 48

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issue 2

141-156

EN

This paper addresses the relation between the need for cognition and rationality in decision-making and also reconsiders the relation between need for cognition and the framing effect using modified versions of the Asian disease task. In the first study (N = 205), a significant and positive relationship was obtained between need for cognition and the rationality of decision-makers. Also a negative and significant relationship was obtained between need for cognition and indecisiveness. These findings are consistent with the theoretical propositions hypothesized in the need for cognition theory (Cacioppo et al., 1996). The second study (N = 462) is an in-depth analysis of the relation between the need for cognition and the framing effect, revealing a positive and significant relation between need for cognition and the respondents' preference for the probabilistic framed alternatives in two risky choice framing effect tasks.

4

COMPARISON OF EXPERIENCED VS. NOVICE TEACHERS IN COGNITIVE REFLECTION AND RATIONALITY

80%

Čavojová V., Jurkovič M.

Studia Psychologica

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2017

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vol. 59

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issue 2

100 – 112

EN

Relatively little is known about actual cognitive skills and thinking dispositions of teachers, despite their possible importance. In the current paper we examined two predictions related to rational performance of teachers. First, we expected that more experienced teachers have more rational thinking dispositions, are more cognitively reflective and discount the future less in comparison to novice teachers. Second, we expected that cognitive reflection is related to options involving more patience. 109 novice teachers (undergraduate students) and 55 experienced teachers participated in the study. Thinking dispositions were measured by Rational-Experiential Inventory, cognitive reflection was measured by CRT, to measure future discounting we used intertemporal choice tasks and Consideration for Future Consequences questionnaire. We found that teachers differed significantly from undergraduate students in CRT and all subscales of these measures in the expected direction, with the exception of CFC-Immediate and REI-Experiential Engagement, but we found no significant differences between teachers and students (with one exception) on intertemporal choice tasks. The results also confirmed the expected relationships between CRT, CFC and REI. These results pose some important implications for educating future teachers.

5

RATIONALITIES OF EMOTION - DEFENDING, DISTINGUISHING, CONNECTING

80%

Rietti S.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2009

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vol. 16

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issue 1

38-61

EN

Claims that emotions are or can be rational, and crucially enabling of rationality, are now fairly common, also outside of philosophy, but with considerable diversity both in their assumptions about emotions and their conceptions of rationality. Three main trends are worth picking out, both in themselves and for the potential tensions between them: accounts that defend a case for the rationality of emotions A) by assimilating emotions closely to beliefs or judgements; B) in terms of the very features that traditional views of emotions as irrational/a-rational emphasized; C) by arguing that emotions exhibit a more sui generis kind of rationality, often one based on a narrative or dramaturgic 'inner logic'.

6

DISTINCTIVE RATIONALITY OF INTENTIONS

80%

Botting D.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2013

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vol. 20

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issue 4

507 – 526

EN

In this paper the author intend to defend Broome’s cognitivist view that reduces practical normativity to theoretical normativity, but argue that this leaves unaccounted for distinctively practical norms that the author seeks to capture as a system of local obligations to have particular intentions. The krasia requirement dictates what obligations we have relative to the normative beliefs that we have but does not tell us what intentions it is rational to have all-things-considered.

7

MALÁ ŠTÚDIA O FANATIZME (NA MOTÍVY VEĽKEJ ŠTÚDIE MARIANA VÁROSSA O FANATIZME)

80%

Buraj I.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2014

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vol. 69

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issue 2

143 – 153

EN

The aim of the first part of the paper is to make the reader acquainted with the selected parts of Váross’s large study of fanaticism (Le Fanatisme. Une analyse psychologique et axiologuiqe; Paris: Sorbonne 1947, 541 pp.). The second part deals with two contemporary most expanded kinds of fanaticism: political and ideological ones as two distinctive kinds of rationality. Attention is paid also to several parallels between political fanaticism and ideological fanaticism, as they are defined by M. Váross, and as conceived by H. Arendt.

8

RADICAL RATIONALIZATION ACCOMMODATES RAMPANT IRRATIONALITY

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Lipski J.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2018

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vol. 25

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issue 1

53 – 73

EN

According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper the author will offer one such criterion. More specifically, he argues that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this notion can be distinguished from a more commonly used notion of rationality and hence cannot be shown to be undermined by the potential prevalence of a corresponding kind of irrationality.

9

RATIONAL AKRASIA

80%

Brunero J.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2013

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vol. 20

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issue 4

546 – 566

EN

It is commonly thought that one is irrationally akratic when one believes one ought to F but does not intend to F. However, some philosophers, following Robert Audi, have argued that it is sometimes rational to have this combination of attitudes. I here consider the question of whether rational akrasia is possible. I argue that those arguments for the possibility of rational akrasia advanced by Audi and others do not succeed. Specifically, I argue that cases in which an akratic agent acts as he has most reason to act, and cases in which an akratic agent achieves a kind of global coherence he wouldn’t have achieved had he instead formed intentions in line with his best judgment, do not establish the possibility of rational akrasia. However, I do think that rational akrasia is possible, and I present two arguments for this thesis. The first argument involves a case in which one is incapable of revising one’s belief about what one ought to do, where one also acknowledges this belief to be insufficiently supported by the evidence. The second argument involves a case in which one rationally believes that one ought to have an akratic combination of attitudes.

10

Świadomość mityczna jako problem filozoficzny

80%

Ples M.

IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych

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2012

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vol. 24

5-18

EN

The article Mythical consciousness as a philosophical problem is an at- tempt to analyze the subjective reflection of a myth that is concentrated on such notions as: “mythical consciousness”, “mythical imagination”, “mythical thought” or “logic of myth”. The analysis shows the main theses and pro- blems of subjective reflection of the myth, based on philosophical theories (E. Cassirer, L. Kołakowski) and also on the concepts which developed in the area of the cultural anthropology (B. Malinowski, L. L´evy-Bruhl, J.G. Frazer, C. L´evi-Strauss).

11

DEFENDING THE GOOD DOG PICTURE OF VIRTUES

80%

Mărăşoiu A. I.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2020

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vol. 27

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issue 4

539 - 555

EN

I consider and reject a specific criticism advanced by Korsgaard against virtue ethics and epistemology when these are conceived with the help of what she calls the image of the “Good Dog.” I consider what virtue ethics and epistemology would look like if the Good Dog picture of virtues were largely correct. I argue that attention to the features that make Korsgaard undermine the usefulness of virtues when conceived along the lines of the Good Dog picture reveals the opposite of what she claims. On the Good Dog picture, virtue ethics and epistemology are seen as more promising approaches to rationality than Korsgaard’s own advocacy of reflection.

12

LOGIC AND RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

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Tajer D.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2016

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vol. 23

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issue 4

460 – 487

EN

In this paper, the author discusses the relation between logic and rationality. He develops (formally and conceptually) a rational requirement which can respond to the classic objections by Harman (1986). On the one hand, the requirement pays attention to the relevance of the premises and the conclusion, which is formally expressed by the notion of weak relative closure. The requirement also takes care of the complexity of the inferences. This notion of complexity is formally represented by a partially ordered scale of the difficulty of inferences, which is weaker than the notion of complexity as a number of steps.

13

NARROWNESS OF WIDE-SCOPE PRINCIPLES

80%

Botting D.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2016

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vol. 23

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issue 2

177 – 203

EN

In this paper the author will propose that the unpalatable consequences of narrow-scope principles are not avoided by altering the scope of the principle but by changing the kind of conditional. He argues that a counterfactual conditional should do the trick and that the rational requirement of modus ponens can be understood as something like a “Ramsey test” on this conditional.

14

Hermeneutyka a kwestia rozumu

80%

Torzewski W.

Filo-Sofija

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2010

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vol. 10

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issue 2(11)

29-40

EN

This article is an expression and an attempt to justify the belief that hermeneutic philosophy is an interpretation of the rationality’s concept. Although hermeneutics itself is a critique of a certain form of rationalism, and therefore falls under charges “irrationality”, the concept of reason is an essential component of its identity as a philosophy.

15

IS THE ENKRATIC PRINCIPLE A REQUIREMENT OF RATIONALITY?

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Reisner A.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2013

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vol. 20

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issue 4

437 – 463

EN

In this paper the author argues that the enkratic principle in its classic formulation may not be a requirement of rationality. The investigation whether it is leads to some important methodological insights into the study of rationality. He also considers the possibility that we should consider rational requirements as a subset of a broader category of agential requirements.

16

Philosophical Controversies on Rationality of Science

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Motycka A.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2008

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vol. 44

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issue 3-4

459-464

EN

Science is not only rational but non-rational (beyond-rational) too. In the paper the authoress is arguing this thesis.

17

PROLEGOMENA TO THE RÓZEWICZ'S BODY AND THE END OF EKPHRASIS

80%

Mrugalski M.

Przegląd Humanistyczny

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2005

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vol. 49

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issue 4(391)

25-43

EN

Classical ekphrasis, represented here by Philostratos' 'Imagines' works thanks to an unusual combination of rationality and highly developed sensuality: method combines with charm to seduce the reader. Rózewicz puts the components together differently, obtaining another genre. One can come closer to it thanks to Freud's school of dream explanation and Walter Benjamin's concept of dialectic image. Rózewicz's images are controlled by negative dialectics. It does not attempt to get back presence, but it tries to regain a thing without losing its loss.

18

KONTEXTUALIZÁCIA EVIDENCIE O BAYESOVSKOM USUDZOVANÍ V EMPIRICKOM SPORE O RACIONALITU

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Sirota M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2008

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vol. 63

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issue 5

417-426

EN

Bayesian reasoning is considered to be the prototype of rational judgment. The differences between the descriptive and normative models of reasoning used to be interpreted as supporting the thesis of the principal irrationality of humans. The paper shows the possible re-interpretations of this research evidence by means of focusing on the contexts of individual differences as well as the context of differences in the experimental environment. Taking into account of these contexts makes the originally pessimistic answer to the question of rationality more optimistic.

19

Twierdzenie Godla a wiara i rozum - czyli w poszukiwaniu nowych uzasadnień

80%

Jobczyk K.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

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2010

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vol. 46

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issue 1

191-195

EN

The aim of the paper is to show certain similarities between rationality of formal sciences and rationality of religious discourse. These similarities can be seen when analysing the ways in which the well-known Gödel's incompleteness theorem is justified. The main idea of the paper is that these two types of rationality are not dichotomous. This is so, because even in such formalised areas of rationality like mathematics and logics, mutual influences of rational and non-rational elements can be, unexpectedly, found.

20

(Racjonalnosc, zło i ewolucja

80%

Florek S.

Archeus. Studia z bioetyki i antropologii filozoficznej

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2011

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vol. 12

89-106

EN

In philosophical anthropology and ethics the phenomenon of rational agent doing evil to others or oneself has always been seen as a problem which demands solution. It is argued that adopting an evolutionary perspective and making distinction between instrumental and biological rationality enables to explain this enigma. It is maintained that in the reference to the evolutionary theories of altruism also egoistic and evil behavior can be explained. From this point of view many human actions, although evil, seem to be biologically rational. Furthermore, it is pointed out that also many irrational evil actions can be explained on the grounds of evolutionary biology and psychology (1) as byproducts of psychological mechanisms that evolved to promote altruistic behavior or (2) as results of nervous system dysfunction.

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Siateczkowy model rozwoju nauki a struktura racjonalnego działania

UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE CONCEPT OF REASON IN HERMANN COHEN'S PHILOSOPHY

NEED FOR COGNITION AND RATIONALITY IN DECISION-MAKING

COMPARISON OF EXPERIENCED VS. NOVICE TEACHERS IN COGNITIVE REFLECTION AND RATIONALITY

RATIONALITIES OF EMOTION - DEFENDING, DISTINGUISHING, CONNECTING

DISTINCTIVE RATIONALITY OF INTENTIONS

MALÁ ŠTÚDIA O FANATIZME (NA MOTÍVY VEĽKEJ ŠTÚDIE MARIANA VÁROSSA O FANATIZME)

RADICAL RATIONALIZATION ACCOMMODATES RAMPANT IRRATIONALITY

RATIONAL AKRASIA

Świadomość mityczna jako problem filozoficzny

DEFENDING THE GOOD DOG PICTURE OF VIRTUES

LOGIC AND RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

NARROWNESS OF WIDE-SCOPE PRINCIPLES

Hermeneutyka a kwestia rozumu

IS THE ENKRATIC PRINCIPLE A REQUIREMENT OF RATIONALITY?

Philosophical Controversies on Rationality of Science

PROLEGOMENA TO THE RÓZEWICZ'S BODY AND THE END OF EKPHRASIS

KONTEXTUALIZÁCIA EVIDENCIE O BAYESOVSKOM USUDZOVANÍ V EMPIRICKOM SPORE O RACIONALITU

Twierdzenie Godla a wiara i rozum - czyli w poszukiwaniu nowych uzasadnień

(Racjonalnosc, zło i ewolucja