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MAX WEBER A SOCIOLÓGIA PRÁVA

100%
Sociológia (Sociology)
|
2012
|
vol. 44
|
issue 5
621 – 637
EN
This article focuses on the sociology of law in the work of Max Weber, and some problems related to its reception in legal thinking. As a social and legal thinker, Weber had long been stigmatized as a representative of “bourgeois pseudo-science“ in Slovakia and his original works on the sociology of law were unavailable for decades. Thus, the reception of his sociology of law suffers due to this discontinuity. An analysis of Weber’s sociology of law can divide his ideas in two categories: 1. law and social statics, including social structure and related issues, 2. law and social dynamics, including actors of societal changes. This paper stresses two key problem fields in his sociology of law: 1. the reflection of extralegal factors in the content of law and 2. the formalization of the social role of participants in legal relations by means of the construction of “legal status.“ The author claims that focusing on these two topics, together with the concept of rationalization, can broaden our contemporary knowledge about law and society.
EN
During the last decades several studies in cognitive psychology have shown that many of our actions do not depend on the reasons that we adduce afterwards, when we have to account for them. Our decisions seem to be often influenced by normatively or explanatorily irrelevant features of the environment of which we are not aware, and the reasons we offer for those decisions are a posteriori rationalisations. But exactly what reasons has the psychological research uncovered? In philosophy, a distinction has been commonly made between normative and motivating reasons: normative reasons make an action right, whereas motivating reasons explain our behaviour. Recently, Maria Alvarez has argued that, apart from normative (or justifying) reasons, we should further distinguish between motivating and explanatory reasons. We have, then, three kinds of reasons, and it is not clear which of them have been revealed as the real reasons for our actions by the psychological research. The answer we give to this question will have important implications both for the validity of our classifications of reasons and for our understanding of human action.
EN
The following essay aimes at answering two questions. The first one concerns the formal character of the critical basis of the Habermasian social theory. Due to the fact that the Habermasian theory already presupposes a democratic institutional background and certain maxims that can not be deduced from the formal pragmatic analysis of language, the author argues that its critical basis contains substantive elements. In the second part of the essay he explains one of these elements. This element can be deduced from an immanent problem of the Habermasian social theory. Habermas introduces the notion of communicative action as the coordinating mechanism of social actions. It is needed only if the cooperation gets stuck because of the actors' different defmition of the situation. The communicative action itself is, however, a social action, as well. So the question proposes itself: what mechanism may put it back on track if it gets stuck? With other words: how can the coordination of communicative action be achieved? In a default situation, the coordination of social actions is assured by the lifeworld, so the problem of coordinating communicative actions is inseparable from the problem of the lifeworld. In The Theory of Communicative Action Habermas differentiates the lifeworlds by their level of rationality openness. Accordingly, the blocking of communicative action may be traced back to the different rationality levels of the actors; and the coordination of communicative action may be described as the elimination of this difference. So the author introduces the coordination of communicative action basically as a process of 'reflectivization'. In the course of the elaboration of the notion of 'reflectivization' he takes into account both Habermas's early and late works. Finally using the results of the discourse ethics and the democratic theoretical writings, he concludes that the coordination of communicative action may be described as a relearning of action-coordination on a higher level of moral development.
EN
The aim of this paper is to confront two highly differentiated accounts of transformations of contemporary intimacy. The first account, represented mainly by Anthony Giddens and Brian McNair, concentrates on the processes of democratization and emancipation; simply speaking, this approach suggests that modern intimacy contains higher amount of freedom than the pre-modern one. The second account underlines significance of processes of commercialization and rationalization of intimacy; according to this approach intimacy becomes more and more dependent to the capitalistic market. This point of view is represented by social scientists such as Ulrich Beck, Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, Eva Illouz and Arlie Russell Hochschild. The aim of the article is to analyze the abovementioned accounts not as opposite, but as complementary perspectives, which enable one to perceive the highly ambivalent character of modernization of intimacy and modernization in general.  
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