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1

AGAINST NORMATIVE JUDGEMENT INTERNALISM

100%
Del Corral M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue 4
567 – 587
EN
Normative judgement internalism claims that enkrasia is an ideal of rational agency that poses a necessary link between making a normative judgement, and forming an intention to act according to that judgement. Against this view, I argue that enkrasia does not require the formation of new intentional states; instead, it requires that the agent's intentions do not contravene her normative judgements. The main argument for considering that an intention ought to follow from a normative judgement is the claim that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention. I will argue that this account is mistaken: practical reasoning aims at justifying certain actions or intentions, and thus its conclusion is a normative judgement. Defenders of NJI might argue, though, that intentions ought to follow from our normative judgements, because of certain requirements affecting not only practical reasoning, but rational agency. I argue that this conception of enkrasia is too demanding. Enkrasia, I suggest, is better understood as a restriction over our intentions: they ought not to enter into conflict with our judgements.
2

WHAT IS (MODERN) LOGIC TAKEN TO BE ABOUT AND WHAT IT IS ABOUT

100%
Peregrin J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2016
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vol. 23
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issue 2
142 – 161
EN
Since Antiquity, logic has always enjoyed a status of something crucially important, because it shows us how to reason, if we are to reason correctly. Yet the twentieth century fostered an unprecedented boost in logical studies and delivered a wealth of results, most of which are not only understandable by non-specialists, but their very connection with the original agenda of logic is far from clear. In this paper, the author surveys how the achievements of modern logic are construed by non-specialists and subject their construal to critical scrutiny. He argues that logic cannot be taken as a theory of the limits of our world and that its prima facie most plausible construal as a theory of reasoning is too unclear to be taken at face value. He argues that the viable construal of logic takes it to be explicative of the constitutive (rather than strategic) rules of reasoning, not of the rules that tell us how to reason, but rather of rules that make up the tools with which (or in terms of which) we reason.
3

Poznawczy paradygmat rozumienia tekstu jako potencjalna metoda do badań nad stereotypowym wnioskowaniem

100%
Piber-Dąbrowska K.
Psychologia Społeczna
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2008
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vol. 3
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issue 1(6)
41-53
EN
This article looks at spontaneously-performed stereotypical reasoning based on a set of information that is linked thematically but informally (i.e. not under logical principles). First the typical experimental approach of social psychology is presented, meaning the approach in which a stereotype is one of the premises allowing a valid, albeit not necessarily true, conclusion to be drawn. The main body of the article presents the cognitive paradigm of text comprehension, which enables the skill of informal reasoning to be tested – or more specifically, the building of a situational model via the integration of information obtained with previously possessed knowledge (in the form of a stereotype, for example, or another heuristic). This method seems to be appropriate for testing the kind of stereotypical reasoning in which the stereotype is not a necessary premise for drawing conclusions, but rather an additional factor that may disrupt the ability to reason based on the premises given (especially in individuals who possess a stereotype). The appropriateness of using the text comprehension method for studying this sort of stereotypical reasoning is then discussed, based on the example of the author’s research.
4

INFERENCE OR BEHAVIOUR - ON THE INFERENCES FROM CONDITIONAL SENTENCES

100%
Mackiewicz R.
Psychological Studies
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2007
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vol. 45
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issue 4
41-50
EN
The purpose of the study was to present the discussion between two accounts of conditional reasoning: the mental model theory and the suppositional account. The paper present a critical analysis of both accounts with the review of the arguments provided by the proponents of both theories. According to the mental model account conditional inference is made through building mental models compatible with the information given in the premises. The models can be modified by means of semantic and pragmatic modulation. The proponents of the suppositional theory state that basic understanding of a conditional is psychologically equivalent to the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The conflict between both accounts may be a result of different methodologies but the main argument concerns the assumption of the truth-functionality. In the view of the model theory the beliefs are certain if there are no counterexamples that contradict those beliefs.
5

BOOTSTRAPPING OBJECTION

100%
Piller C.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue 4
612 – 631
EN
If our mental attitudes were reasons, we could bootstrap anything into rationality simply by acquiring these mental attitudes. This, it has been argued, shows that mental attitudes cannot be reasons. In this paper, I focus on John Broome’s development of the bootstrapping objection. I distinguish various versions of this objection and I argue that the bootstrapping objection to mind-based accounts of reasons fails in all its versions.
6

How order of information affects reasoning

100%
Mackiewicz R., Johnson-Laird P. N.
Polish Psychological Bulletin
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2004
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vol. 35
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issue 4
197-208
EN
The theory of mental models predicts that the difficulty of deductive reasoning should depend in part on the order of processing the premises. Those orders that call for an initial construction of multiple models should be harder than those that call for an initial construction of only one model that can be merely updated from subsequent premises. Experiment 1 demonstrated effects of order in the evaluation of given conclusions, and it eliminated potential confounds, including the coherence of the sequence of clauses in the premises. Experiment 2 corroborated the prediction in a more complex task in which the participants drew conclusions for themselves. Order affected both the times they took to read the premises and the accuracy of their conclusions. The paper discusses the results in the light of current theories of reasoning.
7

PRACTICAL AUTHORITY OF NORMATIVE BELIEFS: TOWARD AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY

88%
Audi R.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue 4
527 – 545
EN
People who do not act on their judgments regarding what they ought to do—their practical judgments—are often considered weak-willed, especially when the judgment is made at a time when the act it favours is plainly possible. Is this a kind of practical irrationality, perhaps due to incoherence between practical reason, which should guide intention and action, and behaviour that fails to conform to a guiding directive? More generally, do normative beliefs with the same kind of self-directive content as practical judgments possess the same sort of rational authority, if indeed they must have any such authority? At least since Aristotle, weak-willed action has often been considered irrational. This paper indicates why that view is plausible, but also why it is too strong. The paper shows how the practical authority of normative judgments can be overridden and why, on the theory of rational action suggested by analysis of such cases, certain initially plausible action-guiding principles are too strong. The concluding part of the paper briefly indicates how that theory can do justice to the analogy between practical and theoretical reason and to the essential connection between the two.
8

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING AND HUMAN RATIONALITY: FROM STANDARD LOGIC TO AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH

88%
Mora M. J. A., Martin J. M. L.
Studia Psychologica
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2009
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vol. 51
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issue 4
279-291
EN
The psychological study of human reasoning is responsible for the conceptual evolution of this notion. Initially linked to the solution of standard logic tasks, later developments associated it with performance in the social environment, where individuals face problems with personal relevance. Along with the empirical results and theories proposed about reasoning, certain considerations have arisen around the topic of human rationality. As a part of the previous philosophical tradition, the concept of rationality has specific implications for the conception of both human being and nature. The revision of some psychological approaches that appeared during the 20th century enables us to clarify the reformulation of the concept of reasoning and gives us some clues about its relationship with the notion of rationality
9

FROM DEDUCTION TO KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION

88%
Vince M., Šefránek J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue suppl. 2
216 – 234
EN
In this paper, we discuss why deduction is not sufficient for knowledge representation of programs with common sense. Requirements of representation of incomplete, evolutive and conflicting knowledge led to a rise of alternative logic formalisms, dubbed non-monotonic logics. Important features of non-monotonic logic were discussed on the example of default logic – a role of assumptions in reasoning, use of fix point constructions as a formal tool for building a non-monotonic semantics and, finally, computational aspects of non-monotonic reasoning. This overview is completed by a presentation of our approach to updates. Updates are closely connected to non-monotonic reasoning. We construct our approach for assumption based frameworks (and for default theories, as a consequence).
10

UNDERSTANDING ENKRATIC REASONING

88%
Gjelsvik O.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue 4
464 – 483
EN
Beginning from John Broome’s approach to Enkrasia, the paper quickly moves to giving a condensed presentation of an approach to practical reasoning motivated by a Fregean approach to inference (in theoretical reasoning). The suggested account of practical reasoning avoids using rationality requirements to do explanatory work when accounting for correct reasoning, and thus avoids lots of problems. It is strictly conservative in its approach, and no new inference rules are required for moving from the theoretical to the practical case. It is suggested that we can stick to deductive reasoning when accounting for practical proper; the crucial premise from theoretical reasoning about practical matters cannot normally be established this way. The paper moves on to tackle counterarguments to the effect that there will simply be too little correct practical reasoning on the present (deductive) approach. The simple account of correct reasoning has too high a cost, it is argued. The paper meets this objection when it argues that much reasoning is enthymematic or incomplete reasoning. By making specific claims about how there may be practical premises to which we do not attend even when there are, in some sense, before the mind, the approach is defended.
11

VYUŽITIE SOFTBOTOV NA KULTIVÁCIU EKONOMICKÝCH VEDOMOSTÍ

63%
Andrášik L.
Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)
|
2014
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vol. 62
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issue 8
861 – 881
EN
The complex phenomena in a global knowledge-based society and economy are causing difficulties in understanding by conventional modes. The economists should consequently analyse new phenomena. They need to build new theories and disseminating them to wide community. New results in cognitive sciences and progressing ICT, advances in applied informatics and computational intelligence there are arising new opportunities for a dialogue with mental models and theories in the economic sciences. In economics the creation of virtual laboratories and of simulation experimentation with them is useful, for the author uses name “Economic Softbot”. He refers to the dialogue with such softbots as storytelling. The topic of the essay belongs to the class of emergent research/education/learning technologies. Their innovative power is in the dominance of constructive upon instructive approaches and based on holistic qualitative perception of the various complexities.
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