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1

IMPLICITNÍ PRAVIDLA

100%
Peregrin J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2014
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vol. 21
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issue 3
381 – 398
EN
Michal Ivan scrutinized the author ś notion of implicit rule, concluding that it is flawed in his criticism of the author´s book Člověk a pravidla [Man and rules]. In this contribution, the author defends his approach, explaining the notion in greater detail. He states that his talk about the existence of an implicit rule refers to the social setting in which some kinds of social (especially linguistic) actions are governed by normative attitudes of the members of the society. These normative attitudes institute the propriety which makes instances of actions of the kinds either correct or incorrect; hence people can follow or violate the rule, the rule can come into being, develop, and fade away – without it being explicitly articulated.
2

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AND THE (LEGAL) RULE-FOLLOWING (Ludwig Wittgenstein a riadenie sa (pravnymi) pravidlami)

100%
Berdisova L.
Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)
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2008
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vol. 91
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issue 2
132-143
EN
This paper raises the issue of the notion of rule-following in the late philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and its possible implications in the field of law. First part is focused on Wittgenstein's 'theory' of what does it mean to obey the rule, it sketches the manner he approaches this issue in Philosophical Investigations and it summes up the outcome - i.e. rule-following does not lie in the interpretation, but it is basicly the matter of the practice (customs, institutions). Second part deals with objections to application of Wittgenstein on the theory of law and it aspires to use Wittgenstein's rule-following as the new eyes (new point of view) on the problems of adherence to legal rules. It also offers a few practical examples of legal rule-following and it hopefully provokes the questions about nature and reasons of the process of obeying legal rules. Last section of the second part is dedicated to the discussion of the authorities in given field - mainly Prof. Morawetz and Prof. Patterson. However, the paper ends with conviction that even if Wittgenstein's 'theory' is not en bloc applicable on the legal theory, still, it is not fully unusable and it has some explanatory value.
3

Říká logicismus něco, co se říkat nemá?

88%
Kolman V.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
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2010
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vol. 32
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issue 1
37-57
EN
The objective of this paper is to analyze the broader significance of Frege's logicist project against the background of Wittgenstein's philosophy from both Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. The article draws on two basic observations, namely (1) that Frege's project aims at saying something that was only implicit in everyday arithmetical practice, as the so-called recursion theorem demonstrates, and (2) that the explicitness involved in logicism does not concern the arithmetical operations themselves, but rather the way they are defined. It thus represents the attempt to make explicit not the (arithmetical) rules alone, but rather the rules governing their following, i.e. rules of second-order type. I elaborate on these remarks with short references to Brandom's refinement of Frege's expressivist and Wittgenstein's pragmatist project.
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