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1

Bertrand Russell Meets Wincenty Lutoslawski

100%
Mroz T.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2008
|
vol. 17
|
issue 1(65)
83-100
EN
Personal relations and correspondence between Russell and Lutoslawski are presented. The two philosophers were exchanging letters for nearly thirty years. Lutoslawski published some articles in English and Russell read them. Lutoslawski also knew several of Russell's publications, and he thought favorably of them. Despite deep philosophical differences between the two, each respected and studied the views of the other. In his letters Russell tended to emphasize the differences between their general opinions and philosophical approaches. Lutoslawski, on the other hand, highlighted similarities. As a result, although they had a lot in common, eg. dedication to social activity and education, a serious discussion between them was impossible due to messianic views of Lutoslawski and his metaphysics of eleuterism. Russell could not share such opinions. But he was glad to learn that Lutoslawski was impressed by his History of Western Philosophy, a book which met with much criticism.
2

THOUGHTS IN EXCHANGE: A NOTE ON FREGE’S TRACTATUS LETTERS

86%
Dožudić D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
|
vol. 76
|
issue 7
531 – 541
EN
In 1919, when his Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus), was finished but still unpublished, Wittgenstein sent the manuscript to Frege, and, as a consequence of that, they exchanged several fairly polemic letters in 1919 – 1920. Only Frege’s letters were preserved. The letters are highly compressed in content, and offer an interesting insight in how, mostly critically, one of the authors of whom Wittgenstein held highest esteem, thought about the content, style, and organisation of the manuscript. At the same time, we can get some impression from Frege’s letters how Wittgenstein reacted to his initial letter addressing the Tractatus, and how the subsequent exchange went. In this paper, I offer several observations concerning their exchange, and I compare it to the parallel exchange on the same matter between Wittgenstein and Russell.
3

DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS AGAIN: SINGULAR REFERENCE, QUANTIFICATION AND TRUTH-EVALUATION

86%
Kotatko P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2009
|
vol. 16
|
issue 4
552-568
EN
The author defends a combination of Strawson's explanation of definite descriptions as devices of singular reference par excellence with the Russellian truth-evaluation of utterances of sentences with descriptions. The complex Russellian proposition is, according to the author's view, introduced by such utterances into communication as a by-product of the instrumental side of an attempt to make a singular statement. This, precisely like the instrumental aspects of similar attempts exploiting names or demonstratives has to be reflected by analysis but should not be confused with the communicative function of utterances. The success of all these attempts depends on the fulfilment of empirical conditions of various types, given by semantics of descriptions, names or demonstratives (unless the relevance of these conditions is neutralized by another identification factor dominating in given context). But their communicative function does not consist in claiming that these conditions are fulfilled. The author agrees with Strawson that the first two conjuncts of the complex Russellian proposition are introduced into communication as presuppositions: but argues in favour of defining presupposition (in pragmatic sense) in normative, rather than intentional terms.
4

STRAWSONIAN VS. RUSSELLIAN DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS

86%
Duzi M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2009
|
vol. 16
|
issue 4
587-614
EN
In 1905 Bertrand Russell took on the problem of definite descriptions, and his analysis became the standard until 1950 when Peter Strawson criticised Russell's solution as inadequate. Since then many opponents as well as proponents of the Russellian solution have been involved in a long-term debate on definite descriptions. In this paper the authoress shows that both sides of the contention are partly right and partly wrong, because sentences of the form 'The F is a G' are ambiguous. However, the ambiguity does not concern reference shift of the description 'the F'. Rather, the ambiguity consists in different topic-focus articulations of a given sentence involving occurrences of 'the F'. The authoress demonstrates that when 'the F' is used as a part of the topic of such a sentence the existence of the object denoted by 'the F' is not only entailed by but also presupposed by the sentence. On the other hand 'the F' used in the focus of a sentence triggers merely existential entailment. Thus sentences differing only in their topic-focus articulation should have assigned different logical forms. In order to make such hidden features explicit, she applies the procedural semantics of Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL), furnishing sentences with hyper-propositions that are precisely defined in terms of TIL constructions. These are procedures assigned to sentences as their context-invariant structured meanings. Moreover, the authoress generalises the phenomenon of the topic-focus distinction to sentences of any form, proposing an adequate analytic schema of sentences that come with a presupposition.
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