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Kant, Rawls a kritika kosmopolitismu

100%
Rasmussen D.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2010
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vol. 58
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issue 2
229-244
EN
The author defends a cosmopolitan standpoint and attempts to justify the existence of the principles of global justice in the contemporary globalised world. His discussion involves three steps. Firstly, he discusses the influential conception of T. Nagel which holds that in the contemporary world there are only humanitarian moral duties, not principles of global justice, for such principles would require the existence of political institutions to enforce justice. Next, attention is given to I. Kant and an attempt is made to show that from the moral viewpoint the principles of global justice may exist even without the de facto existence of institutions of global government. Finally, the author analyses in some detail J. Rawls’ The Law of Peoples, which he interprets from a cosmopolitan viewpoint. On the basis of this interpretation Rawls’ conception of the principles of global justice is analysed and at the same time his critique of cosmopolitanism is called into question
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The Law of Peoples and Global Justice: Beyond the Liberal Nationalism of John Rawls

100%
Hrubec M.
Human Affairs
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2010
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vol. 20
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issue 2
135-150
EN
The paper deals with the relation of a theory of international justice, specifically John Rawls's philosophy of the law of peoples, and a theory of global justice. In the first part, the paper outlines Rawls's main theses on the international conception of the law of peoples. The second part concerns a problem found in segments of Rawls's theory, specifically his concept of a social contract-contractualism. This problem inadequately approaches the relationship between the individual and the community. The third part deals with the inconsistent points in Rawls's theory contained in part two, i.e. his principles of justice selected with the aid of social contract. In the fourth part, the paper concentrates on the consequences of these limitations for a socially distributive dimension of justice or as an approach for dealing with disproportionate global inequalities. The last part formulates the causes of the limitations of Rawls's theory of international justice and points out the need for a global justice which is socially and inter-culturally considerate.
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Rawls’s Justification Model for Ethics: What Exactly Justifies the Model?

88%
Alican N. F.
Dialogue and Universalism
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2020
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issue 1
171-190
EN
This is a defense of Rawls against recent criticism, ironically my own, though it is also a critique insofar as it addresses a problem that Rawls never does. As a defense, it is not a retraction of the original charges. As a critique, it is not more of the same opposition. In either capacity, it is not an afterthought. The charges were conceived from the outset with a specific solution in mind, which would have been too distracting to pursue in the same article. This is that solution. It also highlights the problem. The original charges were that Rawls’s decision procedure for ethics does not justify his own moral principles, namely his principles of justice, and that the underlying problem may well keep the decision procedure from justifying any moral principles whatsoever, or at least any normatively useful ones. The underlying problem was, and still is, the model’s inherent universalism, which is built into the decision procedure through design specifications precluding relativism, yet only at the cost of limiting the relevant moral principles to generalities that are already widely accepted, thereby rendering the procedure at best redundant and very likely vacuous as an ethical justification model. These difficulties are manifested in the work of Rawls as the dogmatism of championing a distinctive conception of justice, a liberal one as he himself calls it, through a justification model that is too universalistic to permit such a bias and possibly also too universalistic to permit any substantive conclusions at all. The solution contemplated here is to position the decision procedure as a dynamic justification model responsive to moral progress, as opposed to a static one indifferent to such progress and equally open to all moral input, thus removing the inconsistency between the universalistic design and any distinctive or controversial principles, including the ones Rawls himself recommends, so long as they are consistent with moral progress.
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Rawlsian Contractualism and Healthcare Allocation: A response to Torbjörn Tännsjö

88%
Gibson Q. H.
Diametros
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2021
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vol. 18
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issue 68
9-23
EN
The consideration of the problem of healthcare allocation as a special case of distributive justice is especially alluring when we only consider consequentialist theories. I articulate here an alternative Rawlsian non-consequentialist theory which prioritizes the fairness of healthcare allocation procedures rather than directly setting distributive parameters. The theory in question stems from Rawlsian commitments that, it is argued, have a better Rawlsian pedigree than those considered as such by Tännsjö. The alternative framework is worthy of consideration on its own merits, but it also casts light on two related difficulties with Tännsjö’s approach: (i) the limits of his supposedly ecumenical methodology, which is revealed to be dialectically suspect and (ii) issues with the type of abstraction and idealization from actual judgements and preferences which the approach requires.
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Habermas and Rawls on an Epistemic Status of the Principles of Justice

88%
Kędziora K.
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica – Aesthetica – Practica
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2019
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issue 34
31-46
EN
The so-called debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls concentrated mainly on the latter’s political liberalism. It dealt with the many aspects of Rawls’s philosophical project. In this article, I focus only on one of them, namely the epistemic or cognitivistic nature of principles of justice. The first part provides an overview of the debate, while the second part aims to show that Habermas has not misinterpreted Rawls’s position. I argue that Habermas rightly considers Rawls’s conception of justice as a moral one. In the last part, I discuss two key questions raised by Habermas. The first concerns the relation between justification and acceptance of the principles of justice. The second concerns the relation between two validity terms: truth and reasonableness.
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Solidarity: Its Levels of Operation, Relationship to Justice, and Social Causes

75%
Załuski W.
Diametros
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2015
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issue Diametros 43
96-102
EN
The paper provides an analysis of the relationship between the concepts of justice and solidarity. The point of departure of the analysis is Ruud ter Meulen’s claim that these concepts are different but mutually complementary, i.e. are two sides of the same coin. In the paper two alternative accounts of the relationship are proposed. According to the first one, solidarity can be defined in terms of justice, i.e. is a special variety of liberal justice, viz. social liberal justice, which, apart from the value of liberty, also stresses the importance of the value of equality. An example of such a theory is Rawls’s theory of justice, within which the value of equality is ‘encoded’ in the principle of fair equality of opportunity and in the difference principle. According to the second account, solidarity is an expression of a special type of social relationships – the so-called ‘thick relationships’, which (as opposed to ‘thin relationships’) are non-superficial, positive, their paradigmatic examples being family and friendship; in other words, the rules of solidarity are rules that are built into ‘thick relationships’. On the first account, justice and solidarity are not different, while on the second account they are different but mutually exclusive rather than mutually complementary. In the last part of the paper some remarks on the social causes of solidarity are made.
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European Philosophy and Its Negative Impact on the Treatment of Animals

75%
Probucka D.
Zoophilologica. Polish Journal of Animal Studies
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2017
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issue 3
155-162
PL
W artykule analizuję poglądy Arystotelesa, Kartezjusza oraz Johna Rawlsa dotyczące moralnego statusu istot pozaludzkich i ukazuję ich negatywny wpływ na kształtowanie relacji człowiek – zwierzę w kulturze europejskiej. Celem mojego rozumowania jest wykazanie, że każde z tych stanowisk obciążone jest doborem subiektywnych kryteriów w jakościowym odróżnieniu moralnego statusu ludzi od innych zwierząt oraz wykorzystaniem takich przesłanek, które udowodnią uprzednio założony wniosek. Stanowisko tych trzech filozofów łączy wspólna konkluzja. Jest nią przekonanie o braku wystarczających podstaw do równego traktowania ludzi i istot pozaludzkich w sferze życia moralnego.
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X-Phi and Impartiality Thought Experiments: Investigating the Veil of Ignorance

63%
Paulo N., Pölzler T.
Diametros
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2020
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vol. 17
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issue 64
72-89
EN
This paper discusses “impartiality thought experiments”, i.e., thought experiments that attempt to generate intuitions which are unaffected by personal characteristics such as age, gender or race. We focus on the most prominent impartiality thought experiment, the Veil of Ignorance (VOI), and show that both in its original Rawlsian version and in a more generic version, empirical investigations can be normatively relevant in two ways: First, on the assumption that the VOI is effective and robust, if subjects dominantly favor a certain normative judgment behind the VOI this provides evidence in favor of that judgment; if, on the other hand, they do not dominantly favor a judgment this reduces our justification for it. Second, empirical investigations can also contribute to assessing the effectiveness and robustness of the VOI in the first place, thereby supporting or undermining its applications across the board.
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Dwa modele relacji wolności i bezpieczeństwa

62%
Włoch W.
Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego
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2015
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issue 2(24)
149-178
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu są dwa klasyczne modele relacji wolności i bezpieczeństwa zawarte w teoriach T. Hobbesa i J. Locke’a, a także ich konceptualne rozwinięcia w teoriach H. Kelse-na i J. Rawlsa. Model Hobbesa akcentuje prymat bezpieczeństwa, natomiast model Locke’a prymat praw jednostki. Krytyczna analiza tych modeli pokazuje, że nie można interpreto-wać konieczności istnienia władzy politycznej czy też konieczności gwarancji praw jednostki w sposób absolutystyczny. Ważność modelu Hobbesa ogranicza się do twierdzenia o koniecz-ności istnienia „ośrodka decyzyjnego” zapewniającego „zbiorowe bezpieczeństwo”. Nato-miast istota modelu Locke’a nie polega na konstrukcji „idealnej konstytucji”, lecz na wska-zaniu na demokratyczne formy gwarancji praw jednostki. Nie oznacza to, że należy uznać bezwzględny prymat legislatywy. Zarówno w teorii Kelsena, jak i Rawlsa funkcję tę może spełniać sądownictwo konstytucyjne. Model Hobbesa jest odpowiedni dla deskryptywne-go pojęcia konstytucji, natomiast model Locke’a dla preskryprtywnego pojęcia konstytucji.
EN
The subject matter of the article revolves around two classical models of relationship between freedom and security contained in the theories formulated by T. Hobbes and J. Locke, as well as their conceptual development in the theories by H. Kelsen and J. Raw-ls. The model presented by Hobbes accentuates the primacy of security, whereas the one proposed by Locke, the primacy of the rights of an individual. A critical analysis of those models illustrates that one may not interpret the necessity of existence of a political power, or the requirement to guarantee the rights of individuals in an absolutist way. The validity of Hobbes’s model is limited to the statement regarding the necessity to establish a „deci-sion-centre” ensuring „collective security”. Locke’s model, on the other hand, is not estab-lished upon the construction of an „ideal constitution” but rather it points to democratic forms of guarantying individual rights. This does not mean that one should acknowledge the absolute primacy of legislature. In both the theories proposed by Kelsen and Rawls this function may be fulfilled by constitutional judicature. While the model established by Hobbes is appropriate for the descriptive conceptualisation of constitution, the one of-fered by Locke serves the prescriptive formulation of this concept.
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"Bezstronny obserwator" Adama Smitha a neutralne kryteria oceny w etyce społecznej

54%
Kalita C.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2016
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vol. 36
93-112
EN
Ethical theory for Adam Smith is first of all the basic mechanism of social controls. Going out from decisions of the matter of the moral feelings, which the ‘sympathy’states the foundation; it tries to work out the neutral criteria of ethical opinions introducing the ‘impartial spectator’ figure. Superiority of this category in relation to John Rawls ‘veil of ignorance’ depends on this, that the Smith places his philosophical theory in the strong empirical context (the kind of sociological philosophy). Social ethicist is the base to build more folded regulators of community life, or social, such as economy and politics. The neutral criteria of ethical opinions are the foundation of different derivative social workings (economy, politics).
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