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Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2020
|
vol. 75
|
issue 8
644 – 659
EN
Typically, a distinction is made between argumentation and explanation based on their different illocutionary aims. While the aim of argumentation is to provide support for the acceptability of a particular thesis by means of other statements, the aim of explanation is to provide understanding of a phenomenon, regularity, etc. Although this distinction is well-founded, it obscures certain interesting interactions between explanation and argumentation. This paper identifies a particular type of explanations that presuppose argumentation in their favour. These explanations refer, at least in part, to pieces of knowledge that had not been a part of the pre-existing knowledge base of science. Their epistemic status is therefore problematic and they require separate justification. The success of this justification (a speech act of argumentation) is one of the felicity conditions of (the speech act of) explanation. The paper proposes a general scheme of argumentation in favour of an explanation. It combines subordinate and coordinative argumentation whose aim is to show that the explanation satisfies the (often implicit) criteria of adequacy. The scheme is briefly illustrated on an example of empirical research in International Relations.
EN
In the beginning of the 20th century many philosophers like E. Mach or P. Duhem were convicted that explaining facts is the aim of meta­physics rather than of science. Yet C. G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim, who represented the received view, has worked out the logical reconstruction of scientific explanation and their famous paper 'Studies in the Logic of Scientific Explanation' (1948) began a discussion about nature and various models of scientific explanation. The article is an introduction to scientific explanation, which is very widely discussed in philosophy of science. This concept has many connexions with such fundamental issues as controversy between scientific realism and antirealism, causality and nature of scientific law. The article reveals place of scientific explanation among other epistemic values such as truth, simplicity and coherence, give its short history since Aristotle and typology offered by E. Nagel, who distinguishes the deductive, probabilistic, teleological (functional) and genetic types of explanation.
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