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NEKAUZÁLNA EXPLANÁCIA: HEMPELOVE DEDIČSTVO A JEHO MODERNÉ PODOBY

100%
Makovník D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
|
vol. 76
|
issue 10
752 – 765
EN
This paper not only summarizes Hempel`s analysis of the D-N model that shows how it is possible for the covering-law model to provide both a causal account of particular facts and a non-casual one, but also offers four prominent examples of non-causal explanation. Subsequently a detailed analysis of the examples shows that there is a common denominator between these examples: the presence of a law that describes an empirical system in its atemporal state. But the paper also shows what differences are there in the applicability of the laws in the given explanations. Finally, it reviews the evolution of the conception of non-causal explanation with respect to the discussed examples.
2

TRACTATUS: POJETÍ PŘÍRODNÍCH ZÁKONŮ

88%
Dolák A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2008
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vol. 63
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issue 4
301-304
EN
The paper deals with Wittgenstein's conception of the status of scientific laws (in particular the laws of natural sciences), as presented in his 'Tractatus logico-philosophicus'. The author finds Kantian motifs in the conception, namely conceiving scientific laws as an a priori contribution of reason. According to Wittgenstein, however, there could be many of such a priori 'grids', some of them simple, the other more complete, but none of them can be declared to be the definitive and the only accurate one. This is how Wittgenstein argues against another Kant's contribution, in particular against conceiving scientific laws as something universal and apodictically valid.
3

KVALITATÍVNE PREDIKÁTY VERZUS VEDECKÉ ZÁKONY, EXPLANÁCIA A TESTOVANIE

75%
Hanzel I.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
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vol. 70
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issue 3
188 – 201
EN
The aim of the paper is to show that in the framework of philosophy of science it is possible to choose such an approach to the reconstruction of scientific laws and scientific explanation and also to the testing of scientific theories which enables us to avoid the well-known raven paradox as stated by C. G. Hempel. The paper starts with an analysis of Hempel’s approach to the so-called “purely qualitative predicates.” Then it shows how this approach, which has its origins in the perceptualist philosophy, led Hempel to a completely distorted view on the structure of scientific laws and scientific explanation, that in turn led him to a distorted view on the testing of scientific theories. As an alternative the paper proposes another view on the structure of scientific laws, scientific explanation and introduction of theoretical magnitudes using the method of definition by abstraction. Consequently, it also proposes an alternative view on the testing of scientific theories which eliminates the raven paradox.
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